Credit risks and default behavior of mortgagors by LIU BO
 
 




































A THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE 










The foremost appreciation goes to my supervisor, Associate Professor Sing Tien Foo.  
I am deeply indebted to his patience, inspiration, and efforts. His meticulous attitude 
to research plays an exemplary role in the whole process. 
 
Special thanks to A/Prof. Fu Yu Ming, who enriches me with the research philosophy 
and shares the grace from God, giving people courage to discover. Prof. Deng Yong 
Heng graciously inspires with interesting talks. I feel grateful to Prof. Ong Seow-Eng 
and A/Prof. Tu Yong for their encouragement to overcome my weakness. Great 
thankfulness is also to Dr. Seah Kiat Ying, Dr. Lee Nai Jia, Dr. Liao Wen-Chi and our 
Head A/Prof. Yu Shi Ming, for their discussions and research spirits. Numerous other 
faculty members at National University of Singapore are acknowledged, as Dr. 
Husza'R Zsuzsa Reka, Dr. Qian Wenlan. 
 
Prof. Danny Ben-Shahar and Prof. Campbell, J. Y. are grateful to generously share 
their technique and insightful ideas. My gratitude also goes to various visiting 
professors, named, but not limited to, Anthony B. Sanders, Brent Ambrose, Brent 
Smith, David Ling, Geoffrey K. Turnbull, James D. Shilling, Jay Sa-Aadu, John L 
Glascock, Kerry Vandell, Stuart Gabriel, Timothy J. Riddiough, Nancy Wallace for 
their inspiring suggestions. 
 
I also enjoy sharing ideas with the graduate students, in particular, Dr. Fan Gangzhi, 
ii 
 
Dr. Li Yun, Dr.Wu Jian Feng, Dr. Sun Jing Bo, Dr. Dong Zhi, Zhao Da Xuan, Shen 
Huai Sheng, Zhang Hui Ming, Wong Woei Chyuan, Omokolade Ayodeji Akinsomi, 
and all other peers that I have not named. 
 
Seminars by Department of Real Estate, Institution of Real Estate Studies (IRES) and 
Risk Management Institution (RMI) of National University of Singapore provide a 
great platform to keep path with the updating researches globally. I gratefully 
acknowledge the easily approachable administrative staffs in Department of Real 
Estate, NUS: Ms. Ko Chen, Ms. Zainab, Ms. Kamsinah, and in School of Design & 
Environment, Ms. Nor‟Aini and Mei Yin. 
 
National University of Singapore offers the generous financial support through the 
dissertation. She, a respectful university, also provides great facilities, soft-and-hard 
library source of researches, happy study atmosphere and the platform to access the 
professional excellence. 
 
I am particularly appreciative to my parents, Liu Jinhui and Deng Qingxiu, for their 
morally endless supports and love, and to my brother, Liu Xue, and sister in-law for 
their animating energy to overcome difficulties. 
 
Above all, thanks to my gracious and strong-minded husband, He Lei.  
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................... i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. iii 
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................... ix 
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Mortgage Markets .................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.2 Mortgage Default and Crisis .................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Research Objectives .......................................................................................................... 17 
1.3 Knowledge Gaps ............................................................................................................... 18 
1.3.1 Mortgage Choice, and Default ............................................................................... 18 
1.3.2 Negative Equity and Mortgage default .................................................................. 22 
1.3.3 Market Structure and Mortgage default ................................................................. 23 
1.4 Research Question ............................................................................................................. 27 
1.5 Significance of the Study .................................................................................................. 29 
1.6 Structure of the Study........................................................................................................ 30 
Chapter 2 Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 31 
2.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 31 
2.2 Mortgage Choice ............................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.1 Borrowers‟ Self-Selection ...................................................................................... 32 
2.2.2 Mortgage Choice and Default ................................................................................ 41 
2.2.3 Limitation Summary .............................................................................................. 42 
2.3 Non-Strategic Default ....................................................................................................... 44 
iv 
 
2.3.1 Strategic and Non-strategic Default in Option Theory ........................................... 44 
2.3.2 Credit Score as Determinant .................................................................................. 48 
2.3.3 Other Default Determinants ................................................................................... 49 
2.3.4 Limitation Summary .............................................................................................. 50 
2.4 Market Structure ............................................................................................................... 50 
2.4.1 Contestability and Efficiency ................................................................................. 50 
2.4.2 Supply-side Market Structure, Underwriting and Mortgage Risk .......................... 51 
2.4.3 Limitation Summary .............................................................................................. 58 
Chapter 3 Data Description ............................................................................................................. 61 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 61 
3.2 Data Collection ................................................................................................................. 61 
3.2.1 Data Sources and Collected Raw Variables............................................................ 61 
3.2.2 Data Coverage ........................................................................................................ 67 
3.3 Facts and Statistics ............................................................................................................ 69 
3.4 Data Limitation and Future Enrichment ............................................................................ 75 
Chapter 4 Self-selection and Default .............................................................................................. 78 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 78 
4.2. Mortgage Choice on the Menu ......................................................................................... 80 
4.2.1 Model Essence Summary ....................................................................................... 80 
4.2.2 Stochastic Variables Setting ................................................................................... 82 
4.2.3 Mortgage Menu and Mortgage Interest Rate ......................................................... 83 
4.2.4 Household‟s Lifetime Utility Maximization .......................................................... 84 
4.2.5 Numerical Analysis ................................................................................................ 87 
4.3 Empirical Models .............................................................................................................. 94 
4.3.1 Model Specifications .............................................................................................. 94 
4.3.2 Regression Variables .............................................................................................. 98 
v 
 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................ 104 
4.4 Analysis of Results .......................................................................................................... 109 
4.4.1 Conditional Default Rate ...................................................................................... 109 
4.4.2 Borrowers‟ Self-Selection of Mortgage Type ....................................................... 111 
4.4.3 Effects of Mortgage Self-Selection on Mortgage Default Risks .......................... 114 
4.4.4 Robustness Tests of Borrowers‟ Self-selection Mortgage Type ........................... 120 
4.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 137 
Chapter 5 Non-Strategic Default ................................................................................................... 140 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 140 
5.2 Financial Option on Mortgage Default ........................................................................... 141 
5.3 Rational Mortgage Default model ................................................................................... 144 
5.3.1 Mortgagor‟s Utility .............................................................................................. 144 
5.3.2 Liquidity Constraint ............................................................................................. 150 
5.3.3 Relationship with the Classic Option Model ........................................................ 152 
5.4 Simulation Analysis ........................................................................................................ 160 
5.4.1 Borrowers and Mortgage Specification ................................................................ 160 
5.4.2 Simulation Procedure and Results ........................................................................ 161 
5.5 Empirical Methodology .................................................................................................. 166 
5.5.1 Variables ............................................................................................................... 166 
5.5.2 Empirical Model ................................................................................................... 169 
5.6 Result Analysis ................................................................................................................ 173 
5.6.1 Statistics ............................................................................................................... 173 
5.6.2 Split Population Regression of Mortgage Default................................................ 180 
5.6.3 Ruthless Default ................................................................................................... 185 
5.6.4 Suboptimal Default .............................................................................................. 188 
5.7 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 192 
Chapter 6 Contestability of Residential Mortgage Market ........................................................... 194 
vi 
 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 194 
6.2 Theoretical Intuition and Hypotheses .............................................................................. 195 
6.2.1 Four-Quadrant Model for the Credit Market ........................................................ 195 
6.2.2 Hypotheses ........................................................................................................... 200 
6.3 Empirical Methodology .................................................................................................. 206 
6.3.1 Regression Variable .............................................................................................. 206 
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................ 211 
6.4 Empirical Methodology and Testing ............................................................................... 218 
6.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Banking Market Structure and Mortgage Supply .......................... 218 
6.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Banking Market Structure and Mortgage Default ......................... 226 
6.4.3 Robust Test: Effects of Legislation Risks............................................................. 233 
6.4.4 Robust Test: Credit Expansion Phases ................................................................. 239 
6.5 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 240 
Chapter 7 Contribution and Future Work ...................................................................................... 241 
7.1 Summary ......................................................................................................................... 241 
7.1.1 Main Findings ...................................................................................................... 241 
7.1.2 Policy Implication ................................................................................................ 246 
7.2 Contribution .................................................................................................................... 248 
7.3 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 252 
7.3.1 Limitation and Future Work ................................................................................. 252 
7.3.2 Extensions to Asian Markets ................................................................................ 256 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 258 






This study adds to the understanding of residential mortgage default in three aspects: (i) 
borrowers‟ self-selection, (ii) “non-strategic” mortgage default, and (iii) banking market 
structure effect. 
 
Firstly, borrowers‟ contract choice is modeled under life-time utility maximization in the 
rational consumption of housing and non-housing services. The simulation shows that 
heterogeneous borrowers have different preference for mortgage contracts (mortgage type 
and/or LTV), given the mortgage rate and borrowers‟ observable and unobservable 
characteristics (such as income and credit score) (ceteris paribus). Heckman‟s two-step 
empirical tests are conducted to study the unobservable risk factor effect (that reflected in 
borrowers‟ mortgage choice) on mortgage ex-post default risk. Comparative self-selection and 
self-selection into fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) are found to reduce mortgage default risks. In 
addition, borrowers, who self-select into adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), have higher 
ex-post default probability relative to other borrowers. The self-selection effects are 
reinforced by high credit scores (FICO) of borrowers. 
 
The second part is to explain non-ruthless and suboptimal default behavior of borrowers. A 
rational default model by borrowers‟ life-time utilities extending beyond the negative equity 
of mortgage is proposed and simulated. Split population model, which allows the separation 
of “probability of default” and “time-to-default” and the existence of “non-defaulters”, and 
have better fitting than normal hazard regression statistically, is used to empirically test the 
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proposed rational default model. Although high-risk borrowers (e.g., mortgagors with 
extremely high LTV, No FICO, and Low FICO) have high probability of becoming defaulters, 
they are more “non-ruthless” in exercising default options because of their limited credit 
accessibility. Mortgage characteristics are less important in borrowers‟ decision on suboptimal 
default supporting that unexpected “trigger event” is critical for suboptimal default behaviors. 
 
Thirdly, the question on “how do the banking market structures (contestability and 
concentration) affect non-agency residential mortgage supply and its performance?” is 
empirically studied. The results suggest that contestability in the banking market reduces 
credit supply and concentration in the banking market increases total credit supply during 
2000s, when the market faces with the downturn in demand and in the existence of non-bank 
substitution suppliers. Furthermore, competitive contestability factor increases total credit 
supply, and reduces ex-post default risks compared with other market structure effects (e.g., 
monopoly contestable, monopoly inefficiency, and cut-throat competitive market). 
 
The results imply that collecting individual information (e.g., income, consumption 
preference, payment habits, and submarket status) is important in evaluating default risks of 
borrowers. 
 
Keywords: Mortgage, Default, Hazard, Self-Selection, Market Structure, Option, 
Crisis   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Mortgage Markets 
The U.S. residential mortgage market is made up by players including government 
and private companies, who service individuals as mortgagors in primary mortgage 
market and secondary mortgage market. Its structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
If loans through agencies like Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Department of 
Veterans Affairs (VA), and Department of Agriculture Rural Housing Service (RHS) 
meet the requirements set by each agency, they are guaranteed by these agencies, and 
securitized by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA, Ginnie Mae). 
If loans offered by private firms meet requirements of Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA, Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(FHLMC, Freddie Mac), they are conforming loans, which are either hold in portfolio 
or securitized by these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). For the 
nonconforming loans, which could not meet the requirement of GSEs, they  are 
securitized by private-label securitizers or held within financial institutions‟ portfolio 
(Barth et al. 2009).  
 
The mortgage loans made by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were supposed to have 
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less heterogeneous borrowers, lower loan-to-value, and good credit history using 
automated underwriting standard, than nonconforming loans.  
 
 
Figure 1. 1: Home Mortgage Market in U.S. 
Source: Enriched based on Page 15, (Barth et al. 2009) 
Abbreviation: GSEs (Government-sponsored enterprises); Fannie Mae (Federal National 
Mortgage Association); Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation);  
FHA (Federal Housing Administration); VA (Department of Veterans Affairs); RHS (A 
loan made by or guaranteed by the United States Department of Agriculture Rural 
Housing Service (RHS). RHS mortgage loans may be part of a pool of mortgages 
securitized by the Government Nation Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae));  
 
 
Non-conforming loans by private-label/non-government sponsored companies are 
indicated as “non-agency” loans in this thesis. The empirical data in this thesis are 
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proportion of mortgages in the whole U.S. mortgage market over the years (Barth et 
al. 2009). Primary originators in these non-agency loans are commercial banks, credit 
units, and non-banks (or referred to as mortgage banker (Reed 2010)). Banks create 
their capital vault mainly through deposit, from which loans (e.g., residential 
mortgage) are made. Credit unions and Save & Loans (S&Ls) similarly make home 
loans from their own funds or from a credit account set up previously. Mortgage 
bankers (or so called non-bank companies) carry out a whole range of mortgage loan 
activities starting from underwriting, preparing loan documents, packaging loans for 
securitization in the secondary market, and sometimes servicing these loans. They are 
normally small, and their sources of fund heavily depend on securitizations by 
non-GSEs and also partially come from other investors such as investment banks. 
 
Compared to the GSEs, the private institutions (both banks and non-banks) are less 
stringent. Their businesses are mainly in the subprime sectors where borrowers 




 is widely accepted by the lenders 
as observable information for credit evaluation to capture the risks of mortgagors. 
Borrowers‟ credit history that includes delinquency (late payments), the amount of 
                                                             
1 Creditworthiness means the perception of how likely borrowers will keep paying the mortgage. Credit 
score is a kind of statistical analysis score of a borrower‟s perceived creditworthiness. 
2 FICO risk score is a kind of credit scoring method developed by Fair Isaac&Co. and universal in the 
residential mortgage field with a range of 300 to 850. There are three largest credit bureaus issuing 
borrowers credit report and FICO scores including Experian, Transunion and Equifax. Strictly speaking, 
the lenders actually differ on grades given same FICO borrowers scores. The method of calculating a 
credit score is to attempt to condense a borrowers‟ credit history into a single number. The Federal Trade 
Commission has ruled this to be acceptable. Of course, they are also other credit scores which would try 
to measure properly the credit history of the borrowers, such as NextGen, VantageScore, and CE score in 
United States. It is noted that credit score is required to capture the credit history factors, not other 
discriminate and predatory factors .For example, in American, the Federal Reserve Board‟s Regulation B 
(implementing the Equal Credit Opportunity Act), expressly prohibits a credit scoring system 




time that credit has been established, length of residence, and negative credit records 
(e.g., default, personal bankruptcies) are determinants of FICO scores.  When 
lenders use risk-based pricing to incorporate the credit history information into their 
mortgage pricing, borrowers with credit scores are assigned with different credit 
spreads. Automatic underwriting reduces the operating costs of originating and 
evaluating individual‟s mortgage default risks. 
 
Residential mortgage backed securitization (RMBS) structured in the private market 
are usually not required to follow uniform underwriting guidelines. Mortgage 
originators can design mortgage contracts with flexibility with respects to high risk 
borrowers. Those loans could either be kept within portfolio or securitized into the 
secondary market. In the secondary market, private mortgages are sliced into tranches 
with the lowest priority tranche bearing initial losses, and subsequent tranches 
absorbing any additional losses. 
 
Figure 1.2 shows private residential mortgage process in both primary and secondary 
markets. Mortgage lenders get information from credit reporting agencies, and use 
the credit rating information to assess borrowers‟ credit risks and price the risks in the 
underwriting process
3
. The mortgage originators then sell the loans to “securitization 
sponsors” in the secondary mortgage market, who put mortgages in a pool
4
. The 
                                                             
3 Lenders usually set the requirements for FICO scores, payment to income ratio, down payment 
requirement, and home value, etc. Some of subprime mortgage are lack of adequate underwriting, 
instead they say “yes” to teaser interest rates on ARM, permitting little down payment, high 
payment-to-income ratio, and inadequately reviewed house appraisals. 
4 In the first few years of the market, the originator would keep the first-loss piece as theories predicts 
when pooling to secondary market; Later on, subprime originators no longer keep the first-loss piece, 
instead a certain amount of the piece would be pooled and sold to secondary market in the form of 
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mortgage pool is assigned to a “special purpose vehicle (SPV)”
5
. Investors purchase 
the mortgage backed securities backed by payment streams of underlying mortgages. 
The securities are divided into different tranches (in this figure, there are three classes: 
subordinated as first-loss pieces, mezzanine, and senior with highest priority to 
payments). One or more credit rating companies/agencies are appointed to provide 
credit ratings for each of the securitized tranches. These credit rating agencies 
consider mortgage origination strategies, historical loan performance, underwriting 
standards, loan characteristics and other features in the credit assessment process. 
Credit enhancements are used by the securitizers to guarantee losses against mortgage 
default. 
 
When a borrower defaults, the originator in the primary market suffers losses in 
mortgage value. These losses are transferred to the “SPV” and then investors. 
Investors of the subordinated tranche will suffer the losses first as they have the last 
priority in the distribution in, but they face the first-loss in the structure. The 
proportion of subordinated tranche in the securitized mortgage parcel will determine 
credit rating of the mortgage backed securities. Home-owners‟ termination of 
mortgages causes premature disruption to unscheduled principal and interest 
payments. Unexpected termination, either prepayment or default, is not desirable for 
mortgage backed securities (MBS) investors, as it may disrupt the cash flows. 
Uncertainties on macroeconomic conditions, borrowers‟ income/future payment 
                                                                                                                                                               
collateralized debt obligation, credit default swap. See Dombrow, Lee and Shilling (2008). 




ability, and borrowers‟ other incentive to terminate loans are factors that cause 
difficulties in predicting default risks. 
Figure 1. 2: Subprime Home Mortgage Securitization Structure 
 
 
Source: (Peterson 2008) 
 
1.1.2 Mortgage Default and Crisis 
Mortgage default risk has received much attention after the unfolding of the 
“subprime” turmoil from the last quarter of 2007. , there is no exact definition to 
subprime mortgage. Some define mortgages originated through different originators 
in HUD list (Gerardi et al. 2009). The distinction between them is ambiguous. 
Generally, lenders were required to evaluate applicants‟ information such as income, 
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minimum employment period, proof of residence using different levels of 
documentations and information on property details (e.g., household insurance, 
security) in the mortgage underwriting process. The underwriting process determines 
the credit floor requirement, the level of prepayment penalties, payment to income 
(PTI) ratio, and alternative payment structure (e.g., tease rate with fixed payment 
period of hybrid ARM).  
 
Some define “subprime” as lending to borrowers, who do not qualify for conventional 
loans owing to various risk factors, such as applicants‟ income level, size of down 
payment, credit history, and employment status
6
(Barth et al. 2009). Subprime 
mortgage is also defined as loans with a contract rate that is at least 100 basis points 
higher than the average contract rate reported in the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage 
Market Survey (PMMS) at origination (Pennington-Cross 2003).  
 
The high default rate in residential subprime mortgage market causes cash flow losses 
to originators in the primary market and also investors in both the primary and the 
secondary market. The liquidity shocks to these financial institutions subsequently 
create significant shocks to economies in the U.S. and other countries globally. 
Regulators, economists, policy makers, politicians, government, agencies, researches, 
speculators, and bankers all look into the melt-down of the “subprime” mortgages, 
which were mostly issued to low-income, minority borrowers. They attempt to find 
                                                             
6 This definition is also based on the Wikipedia, modified on August, 2008. 
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explanations for the high mortgage defaults, besides sharp housing downturn. They 
share the view that default is not only a pure financial event triggered by stochastic 
macro-condition (e.g., housing price and interest rate), but also influenced by 
individual behavior. 
 
Figure 1.3 shows that default patterns for prime and subprime FRM and ARM 
mortgages across time from 1998 to 2004 (similar pattern is also observed in 
LoanPerformance data, (Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross 2006)).  
 
Figure 1. 3: The Delinquent Rate for Prime and Subprime FRM and ARM Mortgages  
 
Note: From MBA 2006 National Delinquency Survey (Mortgage Banker Association) 
(From 1998, Q1 to 2006 Q3). 
 
During the subprime periods, ARM is a typically hybrid structure (e.g., 2/28 with 
fixed period 2 years, and remaining adjustable 28 years), which dominates the 
non-agency private label securitization market (Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010). 
During credit expansion , ARMs become popular to lower-income borrowers‟ loans, 
as borrowers enjoy short-term low teaser interest rate, meanwhile bear a potential 
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high interest rate in the future. In a short term, if interest rate does not increase, 
borrowers are more affordable through ARMs, but they face higher risks of payment 
jumps. 
 
Private institutions (banks and non-banks) are partially blamed for causing “subprime 
crisis” in 2007. Based on non-agency loan data, 10,050 and 10,620 were originated in 
1994 and 1995. The loans increase sharply to 92,426 in 2000. In 2006, the total 
non-agency loans originated surge to 4,855,970 (in Figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 1. 4: Total Number of Loan Origination by Year 
 
Note: This figure is generated based on individual loan performance data with 
origination year information. They are originated by non-agency institutions from 1991 to 
2008. The vertical line is the total number of loans that originated at the specific years. 
 
Default by geographic distribution shows some correlation between concentration of 
mortgage suppliers and the default intensity. Non-agency mortgage default as shown 
in Figure 1.5 is relatively small and scattered based on the 1994 data. In 2006, when 
non-agency loans were at the peak, residential mortgage default rate is higher than the 
10 
 
previous areas, and spatial default clustering in default can be seen in some areas 
(Figure 1.6). 
 
In 2006, mortgage default concentrates in few states in the western part of the U.S. 
(state of California), the eastern part of U.S., and Florida. At the same time, 
geographic concentration of U.S. banks in 2006 shows similar distributions with that 
of mortgage default (see Figure 1.7).  
 
The spatial distributions of banks and mortgage default rates may embed useful 
information and possible causal relationships between the banking market structure 
and the mortgage default (see Figure 1.8 (a), and Figure 1.9). Mortgage originators 
that concentrated in selected submarkets, however, were not directly related to the 
clustering of borrowers‟ characteristics, such as the concentration ratio of low FICO 





Figure 1. 5: U.S. Residential Mortgage Default Rate (Originated at year 1994) at Counties 
Level based on Private Originators‟ Loan  
 
Note: This figure is based on individual mortgage performance data with origination date 
that originated by non-agency institutions (Truncated at July 2009). It is calculated by 
number of default/number of total loan at each county level. The location is geocoding 
based on zip code level, with 84% matching. 
 
Figure 1. 6: U.S. Residential Mortgage Default Rate (Originated at year 2006) at Counties 
Level based on Private Originators‟ Loan. 
 
Note: This figure is based individual mortgage performance data with origination date 
that originated by non-agency institutions (Truncated at July 2009). It is calculated by 
number of default/number of total loan at each county level. The location is geocoding 




Figure 1. 7: Spatial Distribution of Market Concentration of U.S. Banks in 2006 
 
Note: The market concentration is measured by Gini coefficient based on individual 
banks’ total loan amount serviced from their report data for the year 2006. The pattern of 
the market concentration groups is dispersed geographically, which is different with the 
spatially 12 Federal Reserve Districts (1996) by U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
( http://www.federalreserve.gov/otherfrb.htm) . Gini coefficient in the figures is separated 
into 10 groups by equal quantile interval of 10%. 
 
Therefore, it is also interested to study: How does banking market concentration and 
competition force affect individual residential mortgage performance? Under what 












Note: The horizontal of the figures is the Gini Subsample group, where group 10 is the 
largest Gini value group, indicating strong inequality as strong market concentration. 
This Figure a) shows the descriptive relationship between market concentration measure 
Gini coefficient and the gini group submarket’s default ratio of individual mortgage. The 
default ratio is gained by the number of default originated in the submarket of specific 
gini group divided by total number of loans originated in that group. b) shows the 
descriptive relationship between market concentration measure Gini coefficient and the 
gini group submarket’s CLFICO at zip level for individual mortgage property. The data is 
based on the period from year 1999 to 2008 period. Gini coefficients, as measure of 
market concentration in the supply side, are sorted into 10 groups according to criteria of 



























Note: Gini coefficient here is the bank market concentration measurement. Default ratio 
here is total number of defaulters divided by total number of originated loans in each 
state. Picture (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) are based on data in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 




1.2 Research Objectives 
Default on residential mortgages occurs when borrowers stop making payments for 
mortgages resulting in foreclosure of their property. This thesis focuses on default 
risks for residential mortgages. 
 
This research aims to analyze the determinants of residential mortgage defaults from 
three main aspects: borrower self-selection, borrowers‟ incentives for non-strategic 
default, and banking market structure. More specifically: 
 
A) Borrowers’ Self-Selection 
To model heterogeneous borrowers‟ mortgage choice, when they rationally maximize 
their lifetime utility, and when their default decisions are conditional on the optimal 
choice of mortgage type. The goal is to understand mortgagors‟ contract choice 
(reflecting unobservable risk factors) based on a theoretical life-time utility 
maximizing rational model, and its effect on borrowers‟ ex-post default risk. 
 
Understanding the relationships between borrower‟s self-selection and mortgage 
default decision helps to build linkage between the borrowers‟ observable 
characteristics (e.g., LTV, mortgage size) and their unobservable risk (e.g., real 
income, creditworthiness, borrowers‟ initial wealth, preference to house consumption 




B) Non-Strategic Default 
The objective is to build a rational model to explain financial and nonfinancial 
incentives to mortgage default. Theoretical model on mortgage default behaviors is 
proposed to explain the question of “Why do borrowers behave non-ruthlessly or 
sub-optimally on mortgage default?”  It aims to extend the financial option model of 
optimal default decision in a 3-stochastic process framework, considering borrowers‟ 
liquidity constraints. 
 
Empirically, it aims to test different characteristics in explaining of non-strategic 
behavior (e.g., “sub-optimal” and “non-ruthless” behavior of mortgagors) predicted 
by the proposed rational model. 
 
C) Banking market structure 
The third objective is to empirically examine the relationship between mortgage 
default rates and concentration and competition of banks in different sub-markets. 
Although some loans are originated by non-banks, banking market structure is 
focused in this study; meanwhile, the existent non-bank market is discussed by 
exogenous assumption on its existence as a substitution market. 
 
It uses the concept of the industrial production efficiency framework to explain the 
mortgage credit supply and default risk of servicing product. 
1.3 Knowledge Gaps 
1.3.1 Mortgage Choice, and Default 
Mortgage choice studies focus on borrowers‟ self-selection in asymmetric 
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information framework. In these studies, borrowers with different exogenous default 
risk (measured by exogenous movability, or probability of income changing in 
two-period models) are suggested to self-select into different mortgages. Firstly, 
borrowers with exogenous default risk profile self-select into different mortgages 
with LTV and coupon-points combination. For example, low risk borrowers  
(measured by exogenous high default costs) self-select into high loan-to-value ratio; 
while high risk borrowers self-select into high loan-to-value, if the default costs are 
low, as they assume that lower risk borrowers are with lower default costs (Brueckner 
1994; Brueckner 2000; Chang and Yavas 2009; Chari and Jagannathan 1989; 
Harrison, Noordewier and Yavas 2004; LeRoy 1996; Stanton and Wallace 1998). 
Secondly, borrowers with different exogenous risk factors (e.g., socially moving 
incentive and impatience) prefer different mortgage type (Brueckner 1992; Brueckner 
1993; Coulibaly and Li 2009; Dhillon, Shilling and Sirmans 1987; Follain 1990; 
Hendershott, LaFayette and Haurin 1997; Mori et al. 2010; Posey and Yavas 2001; 
Sa-Aadu and Sirmans 1995).  For instance, borrowers with low credit scores and 
high loan-to-value loans are also more likely to end up with subprime hybrid 
adjustable rate mortgage; Correspondingly, borrowers with high credit score with low 
loan-to-value choose subprime fixed rates mortgages(Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 
2009) . 
 
Studies on mortgage choice under borrowers‟ self-selection in asymmetric 
information framework are all based on some the implicit assumptions of exogenous 
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default risk and lender‟s zero/maximized profit, which might not be true in real 
economic.  
 
On the other hand, borrowers walk away from the unamortized house in the event of 
residential mortgage default. In standard financial option framework, mortgage 
holders have a put option their default option to default and a call option to 
prepayment. The financial factors (e.g., “in the money”, “out of the money” of option 
value, and the liquidity constrained borrowers) and nonfinancial factors, such as 
change of job; marriage status; children schooling are modeled through structure, 
semi-structure, and reduced form intensity models (e.g., Poisson process) (Kau and 
Keenan 1994; Kau and Keenan 1995; Kau et al. 1985; Kau et al. 1992; Kau et al. 
1993; Kau et al. 1990; Riddiough 1991; Sharp, Newton and Duck 2008; Vandell 
1995). 
 
Empirical studies testing the option theories use mostly the probability of negative 
equity to estimate default in the proportional hazard model with competing or 
non-competing risk (Deng 1997; Deng and Quigley 2008; Deng, Quigley and Van 
Order 2000), and in other statistical methods, such as multinomial Logit, and Probit 
model (Calhoun and Deng 2002; Harrison, Noordewier and Yavas 2004; Haughwout, 
Peach and Tracy 2008; Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010). 
 
Macroeconomic factors such as house price, interest rate and borrowers‟ 
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observable/unobservable risk factors, which include loan-to-value (LTV), debt 
service-to- Income (DTI), credit score, and income, initial wealth, and preference to 
house consumption, are considered in those empirical studies. Those factors 
(observable/unobservable) happen to be related to borrowers‟ consumption bundle 
choices when taking mortgage. Researchers find that borrowers‟ optimal allocation 
between non-housing and housing in the consumption is correlated variables such as 
income, wealth and preference to different consumptions (Campbell 2006; Campbell 
and Cocco 2003; Van Hemert, de Jong and Driessen 2005).  
 
However, there are very few studies on effect of borrowers‟ mortgage choice on the 
risk of ex-post default, although different effect for risk factors like mortgage size and 
original LTV for ARM and FRM on default have been found (Calhoun and Deng 
2002; Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010). 
 
Mapping borrowers‟ characteristics to the mortgage choice decisions reveals more 
useful residual unobservable risk information. Structural models, predicting default 
hazard, are based on observable attributes like LTV value, credit scores and mortgage 
type, and are likely to mis-calculate risk profile of the borrowers, as unobservable risk 
information of borrowers are neglected. 
 
Overall, there is a gap in understanding the relationship between borrowers‟ mortgage 
choice and their ex-post default behaviors, conditional on observable mortgage choice 
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and heterogeneous borrowers‟ characteristics. 
1.3.2 Negative Equity and Mortgage default 
Mortgage default has been analyzed traditionally using the option theory (Kau and 
Keenan 1995), where individual borrowers make their default decision based on 
housing equity to minimize mortgage costs. Behaviors, when mortgagors choose to 
default with negative house equity, and hold their mortgage options when housing 
equity is positive house equity, is referred to as “strategic default”. Researchers, 
supporting the “strategic default”, attribute mortgage defaults to disastrously 
depressing house price after summer of 2007 (Haughwout, Peach and Tracy 2008), 
that increases negative equity of many houses. However, the house price appreciation 
before 2007 led to the under-estimation of potential risk. The deterioration of the 
subprime loan can be traced back to 2001(Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2009). It 
implies that recession aggravated the default risk 
 
Some individual borrower‟s default behaviors are not predictable by the housing 
equity position, and the default is known as “nonstrategic default”. Some borrowers 
are “non-ruthless” mortgagors, who do not default with out-of-money put option on 
negative house equity. While others, known as “sub-optimal” defaulters, default with 
in-the-money put option (Deng, Pavlov and Yang 2005; Deng and Quigley 2008; Kau 
and Keenan 1995; Kau et al. 1993; Lehnert and Passmore 2006; Vandell 1995). 
“non-ruthless” default behaviors are previously explained by the option models that 
incorporate exogenous transactions costs (Kau et al. 1993), and “sub-optimal” default 
behaviors are usually explained by “trigger events” that are modeled as exogenous 
hazard (e.g., changing job, divorce) in Poisson process (Riddiough 1991). The option 
models have not considered non-financial conditions relating to borrowers‟ utilities of 




Empirical studies show that heterogeneous borrowers have different default behaviors 
(Deng 1997; Deng and Gabriel 2006; Deng and Quigley 2008; Deng, Quigley and 
Van Order 2000; Ong, Sing and Teo 2007), which support the existence of 
“nonstrategic behaviors” in residential mortgage market (Nonstrategic borrowers are 
defined as borrowers, whose default decision could not be predicted by financial 
option theory). The widely observed “non-strategic” behavior raises the questions: 
“Why do some heterogeneous borrowers default when they hold positive house 
equity?”, and “Why some borrowers do not default when they hold negative positive 
house equity?”. The co-existence of “strategic”, “non-ruthless”, and “sub-optimal” 
borrowers pushes for the need to a rational economic framework to explain borrowers‟ 
incentives. 
 
Therefore, it is still a puzzle how do heterogeneous characteristics of borrowers link 
with “non-ruthless” and “sub-optimal” default patterns, although many empirical 
works have tested the significance of the relationship between borrower 
characteristics and default behavior.  
1.3.3 Market Structure and Mortgage default 
The U.S. residential mortgage market has undergone three dramatic “technique 
innovation” waves in the last few decades: introduction of risk-based pricing via 
automatic underwriting (e.g., credit score); securitization; and government sponsored 
enterprises. The introduction of risk-based pricing via automatic underwriting reduces 





The subprime crisis studies blamed mortgage securitization as one possible root of 
the problem. The moral hazard and adverse selection of mortgage originators by 
lowering their underwriting criteria/securitizing lemon assets under information 
asymmetry, benefits the originators with high liquidity (Boot and Thakor 1993; 
DeMarzo 2005; Downing, Jaffee and Wallace 2005; Greenbaum Anjan and Stuart 
1987; Hess and Smith 1988; Heuson, Passmore and Sparks 2001; Passmore and 
Sparks 1996; Pennacchi 1988). Exogenous defaults in the choice of securitization 
level (Downing, Jaffee and Wallace 2005; Downing, Stanton and Wallace 2005; 
Downing, Stanton and Wallace 2008), and whether securitization leads to micro-level 
individual defaults are also been discussed, e.g., (Bubb and Kaufman 2009; Keys et al. 
2010). 
 
Securitization is as a mechanisms that reduces costs in the mortgage origination 
process (Deng and Gabriel 2006), which helps to support homeownership
7
. In a 
recent survey by Gerardi, Rosen et al.(2010), securitization result in imperfect 
mortgage market supply that affect borrower default decision, however a conflicting 
result were found in Hirtle (2009). 
 
The introduction of GSE into residential mortgages aimed to remold the exclusionary 
                                                             
7 Socially speaking, encouraging homeownership could be a sustainable way because of better usage 
and lower physical depreciation in the asset value. However, homeownership encouragement could also 
induce extensively unhealthy competition among non-agency institution, and governments to extend 
their market share. The preferences for homeownership of private institutions are probably more driven 
by financial profit incentives, instead of sustainability. 
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redlining in mortgage credit market into exploitive greenling, through changing the 
cost of mortgage intermediaries and making easier credit accessibility for low-income 
and constrained borrowers(Ambrose and Thibodeau 2004). The market structure for 
mortgage origination (both for bank and non-bank originators) has been changed in 
the process of these “technique innovation”, which reduces costs of mortgage 
origination services. 
 
In the classic industrial organization theory, market structure in supply market would 
affect the suppliers‟ performance, such as transportation costs in the location theories 
(Hotelling 1929), and in financial banking service (Ali and Greenbaum 1977; Berger 
1995; Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven 2008; DeYoung, Klier and McMillen 2003; Dick 
and Lehnert 2010; Gan and Riddiough 2008; Gilbert 1984; Hakenes and Schnabel 
2010; Wang 2003). 
 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt et al.(2006) explore the relationship among national bank 
concentration, bank regulation, and systemic bank fragility through empirical results 
from 1980 to 1997. They find that more concentrated banking systems are less likely 
to have crisis after controlling regulatory policies, macroeconomics and economic 
shocks. On one hand, higher concentration in banking increases market power for big 
banks, which increases their resistance against adverse shocks, and they are also 
easier to be monitored. On the other hand, high market power of large banks in 
mortgage market induces higher mortgage pricing strategies (e.g., higher interest rates, 
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less credit rationing), forces mortgagors to take higher risk actions, which is referred 
to as “concentration-fragility”. Moreover, the problem of “too big to fail” also exists 
in mortgage market. High subsidies to big banks from government worsen the 
“concentration-fragility” when banks take riskier mortgage loans. 
 
The effect of market structure on lenders‟ credit supply can be traced back to the 
studies of “credit rationing”(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), 
where high risk borrowers are rejected for credit when the supply control is imposed. 
Mortgage products with pricing spread differentiation are created in non-competitive 
bank market (Merriken 1998). The recent studies show that lender‟s market structure 
could influence lenders‟ incentives to provide different LTV loans (Ben-Shahar 2008), 
to obtain borrower-specific private information (Ogura 2010), to control underwriting 
strictness (Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven 2008), and to implement credit risk transfer 
(CRT)(Hakenes and Schnabel 2010). 
 
Ergungor (2007) studied whether mortgage originated by regulated Federal agencies 
or less-regulated institutions has different foreclosure patterns in the Ohio‟s counties. 
He found that results vary in different periods. 
 
To my knowledge, there is little study to specifically address the effect of banking 
market structure on individual mortgagors‟ default risks. 
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1.4 Research Question 
There are three main questions to be examined in the thesis. 
Question 1: How do borrowers choose different mortgages under consumption 
allocation? Do unobservable risk factors (reflected in mortgage choice between FRM 
and ARM of heterogeneous borrower) affect borrowers‟ ex-post default risks? 
 
It separates borrowers‟ decisions into two steps: mortgage type selection and ex-post 
mortgage default. It examines borrowers‟ observable risks and their interactions with 
their unobservable risks as determinants of mortgage default. Borrowers‟ choice of 
mortgage types provides useful information on borrowers‟ unobservable risk 
attributes (e.g., real income, and housing consumption preference). The decision on a 
particular mortgage type reflects borrowers‟ “willingness to pay”.  
 
Question 2: Why do idiosyncratic borrowers default when they hold positive housing 
equity? Conversely, why do borrowers not default when they hold negative housing 
equity? 
 
This question examines factors affecting the “non-ruthless” and “sub-optimal” default 
behaviors of borrowers; “Are these two default behaviors mutually exclusive, because 
of heterogeneous characteristics of mortgagors?” Different from previous studies that 
concentrate on “financial willingness” to pay, this study covers basic mechanics and 





The proposed rational model separates the “probability of default” and 
“time-to-default”, and it is not constrained by the implicit assumptions of “ever 
defaulter” borrowers. It allows mortgage default behaviors to be better represented, 
especially to help answer the question of “Why do borrowers default non-ruthlessly 
or sub-optimally?” This question requires a rational economic model containing 
different incentives that trigger borrowers default. Under stochastic macro-economy 
conditions, it also asks theoretically and empirically the role of “the negative equity 
condition” in option model, if it is neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for 
mortgagors‟ default behavior. 
 
Question 3: How does the banking market structure, which is represented by the 
concentration and contestability, affect individual residential mortgage performance? 
 
The part tests the question of whether concentration and contestability in the banking 
markets affect the credit supply and credit quality for non-agency mortgages. “What 
drives some lenders to lower their underwriting standard, loosen credit constraints 
and increase their market share for specific mortgage risk types? How do the credit 
expansion strategies of mortgage bankers affect total individual mortgagors’ default 
behaviors in non-agency mortgage loans?” 
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1.5 Significance of the Study 
Understanding the borrowers‟ self-selection, borrowers‟ incentives to default and 
banking market structure helps to better manage risk in residential mortgages. 
 
It is useful for lender to match the current mortgage contract to borrowers with 
specific characteristics in underwriting process properly. It is also useful to devise 
policies to stabilize mortgage market and the economy system, if risk profiles can be 
better analyzed. It may also be beneficial to mortgage contract modification to better 
manage the cash flows among borrowers, lenders and investors. 
 
The risks from borrowers to lenders via mortgage contracting, and then they flow 
from lenders to investors via mortgage securitization. If banking market is not 
efficient, mortgage originators (both banks and non-banks) might use relative bad 
underwriting criteria to initiate mortgage. The credit rating agencies, if failing to 
assess the credit risks of pooled mortgages properly, will pass the risks from the 
lenders to investors. When housing market turns adversely, credit risks would affect 
the borrowers. The process generates a chain reaction that adversely impacts the 
economy growth. The subprime crisis is one occurrence that causes significant 
economic losses in the housing and credit market. 
 
Understanding the potential default determinants of mortgages helps to reduce the 




1.6 Structure of the Study 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 presents the motivations, 
objectives and significance of the research. The key research questions are defined. 
Chapter 2 reviews literature on self-selection, non-strategic defaults, and mortgage 
market structure. It links different parts of the study and provides systematic 
understanding to relevant works. 
 
Chapter 3 describes the data collection and some basic facts. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the self-selection of mortgage type by borrowers with 
heterogeneous risk attributes. 
 
Chapter 5 examines borrowers‟ “non-strategic” and “strategic” defaults behaviors, 
and separates default risks into two parts, that are “probability of default” and 
“time-to-default”. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the banking market structure on borrowers‟ default risks using 
the sample of U.S. non-agency loan in the origination year period of 1999-2008. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the contributions and future studies. Its 
limitation and further extensions are also discussed.  
 31 
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter reviews literatures relating to determinants on mortgage defaults mainly 
in three aspects: mortgagors‟ self-selection, strategic and non-strategic default 
behaviors, and mortgagee market structure. 
 
In the mortgagor‟s self-selection section, mortgage choice (e.g., choice between loan 
to value ratio and coupon-point combination; choice among mortgage type, agency 
problem and dynamic optimal mortgage design) is firstly discussed. Then it discusses 
how mortgage self-selection is linked to mortgage default under information 
asymmetric framework and also its limitation on such linkage. 
 
In Section 2.3, it firstly concentrates on studies on “sub-optimal” and “non-ruthless” 
default behaviors in the financial option theory. Then, credit score FICO is 
specifically discussed, as it is used relatively new to control default risk level. Other 
behavioral determinants of mortgage defaults are further discussed. 
 
At last in Section 2.4, it discusses some basic literatures on market contestability and 
efficiency in order to frame proper measurement on market structure. The relationship 
between mortgage risk and supply-side in mortgage market, relationship between 
supply-side market structure and lenders‟ underwriting, relationship between 
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supply-side market structure and borrowers‟ behaviors, and relationship between 
supply-side market structure and mortgage risk are systematically reviewed. 
2.2 Mortgage Choice 
2.2.1 Borrowers’ Self-Selection 
A) Choice between LTV and Coupon-Point Combination 
Under asymmetric information, borrowers with specific risk profile self-select into 
different observable factors, such as mortgage size, loan-to-value (LTV) and 
coupon-point
8
 combination, when default risks are exogenously defined (e.g., 
mobility). Chari and Jagannathan (1989) examine the coupon-point choice when 
borrowers differ in the riskiness of their potential gains from selling their properties. 
They found that points and interest rate combination provide insurance to lenders in 
the presence of borrowers‟ adverse selection when prepayment penalties are 
prohibited. Harrison, Noordewier, and Yavas (2004) argue that risky borrowers 
self-select into low LTV to reduce high default costs, as represented by credit score in 
their two period models. At the same time, low risk borrowers take advantages of 
their creditworthiness to self-select into high LTV loans. The results are not consistent 
with normal assumption, which matches borrowers with high LTV with high default 
risk. 
 
LeRoy (1996) finds that slow mobility borrowers are indifferent in the coupon-point 
                                                             
8 Origination points are that percentage or amounts paid by mortgagors, but are used to cover the costs 
of originating the mortgage, not as reduce mortgage principle, such as compensation for the loan officer, 
application processing costs, etc. 
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choices, when minimizing their costs; while high mobility borrowers prefer 
low-points mortgage. The points in mortgage reduce the coupon and incentives to 
refinance. Brueckner (1994) examines borrower‟ choice of mortgage size, housing 
value, and level of saving in a two-period mortgage selection model, and finds that 
the size of mortgage depends on the relationship between the mortgage interest rate  
and the rate of return on investment. 
 
Brueckner (2000) utilizes exogenous transaction costs to proxy default cost and 
analyzes the loan amount demanded by borrowers under asymmetric information. He 
finds that only risky borrowers pay higher risk premium for larger LTV loan.  
Stanton and Wallace (1998) analyze the borrower‟s choice between coupon and 
points under asymmetric information, by including the self-selection  into the 
boundary condition of the contingent claims, they find that the explicit transaction 
cost (fixed proportional to the house price with exogenous mobility) could determine 
the optimal choice of FRM contact with combination choice of points and coupons in 
a separating equilibrium . 
 
Using individual mortgage data through Cox hazard regression, Chang and Yavas 
(2009) find empirical evidence to support the separating equilibrium where borrowers‟ 
self-selection in to lower-point/high rate mortgage contracts, based on their lower 
refinancing cost, probably due to lower refinancing cost borrowers are less 
constrained by the current high interest rate mortgage as they can choose to refinance 
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later. Their result draw from the observation that the coefficient for the discount point 
in their tests has negative, but significant sign on the termination probability and 
refinance probability. However, their results do not support the hypothesis that the 
choice of mortgage points affects borrowers‟ default. 
 
B) Choice among Mortgage Type 
Concerning mortgage types choice, most of studies are under two-period model 
framework, like that reviewed by Follain (1990), where it discussed series of studies 
that borrowers with different risk-aversion, socially moving incentives and 
impatience prefer different type of mortgages. Most studies suggest that ARMs are 
more attractive to households when long-term rates increase. Liquidity constraint is 
another factor motivating younger and low current income households to choose 
ARMs which requires lower initial payments, especially those ARMs with teaser rate. 
Through ARMs, lenders transfer the interest rate risks to borrowers.  
 
Most of mortgage studies, as mentioned, assume expected mobility motive of 
borrowers, attributing the mortgage choice to the macro economic reasons such as 
market shock and interest rate risk sharing, like in Brueckner (1992), who analyzes 
borrowers‟ self-selection and mortgage pricing between fixed rate mortgage and 
adjustable rate mortgage (FRM/ARM). He finds that market shock increases the 
attractiveness of FRM. Mobile borrowers‟ preference on ARM and the interest rate of 
FRM depends on the average mobility of the FRM borrowers‟ pool. In a separate 
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paper, Brueckner (1993) uses a loan-rate function to explain the risk sharing between 
lenders and borrowers in ARMs. In his model with the assumption that lenders are 
risk-neutral and borrowers are risk-averse with impatience, he shows that impatient 
borrowers choose “the loan-rate function” of ARMs to gain a more favorable time 
path of payment.  
 
In another ARMs choice study, Posey and Yavas (2001) define default risk as the 
possibility of next period income increasing in their two-period models, and 
attributing default cost (measured by FICO) as one of the choice reasoning. They find 
that high risk borrower (i.e., borrower with low probability of income increase and 
vulnerable to negative income shock) would prefer ARM than FRM.  
 
While others suggesting that mortgage type choice should be considered 
simultaneously with LTV choice, instead of independently concerning mortgage type 
choice in previous mentioned studies. For instance, Hendershott et al. (1997) argue 
that by simultaneously allowing LTV and mortgage type choice, the limitation 
associated borrower constraints can be dealt with. They explore the mortgage choice 
between FHA ARM (Federal Housing Agency adjustable rate mortgages) and 
conventional FRM loans, and find that down payment constraints (LTV constraint if 
the house unit is fixed) in FHA mortgage make the conventional mortgage more 
favorable. Their empirical test uses a nested logit mortgage choice model based on 
data from Metropolitan American Housing Survey with 819 observations during the 
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period of March 1983 and November 1984. Their results support the significance of 
price insurance premia between these two contract types. Two interesting 
contributions in their studies are: First, they suggest the importance of simultaneously 
considering the mortgage size choice and mortgage contract type choice, given the 
liquidity constraints. Second, they suggest that an alternative way to study the 
mortgage choice is to build a structural model with households ‟maximization of their 
utility, subject to budget constraints. 
 
In developing multi-period dynamic structural models for mortgage choice, Campbell 
and Cocco (2003) and Campbell (2006) explain the dynamic decisions on optimal 
contract choice between ARM and FRM by borrowers with different risky income, 
exogenous risk aversion, and moving probability. Inflation risk, as one of the 
macroeconomic factor, is considered to affect mortgagors‟ type choice, such that 
FRM might be riskier than ARM in yielding “wealth effect” as individual‟s income 
and accumulated wealth gain. Their models consider the housing consumption and 
investment on their assets, and also discuss borrowers‟ investment mistakes and their 
under-diversification in risky portfolios. Based on life-cycle simulation with risky 
income and liquidation constraints, it is found that large mortgagors with risky future 
income, high risk aversion, and low probability of moving prefer nominal FRMs to 
ARM. However, inflation-indexed FRMs increases capital value and create the 
“wealth effect”, and it is a superior as individual‟s risk management tools for 
households. The models make an implicit assumption that borrowers are 
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“ever-defaulters” under financial condition, where they will default either sooner or 
later. 
 
Van Hemert, de Jong et al.(2005) use dynamic modeling with constant real risk 
aversion (CRRA) preference to model the portfolio choice of equity, bond, 
considering stochastic inflation and real interest rate in mean-efficient theory. They 
find that housing choice would affect non-house financial choice in the risky portfolio. 
They suggest that less risk-averse borrowers tend to choose adjustable-rate mortgage 
than fixed rate mortgage to maximize the expected return under different optimal 
non-housing financial options. Their research differs from Campbell and Cocco (2003) 
in two main points. First, they do not include income risk; instead they model 
persistent shocks in inflation and real interest rate, and analyze financial choice 
between stocks and bonds with various maturities. They integrate the portfolio 
analysis into mortgage choice. Second, in their model, the house size is given, such 
that the analysis of non-housing financing choice, rather than the housing choice, is 
directly related to mortgage choice. 
 
In some earlier studies, borrowers are assumed to be homogeneous. However, 
borrowers are heterogeneous in many ways such as income and consumption 
preference. Dhillon, Shilling et al. (1987) empirically examine the effects of 
observable borrowers‟ heterogeneous characteristics on their mortgage contract 
choice based on 78 mortgage samples from a national mortgage banker from 1983 to 
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1984. Their Probit regression results show that low pricing spread between 
ARM/FRM, borrowers with co-borrowers, married couples, shorter expected housing 
tenures result in higher probability of ARM choice. However, their results show that 
borrower‟s social characteristics such as age and education are insignificant. 
 
Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) test the question of borrowers‟ heterogeneous 
characteristics on their choice among various ARM and FRM, using multinomial 
logit model. Their empirical results are based on 345 mortgage observations from a 
Midwestern‟s federally charted loan association from 1979 to 1984. Their results 
show that younger borrowers prefer short-term mortgage, and tilted income stream 
favors the ARM choice under high expected interest rate. Mayer, Pence et al. (2009) 
find that on average, borrowers with lower credit score and higher combined 
loan-to-value are more likely to have subprime hybrid adjustable rate mortgage. 
However, borrowers with higher credit score and lower combined loan-to-value will 
choose subprime fixed rates mortgages. Agarwal and Ambrose (2007) test the effects 
of marketing force on mortgagors‟ default, and find empirically that the advertising 
leads to suboptimal financial choice between FRM and ARM for some consumers. 
 
Coulibaly and Li (2009) empirically test the determinants of mortgage choice 
between FRM and ARM using a logit model, and they identify that housing price, 
affordability, mobility expectation, income volatility and risk attitudes are important 
determinants for the mortgage choice. Their results support that fixed rate mortgage is 
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preferred by borrowers with high level of risk aversion. They use data from the 
Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) (self-reported data), which contains direct 
measurement of household risk attitude, moving expectation, and household income 
risk. However, the SCF survey sample might be bias towards wealthy households. 
Therefore, the risk attitude might be correlated with household income, which means 
that the independent variables could be correlated.  
 
Interest rate expectation (yield curve slope), original liquidity constraint, lenders‟ 
incentives in sharing interest risk, mobility, and observable characteristics of 
borrowers are found to be related to borrowers‟ decisions on mortgage type choice. 
Psychological factor, such as the reflection effect in the prospect theory is found to 
affect mortgage choice. Mori et al. (2010) suggest that risk-seeking borrowers prefer 
ARM and risk-averse borrowers prefer FRM. Their experiments are limited by a 
small number of business professionals in U.S. (85 survey observations), Germany 
(55 survey observations), and Japan (49 survey observations). 
 
C) Agency Problem and Optimal Mortgage Design 
In the self-selection determiner examined earlier, the mortgage choice is limited to 
LTV, coupon-points, and mortgage types. There are other studies that dynamic asset 
contract design to address the endogenous problems in optimal mortgage. The 
mortgage choice of borrowers is endogenously related to payment structure of the 
mortgage types. The potential agency problems between conflicting sides are also 
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dealt with in the dynamic asset design framework. 
 
Goodman and Wassmer (1992) use a multi-period model with constrained mobility 
and transaction costs to study the optimal mortgage design. They find that ARM 
payments reduce mortgagors‟ transaction costs, and increase housing purchase in the 
early life of younger purchasers. They match housing payments with individual 
preference, and find that income change and borrowers‟ preference affect borrowers‟ 
mobility. The limitations in their study are that: 1) the constant income and constant 
interest rate do not account for uncertainty raised relating to mortgage payment and 
affordability of liquidity constraint mortgagors. 2) The link between mortgage default 
and, on borrowers‟ choice of mortgage contracts is not established. The adjustable 
rate mortgage payments are determined by borrowers‟ preference and a random 
matching.  In reality, borrowers‟ mortgage payments are determined by mortgage 
type choice and mortgage market after matching. Borrowers will also be free to 
choose the non-housing consumption, which in turn will impose constraints on their 
mortgage contract choice. 
 
Piskorski and Tchistyi (2010) propose a dynamic optimal security design model with  
asymmetric information, when the lender does not know the borrower‟s true income. 
In the model, borrower would mis-report their income, and use their money to 
increase consumption given zero optimal saving for borrower. They prove that the 
optional ARM, interest only mortgage with home equity line of credit are the optimal 
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mortgage types that give the right incentive for borrowers to report the income 
correctly. In their models, lenders can design mortgage contract ex-ante and adjust the 
mortgage margin ex-post, when the full revelation of mortgage income information is 
not possible in the presence of information asymmetry. 
2.2.2 Mortgage Choice and Default 
Factors, such as borrower characteristics and liquidity constraints, influence 
borrowers‟ mortgage choice (especially between ARM and FRM) and default 
decisions. Calhoun and Deng (2002) use multinomial Logit models to estimate 
conditional default and prepayment probability in ARM and FRM. Their results show 
that both prepayment and defaults option variables have similar effects on ARM and 
FRM. Other variables such as mortgage size and original LTV explain ARM and 
FRM‟s default differently. For hybrid ARM with teaser rate, potential payment jump 
induces prepayment if borrowers are not liquidity constraint after the lock-in periods.  
Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010) test FRM and hybrid (2 years fixed+28 years 
adjustable) mortgages using competing risk model with unobserved heterogeneity. 
Based on LoanPerformance Asset Backed Securities loan-level data, they find that 
rising interest rates are correlated with higher temporarily termination through 
prepayment, not defaults. In their results, borrowers of hybrid mortgages have lower 
credit scores and larger LTV, compared to borrowers of FRM. 
 
Li and Mosquera (2008) use logit model to show empirically that personal credit card 
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information discloses borrower risk type and determine the default probability. Hence, 
the question of how borrowers of different FICO self-select into a mortgage type 
affect ex-post default risk is unknown. 
2.2.3 Limitation Summary 
There are some limitations on previous studies connecting borrowers‟ mortgage 
choice with default risk mentioned in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
 
1) Mortgage choice in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 literatures all based on borrowers‟ 
self-selection in asymmetric information actually studies the ex-ante default risk 
(measured by exogenous income, housing return, and default cost) effect on 
borrowers‟ mortgage choice, which then reveal‟s borrowers‟ risk type. They assume 
that a presumable exogenous default risk (e.g., mobility probability) affect borrowers‟ 
mortgage choice. These studies on mortgage choice, however, do not examine the 
potential endogenous relationship between borrowers‟ mortgage choice and ex-post 
default.  
 
This assumption is convenient for lenders‟ risk management in pricing based on 
exogenously defined default risk. However, it might not be appropriate for 
mortgagors. In practice, borrower could not consider their ex-post default risk into 
their decision of mortgage choice. Firstly, there are very few persons defaulting under 
expected risk. According to default incentive studies in recent years, most borrowers 
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are either unwilling to default (“non-ruthless” borrowers) or default under unexpected 
trigger events (“suboptimal” default) (Detailed discussion on these behaviors could 
be found in Section 2.3.1). Secondly, borrowers normally will not know their ex-post 
default risk exactly as lender assumes, when borrowers choose mortgage type. It is 
intuitively similar “very few people will presume an ex-post known divorce 
probability when they get married”. Thirdly, non-default borrowers might not be 
indifferent to various mortgage as assumed in previous studies. Borrowers could 
consider their wealth allocation between housing and non-housing consumption 
decision into borrowers‟ decision to mortgage types. 
 
Therefore, borrowers‟ decision on mortgage should be separated into two steps: the 
mortgage choice decision under no real ex-post default presumption and ex-post 
mortgage default decision after mortgage choice. 
 
2) The second implicit assumption for mortgage choice based on borrower 
self-selection in asymmetric information is that lenders are assumed to price 
mortgage to gain zero-profit under competitive or maximize profit under monopoly 
market. This assumption is rational and reasonable under most cases, when lenders 
choose to deny or not to deny mortgage application during strict screening and 
underwriting process normally. However, it does not hold during the credit expansion 
period, when lenders are believed to price based on FICO scores (risk-based pricing) 
and on their capital cost after securitization. Lenders are heterogeneous in the pricing 
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power under different market structure, which determines their strategies on 
risk-based pricing and their capital costs.  
 
Under this case, lenders‟ role in borrowers‟ mortgage choice should be exogenous, 
and lenders care more on their capital cost during origination under securitization, 
instead of borrowers‟ decision on mortgage type, or even borrowers‟ default risk. 
  
How will mortgagor‟s unobservable risk factor (reflected in self-selection) affect 
ex-post default risk? This question is examined in the Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
2.3 Non-Strategic Default 
2.3.1 Strategic and Non-strategic Default in Option Theory 
The contingent claims models offer a suitable framework to analyze the termination. 
In a stochastic setting, the contingent claim models can be categorized into three 
groups: (1) Structure (semi-structure) models are built on the stochastic process of 
underlying assets and interest rate, without explicit assumption for non-financial 
reasons to trigger termination; (2) Intensity (reduced form) models usually use the 
Poisson process to represent the unpredictable event; (3) The another one is structure 
models with default intensity to represent both financial and non-financial reasons for 
termination. Nonfinancial reasons such as divorce, loss of a job, family size change, 
are often modeled as a jump process in the default option models (e.g. Riddiough 
(1991)). Intensity rate is used to proxy the nonfinancial reasons ignoring 
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heterogeneity of borrowers. The heterogeneous characteristics of borrower can 
influence the non-financial trigger events such as unemployment, death, divorce 
(Vandell 1995). Other contingent claim models include the joint of default and 
prepayment options (Kau et al. 1992). 
 
The option-based models assume “ruthless” by borrowers, who default when the 
value of the property drops below the level of the mortgage value and they will wait 
otherwise. The borrowers will not default “ruthlessly” in the option world. However, 
in reality, some borrowers are found to exercise default option suboptimally and other 
borrowers do not exercise their option even the options are in the money. Kau, 
Keenan et al.(1993) argue that the exogenous transaction costs of default and 
suboptimal termination (intensity) would affect the “probability of default” under the 
option framework. They introduce the transaction friction into the default option, 
where default only occurs at the payment dates, and they also distinguish the default 
value with the default probability. Similar works are also found Kau et al.(1985) and 
Kau et al.(1990) . 
 
Vandell (1995) defines ruthless default (or frictionless default) as immediate option 
exercise when the value of the property drops below the value of the mortgage. Three 
reasons for non-ruthless default are discussed in his paper including transaction cost, 
solvency and the lender‟s foreclosure role. “Transaction cost” is referred to as the 
penalty in default, which prevents borrowers from making another property purchase 
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and entering into a new loan agreement at zero costs. He discusses the limitations in 
the previous theoretical works which include loss of equity, access to credit 
transaction cost, possibility of heterogeneous transaction costs among the borrowers, 
and no contract specific endogenous prepayment rates caused by the mortgage 
contract deficiencies. 
 
The transaction costs in the earlier studies are assumed to be a constant percentage of 
initial  housing value (Kau, Keenan and Kim 1993). However, Cunningham and 
Hendershott (1986) propose that default costs should be proportional to the 
outstanding mortgage balance. In addition, transaction costs can also be linked to be 
dependent on the credit risk of the borrowers, and affect borrower default decision. 
Sharp, Newton et al. (2008) describe option-based mortgage valuation with both 
prepayment and default risk under stochastic interest rate and house price process. 
Their models improve the accuracy and speed in numerical solutions through the use 
of “rapid approximation perturbation” approach. 
 
To my knowledge, no economically unified theoretical models are built to explain 
borrowers‟ “suboptimal” and “non-ruthless” default. Evidence of non-strategy default 
is found in empirical works in competing & non-competing hazard, probit, and 
multinomial logit models (Deng 1997; Deng and Quigley 2005; Deng and Quigley 
2008; Lehnert and Passmore 2006). Foote, Gerardi et al.(2008) develop a simple 
two-period theoretical model on relationships between default and “negative equity” 
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by comparing the utilities between continuing to make payments (keep the house) and 
renting to live (no mortgage payments), which show that only 10% borrowers, who 
had their mortgages‟ foreclosure at the end of year 1991 in Massachusetts data, have 
negative equity. Their empirical results support the “non-ruthless” behaviors. 
 
Their two-period models and the empirical study have two important implications: 
First, the results suggest that negative equity is neither necessary nor sufficient 
condition for individual borrowers to default. Second, the results using 
Massachusetts‟s data may capture some local submarket effects. Guiso, Sapienza et 
al.(2009), however, show that negative equity is a “necessary but not sufficient” 
condition to default. They find that moral and social consideration (e.g., acquainted 
with other defaulters; contagion effect) are important in borrowers‟ defaults, based on 
the survey data by asking mortgagors “social and moral attitudes toward default”. 
Their results show that 80% of the respondents “think it is morally wrong to do 
strategic default”, and “no respondent is willing to default strategically if the negative 
equity shortfall is less than 10%”. They suggest that policies reinforcing moral 
commitment to pay mortgage might help to reduce default risks.  
 
Deng, Quigley et al. (2000) use the log-likelihood of non-parameters baseline hazard 
competing model to empirically estimate mortgage default through joint survivor 
conditional function. Their result demonstrates that the unobserved heterogeneous 
characteristics (e.g., borrowers‟ individual income, income volatility, and credit score) 
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are significant in addition to the option values in explaining default behavior. Kau, 
Keenan et al.(2010) also argue for the importance of borrowers‟ attribute in 
explaining mortgage defaults. They use the arbitrage-free principle with pricing 
hazard and estimate a reduced-form credit default risk. They find that implicit default 
hazard rates of borrowers deteriorated from the sample period prior to 2004, and after 
2005.  
2.3.2 Credit Score as Determinant 
FICO score has been widely used as the measurement of borrowers‟ credit risks. 
Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000) find that credit-constrained borrowers are more 
likely to choose Federal Housing Administration mortgages (FHA). They argue that 
the credit history would affect the mortgage choice. Pennington-Cross, Yezer et al. 
(2000) consider the factors affecting subprime mortgage choice and analyze the 
importance of the credit history. Their empirical results show that borrowers with 
high credit risk, represented by pool credit score and/or high non-real estate debt, are 
more likely to use subprime loans. Homebuyers in unstable and deteriorating housing 
markets are more likely to use subprime loans. 
 
The “credit curing” incentives, through improving credit history over time as a 
reverse of transaction cost by keeping payment, decrease the possibility of the 




Van Order (2007) uses the multiplication of the equity (LTV) and trigger events (e.g., 
such as job loss, proxy by FICO) to predict the default rate. In his model, default 
probability is computed by multiplying “probability of negative equity” by 
“probability of a trigger event” (illness or job loss) and the “probability of not having 
sufficient resources to fall back on”. However, FICO might not be a proper way to 
proxy the trigger events such as losing a job. 
 
The question of how credit score is related to “non-ruthless” and “sub-optimal” 
default decision is still unknown. 
2.3.3 Other Default Determinants 
Agarwal, Driscoll et al. (2004) add a distraction mechanism into the stochastic value 
function to explain the early refinance and late refinance (“woodheads”) behaviors. 
Distracted consumers have an opportunity to refinance at some hazard rate. 
Irrationality of the distracted parameter is arbitrary and it is difficult to find a proper 
proxy to represent the distracted variable in the contract. 
 
Ong, Sing et al.(2007) study partially “protected equity” and borrower‟s loss aversion 
and their effects on borrower‟s decisions on delinquency and default. They find that 
the use of protected equity increases the risk of delinquency, and reduces the default 
risk, when the quantum at origination increases and borrower is averse to incurring 




2.3.4 Limitation Summary 
To my knowledge, there is no unified economic framework to explain the 
co-existence of “strategic”, “non-ruthless”, and “sub-optimal” borrowers and their 
utility rationale, which would benefit the lenders to understand borrowers‟ risk, and to 
better facilitate risk management. 
 
Therefore, it is still a puzzle how heterogeneous characteristics of borrowers have any 
linkage with “non-ruthless” and “sub-optimal” default patterns, although many 
empirical works have tested the significance of the relationship between borrower 
characteristics and default behavior. 
2.4 Market Structure 
2.4.1 Contestability and Efficiency 
Market contestability is defined when 1) there are no barriers to entry, 2) all firms 
have access to the same production technology, and 3) entrants can enter and exit 
freely before adjusting prices. Contestability market can have any number of firms 
(only one or a few firms), and efficiency of “thread of entry” will drive incumbents 
maintain prices close to a competitive level. 
 
In Baumol (1982)‟s perfect contestable market with free “hit and run” at the lowest 
marginal costs, firms cannot earn more than zero economic profits, even though the 
 51 
 
small number of firms in the market possess “monopolistic” market power. This 
phenomenon under the contestability is known as “monopolized efficiency”. In 
Baumol‟s model, market structure is endogenously determined through operating 
efficiently at the lowest marginal costs, while free entry drives the economic profit to 
zero, where firms (especially large firms) do not manipulate their market power to 
charge “monopolistic pricing”. New entrants, both small ones and large ones, are 
equally competitive in term of production efficiency (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 
1982; Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1983). 
 
When the “free entry” assumption is not satisfied, either because of production 
process (e.g., high fixed costs, location advantage) or other externality (e.g., 
regulation barrier, natural barrier), the monopolized efficiency in the contestable 
theory does not hold. Taking land development for an example, large developers 
possess location advantage through monopolistic prices or speed in development. 
Location rents in a monopoly land market could also speed up its development, 
especially for large developers (e.g., Turnbull (1988)). 
2.4.2 Supply-side Market Structure, Underwriting and 
Mortgage Risk 
A) Mortgage Risk and Supply-side in the market 
Mian and Sufi (2009) find that excessive mortgage credit expansion in subprime 
zip-code areas is not a result of income-driven demand, and it is instead correlated 
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with increasing in securitization, suggesting the supply-side driven mortgage risk. 
Income-based hypothesis is rejected through their negative correlation between 
income growth and credit increases, and house price expectation-based hypothesis is 
rejected through a relative flat house price growth using land topology-based measure 
of housing supply elasticity. The supply-based hypothesis is supported through 
utilizing the measurement of reduction in risk premium for credit supply factor.  
 
However, they do not differentiate the reasons and strategies for risk premium change, 
as those mentioned (e.g., diversification, lax lending standard on behalf of originators, 
government supported programs, or misperception of real financial market risk). 
Furthermore, they overlooked motivations and incentives for mortgage originators to 
change their risk premium, and possibly to utilize different level of strategies, such as 
diversification intensity, lending standard strictness level, and so on.  
 
Key et al. (2010) find that portfolio with greater ease of securitization defaults more 
than that portfolio with relatively difficulty to securitization. They suggest that 
screening incentives during subprime mortgage underwriting process have been 
reduced by the securitization of mortgage loan contracts. Their results are based on 
the statistic observations of borrowers‟ FICO scores through evaluating the loan 
quality near threshold loans originated below and above credit threshold of FICO 620. 
In their test, they assume that the cost of screening soft information (e.g., income 
stability) for borrowers with FICO 620[-] is higher, and also that mortgage contract 
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with FICO 620[+] are implicitly much easier to securitized. 
 
Relevant studies ask the “whether” credit expansion of risky loans is caused by 
supply-side, but fails to continue to discuss how banking market structure affect 
credit provisions. 
 
B) Supply-side Market Structure and Lenders’ Underwriting 
Competing lenders facing information asymmetry impede the flow of credit to an 
otherwise qualified borrower, and the phenomenon is referred to as “credit-rationing” 
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . In the competitive 
models, lenders select borrowers with different risks under lenders‟ zero-profit 
constraint and borrowers‟ incentive compatibility conditions. Giovanni, Igan et al. 
(2008) show empirically that highly competitive banking markets decrease loan 
denial rates and lower lending standards in the subprime mortgage market. 
 
The contestability in residential mortgage origination markets is highly dependent on 
securitization and risk-based pricing in the market. Deng and Gabriel (2006) suggest 
that lenders‟ costs of financing for underserved borrowers have been reduced because 
of securitization and risk-based pricing in FHA-insured mortgages. This results in a 
more competitive supply-side market structure. 
 
It is not clear whether “credit-rationing” could be still tenable in imperfect market. 
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Campbell (2006) argued that credit market competition would affect consumer‟s 
credit accessibility and default risk. The maximization of lenders‟ pay-off from 
mortgage is also not possible when the market is contestable, where entry is not 
restricted(Gan and Riddiough 2008). Mortgage product differentiation through 
pricing spread is found in non-competitive bank market, that are not subject to 
regulatory entry barrier (Merriken 1998).  
 
Ogura (2010) theoretically review the impact of competition on the production of 
borrower-specific private information. He finds that inside bank loan interest rates are 
lower than the interest rates of outside bank loans for younger firms in concentrated 
loan markets, however, the same is not observed in competitive loan markets, based 
on the 2003 National Survey on Small Business Financing. Their results imply that 
high competition reduces insufficient incentives for banks to collect borrower-specific 
information. 
 
Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) suggest that the degree of competition in the banking 
sector and loan information (private or public) determine the credit risk transfer 
(CRT), which functions better with increasing banking competition and more efficient 
public information. However, Hirtle (2009) show that the use of credit derivatives is 
complement but will not directly increase supply of bank credit, using commercial 
and industrial loan data samples of U.S. banks from 1997 to 2006, as reported in the 
Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. In studying of monopoly 
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effect on brokerage fee, Yavas (2001) shows that monopolized commission rates with 
non-excess profit are the equilibrium results of the free entry in real estate brokerage 
industry. 
 
Ben-Shahar (2008) proposes a theoretical model to analyze lenders‟ screening under 
competitive and non-competitive market structure. The model incorporates the 
ex-ante credit score establishment cost when examining mortgage borrowers‟ self–
selection decisions. The transaction costs of selling the asset, repaying the loan and 
costs of default are exogenous, which restrict the dynamic relationships among 
market structure, credit scores, and default risk. The simulation results show 
borrowers will self-select into diverse LTV levels under competitive and 
non-competitive supply market. However, it did not discuss how the market structure 
in the supply-side affects the ex-post default risk of mortgagors. 
 
Hartman-Glaser, Piskorski et al.  (2010) evaluate the optimal mortgage backed 
securities design in the secondary mortgage market, where investors of securitized 
mortgages do not observe effort level and the mortgage underwriter cost. The optimal 
securitization strategy of investor in minimizing cost reveals that it is best for 
investors to make cash transfers, which are contingent on the first default time in a 
portfolio. The study shows that securitization leads to a lax origination underwriting 
standard in controlling for borrowers‟ default risks. Their results argue that 
securitization with lump sum payments is optimal, and investors have the incentives 
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to impose mortgage originators to perform necessary underwriting screen. There are 
limitations in the optimal mortgage design of the paper, which neglects the ability and 
economic incentives of the mortgage originators to maximize profits and utility in 
different market structures. They assume that mortgage underwriters‟ pricing 
strategies and their effort level in underwriting are exogenous to mortgagors‟ choice 
of loans. The market structure from mortgage originators, that affects the mortgage 
underwriter‟s utility maximization objective, is also ignored in the model. 
 
Gan and Riddiough (2008) show that in a monopoly mortgage market, the advantage 
of incumbent to access to private information and to use entry deterrence strategy via 
false signaling in terms of high loan price, will affect U.S. residential mortgage 
market lending and competitors‟ entry decisions. They segment the mortgage market 
into a higher-credit quality prime market (with pooled pricing) and lower-credit 
quality subprime market (with risk-based pricing). Incumbent originators disguise 
true quality of prime borrowers through pool pricing. They also argue that larger 
mortgage originators have larger prime market share and lower incremental cost of 
entry. Incumbent chooses its pricing level, while potential entrant makes the entry 
decision. They find empirically that market share of prime mortgage increases 
through decreased entry cost and financial capital cost. 
 
C) Supply-side Market Structure affects borrowers’ behaviors 
Gerardi, Rosen et al.(2010) find that securitization affects borrowers‟ behaviors. 
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Based on Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey data from 1970 to 2001, 
they show that credit market imperfection causes individual households‟ income to 
deviate from the prediction by the permanent income hypothesis, which states that 
higher desire consumption should match with higher household‟ s expected future 
income. They build a model when high income and low income households are 
matched into big and small houses respectively, and they show that 
high-income-growth families move from a small to a big house because of relaxation 
of constraints on credit availability. However, the households in their study do not 
trade-off housing consumption with non-housing consumption. Households‟ choice of  
durable and non-durable goods varies, when the credit constraints are relaxed as 
securitization, suggested in Bostic, Gabriel et al. (2009). 
 
D) Supply-side Market Structure and Mortgage Risk 
When loan modification for commercial mortgage were prevalent in 1990s, 
Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) suggest that lender‟s foreclosure cost could wedge the 
valuations between lenders and borrowers in a non-cooperative lending game. 
Workout scheme dominate foreclosure. Their results show lower foreclosure rate 
because of the existence of foreclosure cost for lenders. 
 
Bank regulation, as a source of contestability change, impacts individual borrower 
risk. Dick and Lehnert (2010) link U.S. credit supply (bank deregulation on branching 
and screening technology) with personal bankruptcy during the period from 1980 to 
58 
 
1994. They find that personal bankruptcy is explained largely by deregulation (at the 
level of 10%) and growth in the credit card loans. However, the loss rate on loans 
decreases the credit expansion, after the bank deregulation. Their research based on 
personal bankruptcy files from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, however, 
does not explain deregulation effects on mortgage default risk. 
 
The question of how banking market structure affects individual mortgagors‟ default 
through different strategies (e.g., strictness of underwriting standards) both 
empirically and theoretically is still unclear. 
 
2.4.3 Limitation Summary 
Limitations in previous studies are summarized in the following. 
 
1) The costs of mortgage originators as mortgage service producers (not only as 
capital transfer) affect the demand and supply equilibrium in the residential mortgage 
market. The banking market structure affect the total mortgage supply market (either 
by banks or non-banks), and thus will affect the mortgage performance as default. 
The relationship between banking mortgage markets structure and mortgage default 
has not been explored. 
 
2) Individual demand elasticity is heterogeneous. Mortgagors with different 
characteristics have different preference and price elasticity in demand for 
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housing-related mortgage products. The elasticity of residential mortgage demand is 
dependent on credit constraints, payment to income
9
, and personal preference. The 
risk-based pricing and usage of secondary securitization in mortgage markets
10
 also 
change demand elasticity of mortgagors. Therefore, controlling mortgagor 
characteristics is necessary. Agarwal, Ambrose et al. (2009) pointed out that 
concentration of borrowers‟ characteristics (e.g., credit score, income, and 
loan-to-value) in demand side will affect banks‟ loan performance in terms of default 
in subprime and prime mortgage loans. Their studies, however, does not consider the 
effects of the supply-side banking market structure. 
 
3) While, most of the previous studies use cross country level comparison. 
Micro-level studies using county, city and zip-code data to examine individual 
mortgage default behavior are rare. 
 
4) The use of “email marketing” buffers the effect of transportations costs and 
distance between the banks and consumers. The banking market and non-banking 
market structure are interconnected. Banking market structure should be able to affect 
total mortgage supply, either provided by banks and non-banks. Geographical 
distance is no longer critical as individuals travel less and incur fewer transportations 
                                                             
9 If payment-to-income ratio is too high, borrowers are more careful with the mortgage products. The 
elasticity for high payment-to-income borrowers might be higher. 
10 Securitization means mortgage loans originated are pooled together under some rules as part of 
securitized assets, and sold to other investors. After securitization, mortgage originators are believed to 
escort their risk to the investors, as they no longer bear the mortgage risk originated. However market 
concentration level of mortgage originators do affect their securitization price and bargaining power, 




costs in obtaining loans. Hence geographical distance matters, only if the accessibility 





Chapter 3 Data Description 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the data are described and a basic analysis is given to demonstrate the 
scope of the data. The reason to summarize a separate chapter for the data is because 
the empirical studies in following chapters use data mainly from the same data sets 
when testing the proposed arguments.  
 
Section 3.2 will describe the data collection, and its sample size and variables. Section 
3.3 gives some basic facts and statistics. Section 3.4 illustrates the data limitation and 
potential future enrichment. 
3.2 Data Collection 
3.2.1 Data Sources and Collected Raw Variables 
1) First, individual mortgage performance data is collected from more than 6000 
residential mortgage backed securitization deals issued during the periods from 
January 1991 to June 2009
11
 form data source of Bloomberg. Individual mortgage 
data that originated from January 1991, to December 2008 are selected to the 
loan-level analysis. 
 
                                                             
11 Prior to 1991, the non-agency mortgage information is quite not available. After 1991, the U.S. 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) contributes to develop the non-agency mortgage backed securities 
(MBS) investor reporting, which helps to provide possible information for these non-agency MBS. This 
is one of the reasons for such non-agency loans‟ data availability. 
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Mortgage data contain information on securitization year, securitization deal name, 
individual loan sequence identity (ID), original loan balance, current loan balance, 
initial LTV, FICO score of borrowers, mortgage interest rate, mortgage type (FRM 
and ARM), ARM pegged index name, mortgage interest rate reset status, mortgage 
age, mortgage maturity term, month to maturity, delinquency days, special service of 
foreclosure status, property zip code, MSA, geographic state, and mortgage 
performance record (such as delinquency, default, foreclosure, which is discussed in 
the later paragraph). 
 
The month by month payment records for the last 24 months prior to the sample 
cut-off date in June 2009 were collected for individual mortgages. Mortgage status 
information like 90 days delinquency, 60 days delinquency, 30 days delinquency, 
bankruptcy, or foreclosure was also available. If the sample mortgages have been 
“matured” and/or “dead” by more than 24 months, the actual mortgage foreclosure 
dates could be earlier than 24 months. These mortgage samples are treated as the 
delayed foreclosed cases, with the mortgage duration being computed up to the 
earliest month of the 24-month payment history. This treatment could bias downward 
(understate) the probability of default, but may not have significant effects on the 
default risk analysis. 
 
There are mortgage performance reports like 30 days delinquent, 60 days delinquent, 
90 days delinquent, current as keeping payment, bankruptcy, foreclosure and real 
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estate owned. This thesis utilizes the most conservative definition of mortgage 
termination by foreclosure; otherwise, the individual loans are believed to be still 
alive. 
 
The Bloomberg data also separates the securitized residential loan in to different 
catalogs, including that securitized in Res BC, Alt A, and Whole sale. Bloomberg 
classifies the collateral type based on the loan purpose, credit scores, and the name of 
the legal issuer. 1) Res BC are those consisting of a majority of bad performed or B 
and C-rated loans. Bad performed mortgages are characterized by loans under which 
one or more previous payments were 30 or more days delinquent. 2) Alt A are those 
made to borrowers whose qualifying mortgage characteristics do not meet the 
underwriting criteria established by the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs). 
Alt A loans typically has a higher credit score than Res B/C loans but below Whole 
Loans. The Alt A designation is stated in the prospectus or identified by the Lead 
Manager. 3) Whole Loans are those loans that have a higher credit score than Res B/C 
and Alt-A loans. 
 
After removing mortgages with incomplete information on LTV, the final total sample 
includes 7,297,510 individual mortgages.  
 
2) Macro-level data is also collected that include S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price index 
(Composite 10) and 6-month Libor interest rate from Bloomberg economic database. 
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For study in Chapter 4, the national house price index is used to help to determine the 
put option value. It does not use the house price at MSA level, to have a whole picture 
of self-selection in the national level. 
 
3) For more accurate option variables in the nonstrategic default of Chapter 5 as the 
main story in this part based on the option value criteria, house price indexes (HPI) in 
the MSA level are collected from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
 12
. 
Matching the loan data by MSA will result in missing some observations, as many 
loans have not reported their MSAs, and some MSAs do not have reported HPI from 
FHFA. Deleting missing MSA reports, the total sample is 7,108,723, and after 
matching HPI, the total sample is 4,051,561. The study in Chapter 5 is mainly based 
on the sample of 4,051,561. 
 
4) Other macro-economic data such as monthly personal income index and personal 
saving rate as a percentage of disposable income in the U.S. are collected from 
DATASTREAM. The personal income index and saving is published by the US 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Bureau of Census and the US Federal Reserve. 
 
The income index is based on income received by individuals from all sources. It 
includes income from participating in production as well as from the 
government and business transfer payments. It is the sum of compensation of 
                                                             
12
 Further information on the data refers to http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=87. 
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employees (received), supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors' income, 
rental income of persons, and personal current transfer receipts, less 
contributions for government social insurance. 
 
Personal saving is personal income less the sum of personal outlay, personal tax, and 
nontax payments. It is the current saving of individuals (including proprietors & 
partnerships), nonprofit institutions that primarily serve individuals, life 
insurance carriers, private noninsured welfare funds, and private trust funds. 
Personal saving rate series represents personal saving as a percentage of 
disposable personal income, which is personal income less personal tax and 
nontax payments. It is the income available to persons for spending or saving. 
 
5) Income statements of commercial banks, their location data and loan activities are 
collected from Wharton, University of Pennsylvania from 1999 to 2008. Quarterly 
report data for more than 9,000 banks (original 347,356 pooled observations for the 




Table 3. 1: Number of Bank Sample Information for Each State & Territory in U.S. 
State ID 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Alaska AK 32 29 28 28 27 24 24 28 31 31 
Alabama AL 631 634 636 621 610 618 605 602 603 601 
Arkansas AR 793 761 728 682 660 644 626 609 587 567 
American Samoa AS 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Arizona AZ 180 177 174 167 182 180 190 201 212 220 
California CA 1665 1563 1499 1415 1367 1295 1301 1335 1380 1394 
Colorado CO 765 745 719 694 681 668 658 631 611 581 
Connecticut CT 259 243 246 243 242 222 211 207 206 203 
District of Columbia DC 34 32 28 24 24 27 31 30 30 30 
Delaware DE 159 154 158 152 142 135 134 150 160 155 
Florida FL 1266 1242 1228 1219 1227 1215 1195 1229 1272 1249 
Fd. S. of Micronesia FM 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 
Georgia GA 1407 1390 1351 1321 1304 1325 1336 1354 1354 1327 
Guam GU 24 24 24 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Hawaii HI 47 39 36 33 31 28 24 31 32 32 
Iowa IA 1757 1750 1694 1650 1617 1590 1571 1540 1511 1462 
Idaho ID 65 69 67 68 62 59 57 62 63 66 
Illinois IL 3280 3208 3125 3032 2972 2887 2744 2655 2598 2533 
Indiana IN 687 647 653 648 632 607 573 547 514 494 
Kansas KS 1561 1505 1496 1467 1449 1431 1417 1394 1362 1337 
Kentucky KY 1021 980 923 903 884 863 829 808 784 739 
Louisiana LA 629 618 586 578 568 557 553 564 566 561 
Massachusetts MA 856 839 832 797 778 739 710 719 701 661 
Maryland MD 327 312 302 302 299 284 273 270 249 230 
Maine ME 132 127 122 120 124 125 116 116 112 95 
Michigan MI 715 721 679 673 663 648 646 648 629 604 
Minnesota MN 2017 1989 1945 1886 1863 1851 1813 1753 1720 1675 
Missouri MO 1501 1460 1420 1403 1381 1373 1365 1365 1343 1305 
Mississippi MS 400 401 405 396 389 380 375 377 371 368 
Montana MT 346 339 331 320 313 308 313 317 303 299 
North Carolina NC 420 410 423 392 377 378 382 381 391 394 
North Dakota ND 456 445 427 416 411 400 388 378 376 376 
Nebraska NE 1227 1140 1103 1085 1052 1022 1000 983 956 932 
New Hampshire NH 128 116 108 104 103 96 93 80 75 73 
New Jersey NJ 410 425 436 437 424 407 395 383 379 375 
New Mexico NM 219 208 210 208 204 198 192 188 189 196 
Nevada NV 106 121 131 138 139 143 149 146 159 159 
New York NY 1621 1531 1451 1363 1321 1270 1246 1232 1202 1167 
Ohio OH 990 985 936 909 891 862 825 826 806 761 
Oklahoma OK 1213 1170 1134 1108 1092 1075 1070 1055 1028 1012 
Oregon OR 190 190 173 145 149 157 163 164 167 164 
Pennsylvania PA 979 975 940 915 896 880 854 860 850 822 
Puerto Rico PR 66 66 68 64 60 57 56 56 56 52 
Rhode Island RI 38 38 41 45 48 48 44 46 48 46 
South Carolina SC 312 315 305 313 307 302 304 305 281 276 
South Dakota SD 412 397 372 372 365 354 349 347 342 341 
Tennessee TN 813 785 774 770 762 765 751 750 751 740 
Texas TX 3212 3058 2904 2823 2763 2695 2642 2567 2570 2553 
Utah UT 202 219 228 223 230 241 250 255 247 252 
Virginia VA 595 590 575 516 516 499 501 482 426 419 
Virgin Islands VI 12 12 12 9 8 8 8 9 12 8 
Vermont VT 93 85 84 72 69 68 68 68 62 48 
Washington WA 390 395 377 387 382 370 370 367 374 368 
Wisconsin WI 1460 1351 1232 1175 1151 1143 1121 1123 1119 1076 
West Virginia WV 338 307 285 279 272 267 261 258 256 251 
Wyoming WY 199 194 183 184 178 164 162 166 164 156 
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Variables include absolute total interest income, annual expense on funds, annual total 
salaries and benefits, expenses of furniture, fixture, equipment and auto, total assets, 
total securities, total loans and leases, and other necessary information in financial 
income statement. 
 
The Wharton‟s banking income statements is used to generate the state-year level 
market structure measurements (competiveness and bank concentration ratio), which 
are combined with the individual mortgage performance data by the aggregated state 
and year. 
 
The original total mortgage performance sample in Bloomberg matches the Wharton 
banking information, leaving a sample of 4,004,380 individual loan observations for 
the market structure analysis after 1999 in Chapter 6. 
3.2.2 Data Coverage 
Bloomberg individual loan performance data, officially known as delinquency report 
(DQRP) data, are reports from commercial banks and some servicers, who are the 
investors of the residential mortgages. Individual mortgages data in the non-agency 
mortgage securitization sector are collected. 
 
There is more than 1.77 trillion outstanding amounting up to 2008 of the non-agency 
mortgages in the collected total data sample. However, there is no confirmative report 
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on the real market depth of total U.S. residential mortgage market including all the 
non-agency and agency mortgages. The data size in outstanding balance have covered 
2/3 of the non-agency mortgages during the year 1991 to 2008, compared that size 
reported by Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2010), and the 1.6 trillion outstanding 
balance by Keys, etc (2010) . 
 
Non-agency securitized mortgage loans is relatively a small percentage level of total 
U.S. residential mortgage loan in number, however its absolute dollar value is large. 
However, there is no consensus on actually how large is the total U.S. residential 
mortgage loan market, and also the percentage of non-agency loan to total securitized 
loan in the residential market. It is said that there are “around 8 percent in 2001 to 20 
percent in 2006” for the private-label (called non-agency in this thesis) 
mortgage-backed securities as subprime market share of mortgage market, and “from 
54 percent in 2001 to 75 percent in2006” for securitized share of the subprime 
mortgage market (Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2009). 
 
Geographically, the data covers all the MSAs in United States and the covered 
zip-code in each state are listed in Table 3.2. According to U.S. census Bureau, the 
zip-code number across years might be different, and approximately there are about 
40,000 zip-codes in the whole area of United State in the sample used, there are about 
34587 zip-code reported, which takes more than 80% of the zip-code level coverage. 
In the State level, there is 100% coverage. Coverage in each state in term of the 
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number of loan percentage and total amount could be found in Table 3.5 in next 
section. I here have not reported the MSAs coverage, due to some a large proportion 
of missing reported MSAs and mismatched MSAs with state code in its raw data, 
which is also the reason of missing observations after matching to the bank report 
data used in Chapter 6. 
 
It is worth to notice that this thesis is not in the position of telling the whole U.S. 
market. Instead, data are used to test proposed hypotheses, so that coverage is not a 
concern to affect the result discussions. 
3.3 Facts and Statistics 
Consistent with most studies, the mortgage origination increases from the origination 
amount of 134.54$ million in 1991 to 613,729.07$ million up to 2006 (see Table 3.3). 
After 2006, the aggregate original amount decreases dramatically. Comparing the 
current amount and original amount, it is easy to find that amortization speed 
decrease through years. It could see that default actually starts to increases distinctly 
from 2003 and 2004 in the percentage of foreclosure amount, and also in the number 





Table 3. 2: The Estimated Area Coverage of Total Individual Mortgage Sample 
 




Zip-Code 8100 14206 7459 11317 6057 34587 
State 9 17 13 12 23 74(51) 
N 969146 2499000 2516573 1062321 61684 7108724 
 
 
Note: 1) The table shows calculated number of zip-code, number of county, number of 
cities, number of MSAs from the individual mortgage sample. The real coverage of the 
total data is larger than the reported estimated table, as some individual mortgage 
observations do not have sufficient geographic information. 2) The geographic area here 
follows the definition of U.S. Census Bureau. The eastern United States (Middle Atlantic 
and New England) are: PA, NJ, NY, CT, MA, RI, NH, VT, ME; The southern United States 
(West South Central, East South Central, and South Atlantic) are: OK, TX, AR, LA, MS, 
AL, KY, TN, GA, SC, NC, VA, WV, DC, MD, DE, FL; The western United States (Pacific 
and Mountain) are: WA, OR, CA, NV, AZ, UT, ID, MT, WY, CO, NM, AK, HI; The 
northern United States (West North Central and East North Central) are: ND, SD, NE, KS, 
MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, MI, OH. 3)There are other five territories. Puerto Rico (PR) is 
also an unincorporated territory of the United State. VI means the Virgin Islands, as a 
group of island, which is not counted in 51 states & territories: DC. American Samoa, Fd. 
S. of Micronesia,, and Guam are also such unincorporated territory. 4) Miss-code areas 
are some misreported states names and some special area. Some data are miss-coded in 
their geographical locations, which makes hard to distinguish which state the property 
belongs. For examples, some are coded as 0,99,??,A, C, D, DO, F, G, H,I, K, HA, L, GE, 
IO, DI, KA, LO, M, N, NU, O, P, S, NO, PE, RH, T, SO, U, V, VE, W, TE, WE, X, XX, Z, #. 



























1991 134.54 79.87 1.31 0.9747 1.0612 
1992 234.08 148.87 4.06 1.7332 2.0485 
1993 490.01 317.96 10.42 2.1262 2.4862 
1994 526.02 338.58 9.30 1.7685 1.8507 
1995 411.81 256.36 11.37 2.7602 2.3352 
1996 638.38 419.10 19.74 3.0920 2.4143 
1997 1292.03 927.25 48.60 3.7618 2.6323 
1998 3135.14 2348.09 109.44 3.4906 2.7999 
1999 3656.35 2914.89 167.78 4.5888 3.5250 
2000 3173.32 2726.83 176.67 5.5672 4.2650 
2001 6924.54 5929.70 357.74 5.1662 4.4582 
2002 26478.11 22299.57 824.44 3.1137 3.5871 
2003 151706.27 129479.37 2643.65 1.7426 2.4627 
2004 214973.96 199489.20 9650.73 4.4893 4.7897 
2005 497363.77 483465.99 47335.49 9.5173 8.9353 
2006 613729.07 610498.13 91517.29 14.9117 13.0355 
2007 340126.64 338088.09 40508.59 11.9099 11.3903 
2008 2535.37 2466.90 113.47 4.4755 4.6225 
 
Note: This table is the annual aggregated individual mortgage origination value by year. 
The data sample collected includes different kinds of loans, multi-family, single-family, 








Table 3. 4: Geographic Distribution for the Raw Data of the Full Sample 
 
State State Name Number 
of Loan 





















AK Alaska 6.29 1206.678 1165.254 65.19178 5.594642 4.292528 
AL Alabama 60.113 7557.308 7118.911 314.3389 4.415547 3.714671 
AR Arkansas 27.136 3035.203 2843.592 139.1582 4.893747 3.90625 
AZ Arizona 233.501 53443.11 52412.66 5919.41 11.29385 10.16098 
CA California 1570.301 663451.4 647308 61073.35 9.434975 9.250838 
CO Colorado 162.983 38093.4 36542.55 1939.443 5.307356 4.859403 
CT Connecticut 82.238 25110.38 23745.03 1963.268 8.268123 8.759941 
DE Delaware 19.619 4429.531 4224.759 372.8817 8.826108 8.975993 
FL Florida 758.561 172862.5 169039.7 45205.08 26.74228 24.01402 
GA Georgia 232.298 39997.34 38379.21 2173.596 5.663474 4.984976 
HI Hawaii 33.847 13606.62 13206.12 1384.748 10.48565 9.164771 
IA Iowa 25.571 2640.514 2491.652 218.0943 8.752999 7.989519 
ID Idaho 33.948 6358.708 6148.492 578.5676 9.409911 7.641098 
IL Illinois 239.951 52047.68 49892.27 5716.588 11.45786 10.75678 
IN Indiana 102.314 10873.09 10266.84 1055.901 10.28458 9.291006 
KS Kansas 31.009 3765.96 3513.973 183.3151 5.216746 4.521268 
KY Kentucky 44.791 5180.425 4886.426 410.3437 8.397625 7.454623 
LA Louisiana 54.752 6413.452 6036.414 482.3614 7.990861 6.849065 
MA Massachusetts 125.321 39186.1 37239.35 2920.401 7.842245 7.944399 
MD Maryland 184.694 54904.02 53078.21 4511.685 8.50007 7.964525 
ME Maine 18.222 3279.236 3125.676 420.607 13.45651 12.7154 
MI Michigan 196.21 27814.18 26633 1539.025 5.778642 5.06753 
MN Minnesota 101.696 21817.32 20965.72 1502.095 7.164527 6.759361 
MO Missouri 89.562 11409.74 10804.64 486.1288 4.499259 4.089904 
MS Mississippi 33.493 3241.819 3048.048 176.2062 5.780953 4.469591 
MT Montana 10.159 2329.364 2216.309 140.0517 6.319143 5.236736 
NC North Carolina 144.424 24735.82 23460.18 995.559 4.243611 4.004875 
ND North Dakota 3.394 349.247 325.037 16.18936 4.980776 4.419564 
NE Nebraska 18.244 1957.695 1841.179 96.00183 5.214151 4.511072 
NH New Hampshire 24.262 5054.273 4836.916 258.0026 5.33403 4.649246 





Table 3.4: Geographic Distribution for the raw data of the full sample (Continue) 
State State Name Number 
of Loan 





















NJ New Jersey 184.719 59672.61 56903.05 8100.032 14.23479 13.73275 
NM New Mexico 28.68 5327.236 5052.934 393.3987 7.785552 6.767782 
NV Nevada 156.397 40321.4 39796.49 5558.119 13.96636 12.18885 
NY New York 319.078 113291.2 107176.7 12122.13 11.31041 10.13169 
OH Ohio 190.286 22395.32 21268.63 2218.824 10.43238 9.716952 
OK Oklahoma 45.579 4612.346 4312.355 314.8971 7.302206 6.342833 
OR Oregon 88.91 19806.57 19172.98 1485.435 7.747542 6.558317 
PA Pennsylvania 189.162 28660.59 27069.7 1869.542 6.9064 6.709064 
RI Rhode Island 21.784 5108.099 4905.927 469.4129 9.568281 8.721998 
SC South Carolina 76.767 13548.12 12873.58 1017.198 7.901436 7.088984 
SD South Dakota 4.665 570.5098 537.0899 35.05979 6.527732 6.02358 
TN Tennessee 110.928 14035.81 13258.77 531.9978 4.012422 3.577997 
TX Texas 479.389 61285.74 57367.19 2098.215 3.657517 3.233074 
UT Utah 54.561 11722.89 11360.79 1066.124 9.384248 6.805227 
VA Virginia 201.149 60825.31 58835.16 3169.328 5.386792 4.890405 
VT Vermont 6.097 1298.108 1221.891 120.2798 9.843737 9.299656 
WA Washington 169.308 45378.94 44016.28 2800.536 6.3625 5.880998 
WI Wisconsin 58.796 8763.604 8404.246 976.4893 11.619 11.05858 
WV West Virginia 11.234 1399.954 1335.961 91.51711 6.850283 5.234111 
WY Wyoming 6.331 1297.983 1221.054 41.48814 3.397732 3.032696 
Other Areas besides the 50 Federal States above 
DC Washington, 
D.C. 
19652 7698.984 7364.149 310.2034 4.212345 4.457562 
GU Guam 90 9.264581 7.231409 0.270973 3.747167 3.333333 
MP Northern 
Mariana Islands 
3 0.2232 0.141209 0 0 0 
PR Puerto Rico 16126 2783.617 2483.166 76.97849 3.100013 2.753318 
VI Virgin Islands 129 46.6818 41.17703 0.338382 0.821774 1.550388 
Note: The variables definition is the same as Table 3.3. DC is Washington, D.C.; GU is 
Guam, an organized, unincorporated territory of the United States in western Pacific 
Ocean. MP is an official commonwealth in political union with the United States. PR, 
officially the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, is unincorporated territory of the United 
States in northeastern Caribbean Sea.VI, the virgin islands, are a group of islands in the 
Caribbean that are an insular area of the United States. 
 
There are a large quantity non-agency loans both in number and loan amount in 
California and Florida (see Table 3.4). Mortgage foreclosure percentage is extremely 
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high in the state of Florida, based on the data sample.  Other states such like Arizona, 
Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, and Wisconsin all have quite high 
foreclosure percentage. 
 
Table 3. 5: Basic Statistic for the Raw Data of the Full Sample 
 Full sample Alt A Res BC Whole Sale 
Variables Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
ORGAMT 258276.06 241652.85 264221.46 213221.20 161253.95 137959.11 427865.06 300195.71 
CURAMT 249381.54 235392.42 257850.43 215404.68 157041.26 137425.14 409235.79 290987.25 
LTV 75.91 19.75 73.75 13.64 78.23 23.41 72.96 14.16 
FICO 674.22 75.48 712.10 48.84 637.70 89.17 724.18 54.45 
Dummy_ARM 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.49 
Age 46.27 19.85 43.87 14.31 46.71 21.53 46.80 19.27 
Maturity 
Term 
350.39 60.39 348.17 53.52 350.05 66.51 352.21 51.83 
RATE 7.26 2.05 6.26 0.95 8.36 1.99 5.86 1.36 
Num. of 
Obser. 
7108724 1176840 3799463 2132421 
Note: This table gives a basic statistic to the raw total full sample of residential 
individual loan data. The table displays the statistics by deal types defined by the data 
source Bloomberg for interested readers. The underwriting standards of 
nonconforming loans are referred to as “B/C quality” from subprime originators.  
B/C is a grading scale, where “A” is assigned to mortgages for strong borrower, and 
a “D” scale is assigned to borrowers, with equity-based lending without 
consideration of income and credit history. (Fabozzi, Ramsey and Marz 2000). As 
agency securities are usually 100% guaranteed against credit risk, either through 
explicit or implicit way, non-agency securitized loans have limited loss protection 
with unsecured credit enhancements. A large number of non-agency mortgages are 
traded as “whole sale” loans, where buyers have some level of recourse to the seller 
for potential credit losses. 
 
 
From Table 3.5, the large standard deviation of original amount and current amount, 
showing that mortgage amount diverges. The mean of current amount is only little 
smaller than that of original mortgage amount, indicating a relative slow amortization 
speed for the alive loans. The average LTV for the full data set is 75.91%, and 
averaged FICO of the total sample is 674.22, which is higher than the subprime 
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cut-off of 630. The mean of Dummy_ARM reflects the ARM percentage, a 49% in 
total origination, showing ARM in aggregate has smaller number of loans than FRM 
in total collected data sample. The average age is 46.27 months, which is 
approximately 2 years, while average maturity terms is 350.39 months, close to the 
most widely used loan term of 30 years. 
3.4 Data Limitation and Future Enrichment 
This part shortly discusses some limitation on the collected individual mortgage loan 
and banking data currently.  
 
1) It could not distinguish multi-family or single-family residential loan. The family 
composition is an important factor in the stability on housing, which affects mortgage 
termination risk. When the data was collected at July.2009, no such information was 
available. However, the data sources have been keeping updating their variables, 
which already provide platform for future extensive studies related to the family 
compositions. 
 
2) The collected data currently have not included information on whether ARM is 
hybrid, standard format or mixed FRM/ARM. As hybrid ARM is suggested to be 
highly risky for potential payment jump, compared to standard ARM, the lack of such 




3) The Wharton‟s bank regulation data does not give loan amount to residential or 
commercial mortgage. Hence the competition and concentration determined by the 
data is a proxy to the general market structure on banking service, which would 
indirectly affect strategies to residential loans in banks and non-banks by their 
interactive role of them. 
 
4) The residential mortgage data collected only include non-agency mortgage data. 
However, there are much more information updating, which also include agency 
mortgage data. Except Bloomberg, some agency loans can now be downloaded 
directly from some websites, such as Ginnie Mae. It could refer to 
http://www.ginniemae.gov/disclosure/download.asp?Section=Investors 
 
5) Mortgage originators for each individual mortgage loans and their servicers‟ 
information are important to further extend the thesis understanding to market 
structure of Chapter 6. It might also combine the data with home mortgage home 
mortgage disclosure data (HMDA) by Federal Reserve Board Reports, which provide 
more details on individual characteristics, such as income, based on mortgage 
application information, and also provide institution location information. Besides, 
Department of Housing and Urban Development‟s (HUD) also has a list of subprime 
lenders. 
 
6) To understand the risk of individual residential mortgage, the more detailed 
 77 
 
information is always preferable. Other data sources can be used to further enrich the 
data for extensive studies in the area. For instance, associations such as Mortgage 
Bankers Association, Inside Mortgage Finance, and Credit rating agencies such as 
Standard and Pool‟ s Rating Group, Moody‟s Investors Service, Inc., Fitch ICBA, 




Chapter 4 Self-selection and Default 
4.1 Introduction 
Mortgagees/lenders rely on “observable” characteristics of borrowers to sort 
heterogeneous borrowers into different risk groups in underwriting process. However, 
borrower and mortgage characteristics alone do not reveal sufficient information to 
segregate risks in mortgages.  
 
This part answers the first research question of “Whether borrowers’ choose different 
mortgages under consumption allocation? and how do heterogeneous borrower 
characteristic and their mortgage choice between FRM and ARM affect borrowers’ 
ex-post default risks”. It develops a lifetime utility model to explain borrowers‟ 
behavior in mortgage selection and utility maximization in the consumption of 
housing and non-housing services. The numerical results show that borrowers choose 
high LTV loan to expand consumptions on housing, and borrowers will also make 
self-selection of mortgage types between adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) and 
fixed-rate mortgages (FRM) to maximize their housing utility function. 
 
Using the Heckman‟s two-step methodology, the effects of self-selection on 
proportional default hazard are empirically tested. The empirical tests show that 
comparative self-selection in general, and self-selection into FRM, reduces mortgage 
ex-post default risks. However, borrowers, who self-select into ARM mortgages, are 
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likely to have high default probability relative to other borrowers. The self-selection 
effects are reinforced by higher credit (FICO) scores of borrowers. The results imply 
that borrowers‟ self-selection decisions reveal true signals of the default risks 
embedded in LTV and other observable mortgage and borrower characteristics.  
 
Instead of concentrating on separating or pooling equilibrium from lenders‟ profit 
rules, which are studied greatly in previous studies, this thesis suggests that borrowers‟ 
self-selection process endogenously contributes to explore the ex-post borrowers‟ 
default risk. 
 
The section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 theoretically analyzes the existence of 
optimal choice based on heterogeneous borrowers‟ life time utility maximizing, 
facing a menu of mortgage contracts under stochastic setting. Section 4.3 gives the 
two-step self-selection empirical analysis on borrowers‟ default decision, where 
methodology and empirical results are described. Different empirical models based 
on proportional hazard are compared at Section 4.5. Robust test of self-selection in 
large LTV, selection between long-term and short-term pegged index, and 
self-selection for non-jumbo subsample are also demonstrated. The last section is the 
summary of the study. 
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4.2. Mortgage Choice on the Menu 
4.2.1 Model Essence Summary 
In the earlier mortgage self-selection models under asymmetric information 
framework (Brueckner 1993; Brueckner 1994), the choice of FRM or ARM by 
homogenous borrowers is solely dependent on the exogenous mobility probability. 
The borrowers‟ decision to move triggers default in the second period payments in 
their two-period model. The equilibrium mortgage rates are derived on the 
assumption of zero lender profit. In the proposed model, borrowers choose optimal 
mortgage contracts to maximize their lifetime utility taking into consideration the 
expectation of future income, and ability to make mortgage payments.  
 
There are some assumptions, which make this study different from previous studies 
on borrowers‟ self-selection in the information asymmetric framework. 
 
The first assumption is that borrowers‟ decisions are separated into two steps: 
mortgage choice with non-default probability and then mortgage ex-post default after 
mortgage choice. There is rationality to make such two steps decision assumptions. 1) 
There are very few persons defaulting under expected risk, which means that most of 
borrowers are non-strategic borrowers. According to default incentive studies in 
recent years, most of borrowers are either unwilling to default (“non-ruthless” 
borrowers) or default under unexpected trigger events (“suboptimal” default) 
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(Detailed discussion on these behaviors could be found in Section 2.3.1). Borrowers 
no longer default ruthlessly when housing equity is negative as predicted by the 
option-based models. Mortgage ex-post default behavior is determined jointly by the 
heterogeneous characteristics of borrowers and their ex-ante choice (self-section) of 
mortgage contracts. 2) Borrowers might not consider their default risk as lender 
assumes, when borrowers choose mortgage type. It is intuitively like “very few people 
will presume a divorce probability when they get married”.  Every borrower is 
basically potential arbitrary individual after their mortgage contract settlements. 3) 
Non-default borrowers might not be indifferent to mortgage types as assumed in 
previous studies. Borrowers could consider their wealth allocation between housing 
and non-housing consumption decision into borrowers‟ decision to mortgage types. 
 
The second assumption is that lenders will price the mortgage based on the FICO 
score and lenders‟ capital costs. This assumption comes from the observations during 
the credit expansion and excessive securitizations during 2000s. 
 
Based on these assumptions, a stylized theoretical model is built on mortgage choice 
for two-step decision borrowers, facing simple exogenously specified menu of 
mortgage provided by lenders. In the proposed lifetime utility maximization model, 
borrowers with heterogeneous attributes (e.g., income, credit scores) and 
consumption preference functions choose a menu of mortgage contracts including 




4.2.2 Stochastic Variables Setting 
In addition to the two stochastic house prices and stochastic market interest rates 
commonly found in default option models, stochastic borrower income as the third 
variable is included to simulate borrowers‟ self-selection process in the model. The 
three stochastic variables: house price, 
tP , market interest rate, tr , and borrower 
























                   (4-3) 
 
Where 
p , r , and Y  are the constant drift terms; p , r  and Y  are the 
constant volatility terms; and  
pdz , rdz , and Ydz  are the incremental of a standard 
Wiener process for the respective variables, and the three Wiener processes are not 
correlated, ( , ) 0i jCor dz dz  , where i and j refer to any pair of variables. The 
option-based mortgage default models assume that ( )bp    , where 
b  is the 
expected return of borrower
13
, and   is the constant proportion of housing services. 
                                                             
13
 The expected return αb = μP + θ is equated to market interest rate α
b = r in some cases (Kau and 
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4.2.3 Mortgage Menu and Mortgage Interest Rate 
Lenders offer an ad-infinitum menu of mortgage contracts, where borrowers could 
choose to satisfy the housing consumption objective. For the simulation analysis 
purposes, the mortgage maturity term is fixed at  =30 years. Borrowers choose 
payment structure (ARM or FRM) and LTV ratio, and lenders charge differential 
mortgage rate based on the selected terms in mortgage contracts.  
 
Suppose that the base interest rate of mortgage is computed as the weighted average 
cost of debt and equity: 
, 0( ) (1 ) ( )FRM i i i i pR LTV r DP LTV              (4-4) 
 
where iLTV is the loan-to-value of borrower i, 0r is the initial market interest rate, 
iDP  is the default premium. The last term ( )p   captures the user cost of 
housing, where 
p  is the expected appreciation of house equity, and   is the 
house services consumed. 
 
FRM rate is pegged to the base interest rate 
,[ ]i FRM iR R . The interest rate for the 
adjustable rate mortgage contracts ( )i ARM  , can be defined as follows:  
 
, 0( )ARM i i tR R r r                (4-5) 






0( )tr r  is the term risk premiums for interest rates between time 0 and t; 
and   is a discount to the interest rate given to borrower for bearing interest rate 
risks in ARM.  
4.2.4 Household’s Lifetime Utility Maximization 
Subject to budget constraints, a household (borrower) i chooses to consume 
i  
amount of housing good iQ , and (1 )i  amount of non-housing goods tC . The 
consumption function is continuous in time t, such that the cumulative consumption 
up to time t is given as:
0
t
tC . The household derives the following instantaneous 
utility tu , from the consumption: 
ln( ) (1 ) ln( )t i t i i tu P H C                   (4-6) 
 
where   is the housing services derived from owning a house, tP  is the stochastic 
housing price for a basic housing type, and iH is the optimized housing size 
preferred by household i . i  measures the inter-temporal preference for housing 
goods, and has a value between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates that he/she will give up all 
consumption of non-housing goods for more housing goods.  
 
The household finances the housing consumption (purchase) using a mortgage loan, 
where the accessibility to the mortgage is subject to two conditions imposed by 
lenders in the underwriting process:  
 85 
 
 Down payment constraint:
0 0(1 )i iLTV P H W        (4-7a) 
 Monthly Payment-to-Income Ratio:




is the initial wealth (savings), and  is the acceptable payment-to-income 
ratio. 
tM is the monthly mortgage payment,
14
 which is dependent on the housing 
value ( )t iPH , the market interest rate, tr , the loan-to-value ratio, iLTV  , the 
payment structure, 
i , where [ i  =1, if ARM; or i = 0, if FRM], and the mortgage 
term,  , such that 
( , , , , )t t i i iM f PH r LTV                 (4-8) 
 
For instance, the debt service for an ARM with a monthly compounding interest rate 




t t ARM t i t iM B R LTV PH

    

                            (4-9) 
 
where tB  is the outstanding loan balance at time t ; and the last two terms in the 
equation ( )i t iLTV PH  measure the loan quantum at the origination ( 0)t  .  
 
Subject to the monthly payment constraint as in Eq. (4-8), the household optimizes 
the aggregate lifetime utility function adjusting for time-preference parameter  , 
where 0  , which is set up as follows: 
                                                             
14 In fact, mortgage payment is just one catalog of housing expense, which should also include mortgage 









V e u dt

             (4-10) 
Subject to the constraints on the transition wealth and the lifetime wealth:  
 
1t t t t tW W Y C M               (4-11) 
0(0)W W ; and ( ) 0W                  (4-12) 
 
The optimization problem in Eq. (4-10) can be solved as an optimal control problem 
in the following Hamiltonian function with four state variables :  
( , , , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )i t t t t t i t t t t t tH P C Y u H P C dW Y C M             (4-13) 
 
where 
t  is current Lagrangian Multiplier, and tdW  is the transition wealth that is 
( ) ( )t t t t t t tdW Y C M Y C Y       . 
 
The Pontryagin maximum principle (Shone 2002) is used to solve the optimal control 















   

               (4-15) 
 
where 
t  is the change of the current Lagrangian multiplier.  
 




i . The first-order condition for the non-housing goods 









                (4-16) 
 
Eq. (4-15) is simplified to 






 is dependent on non-housing consumption, mortgage 
contract and exogenous income (See Eq. 4-11). The general solution for the 
simplified equation is given as t
t K e
   , where K  is an unknown parameter 
determined by the boundary conditions. The consumption of non-housing goods as in 







             (4-17) 
 
The wealth function converges in time T subject to constraints in Eq. (4-11) as 
follows: 
0 0 0
( ) ( ) (0)
T T T
t t tW T Y C M W                 (4-18) 
4.2.5 Numerical Analysis 
As 
t  is a complex function consisting of 3 stochastic control variables (house price, 
interest rate, income), there is no close-form solution to Eq. (4-17). The parameter K  
is numerically solved using Monte-Carlo simulations and filtration algorithms to 




The expectation processes for the stochastic state variables including housing price, 
market interest rate and income are generated using the Monte Carlo simulation. The 
optimal consumption paths that maximize the aggregate multi-period utility 
tC  
could be solved subject to the boundary conditions in Eq. (4-14) to Eq. (4-18) defined 
in the Pontryagin maximum principle.
15
 The input parameters used in solving the 
optimal utility are summarized in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2
16
. The mortgage maturity 
period , is fixed at 30 years in the simulation.  
 
The sensitivity of LTV, housing size and mortgage type on optimal utilities of 
households is tested, through varying the LTV range from 10% to 100%, and 
differentiate housing type by size into 7 categories. In the sensitive analysis, the 
household has a binary choice of mortgage type between ARM and FRM. Figure 4.1 
shows the optimal utility locus for high FICO and high income borrowers (Type 1), 
who choose ARMs. With no monthly payment-to-income constraint, the borrowers 
consume more housing by taking higher LTV ARMs to achieve the optimal level 
utilities. The borrowers‟ optimal utilities increase in the housing size and the LTV, 
when an ARM is selected. The simulation analyses is extended to five other types of 
borrower differentiated by income and FICO score as described in Table 4.1. 
 
                                                             
15
  Alternatively, one can generate the stochastic processes for the state variables, and derive the optimal 
consumption paths in the simulation process. The optimal utility is then computed as the mean values of 
the optimal consumption paths. The two simulation processes give the same results.  
16 Different scenario has been set, e.g., borrowers with same income and different housing preferences. 
Results are not all shown here. 
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The optimal trade-offs between housing size and LTV for different borrowers are 
determined by the interception of the payment-to-income constraint line and the 




Table 4. 1: Heterogeneous Borrowers‟ Type 
           Income Level 
Credit Score 
H M L 
H Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
L Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 
Note: 1) H in credit score means high (e.g., 700 FICO Score); L is means low (e.g., 600 
FICO Score); 2) H in income level means high initial income (e.g., $10,000); M in 
income level means medium initial income (e.g., $6,000); L in income level means low 
initial income (e.g., $2,500). 
 
 
Table 4. 2: Estimated Parameters from Data 
Description Parameter Value 
House Price rate of appreciation 
P  
0.00948 
House Price Volatility 
P  
0.00049536 
Drift of disposable income 
Y  
0.0043 
Borrower‟s income volatility 
Y  
0.0008568 
mean of market Interest rate 
r  0.0017247 
volatility of market Interest rate 
r  
0.001795 
Other Parameters and initial values 





          1/360 
1 2 3, ,DP DP DP  
0.001 
4 5 6, ,DP DP DP  
0.004 
ARS 0.0005   
0r  
0.004 (0)mY  
8000 
(0)hY  
10000 (0)lY  
2500 
Note: For the convenience of comparison with empirical results by other researchers. 
House price index is Monthly data of the S&P/Case Shiller Home Price Composite 10 
Index. Income parameters are based on monthly data of U.S. Personal Income (PITL) 
index from the same period. Interest rate parameters are estimated by LIBOR 6 Month 
rate monthly frequent data. Euler estimation method is used for the GBM process 
parameters estimation based on period 1997-2-28 to 2006-7-31 (boom market). 
 
 
By keeping the FICO constant, it is observed that the optimal housing size is 
negatively related to household income. Higher income household (Type 1) consumes 
more housing than lower income household (Type 2 or 3). It is here also shown that 
the optimal LTV are higher for higher FICO borrowers (Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3), 
compared with lower FICO borrowers (Type 4, Type 5 and Type 6).    
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Figure 4. 1: Utility Level under Different Combination of LTV and House size 
 
 
Note: Optimal locus: the locus of optimal Utility under different combination of House 
size and LTV. 
Utility Curves: Utility level under different LTV, given the house size.  
Parameters used in the numerical analyses are summarized in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.  
 
 
The optimal mortgage choices by different borrower types are summarized in Table 
4.3. Unlike Brueckner‟s (1992) “adverse selection” model that is driven exogenously 
by borrowers‟ mobility decisions, in which he argues that borrowers are “indifferent 
between the available mortgage contracts”, the results hypothesize that borrowers do 
have different preference for mortgage contracts (mortgage type and/or LTV) and 
housing consumption, given constant mortgage rate and borrowers‟ characteristics 
(such as income and credit score) (ceteris paribus).  
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Note: The solid line is the optimal combination of House size and LTV in lifetime problem, 
which already takes into consideration of down payment constraints (dash line). Down 
payment constraint is the borrower’s ability to initiate the loan, and it is bound both for 
doc and no-doc loan. Therefore, the solid line is always below the dash line. 
Payment-to-income ratio constraint is a strategy by the lenders to decrease risk, and it is 
not bound for Low/No-doc loan or no-ratio loan. The payment to income ratio constraint 
varies through time, however the payment to income ratio constraints shown in the figure 
is based on initial payment on Fixed rate mortgage. Input parameters in the analyses are 
summarized in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. 
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In Table 4.3, borrowers of Type 2 and Type 3 with high FICO score instead prefer to 
choose ARM, despite having more mortgage options and freely to choose 
conventional FRMs. The choice of more risky ARMs contract allows the high FICO 
score borrowers to secure loans with high LTV, such that they could maximize the 
consumption utility by buying a bigger house. 
 
Table 4.3 also shows that the selection of a risky ARM mortgage by a prime borrower 
reveals useful unobservable information such as real income of borrowers, which is 
related to future default risks of the mortgage. The choice of the ARM mortgage by a 
“subprime” borrower, on the other hand, contains less information to derive such 
unobservable factors to assess the ex-post default risk, because the borrower 
constrained by his/her income and credit-score criteria is not given the same menu of 
choice of mortgage types, i

, as the prime borrower. In this way, specific mortgage 
choice for borrowers (e.g., ARM contracts for prime mortgagors) could reveal some 





Table 4. 3: Borrowers‟ Optimal Choice on Mortgage Contract 
 
Borrower Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6 
FRM 
H 7 4.77 1.97 2.33 3.48 1.51 
LTV 83.55 81.2 83.22 51.51 75.49 74.48 
Utility 1802.82 1721.04 1555.478 1806.836 1751.012 1581.901 
ARM 
H 7 4.81 2.08 2.45 3.54 1.97 
LTV 84 81.87 81.87 49.97 76.36 57.69 
Utility 1802.319 1721.612 1558.646 1808.932 1750.709 1591.24 
Opt.Contract FRM ARM ARM ARM FRM ARM 
Note: This table shows simulated result for scenario case given in Table 4.2. Optimal H 
and LTV for each contract are gained from the curve interception like Figure 4.2. Utility 
is interpolated optimally. 
 
4.3 Empirical Models 
4.3.1 Model Specifications 
This chapter mainly uses the loan performance data of a sample with 7,297,510 from 
1991 to 2009 and macroeconomic data. Detailed data description could refer to 
Section 3.2.1: part1) and 2).  
 
When the mortgage risk is priced at the underwriting process based on observable 
attributes, the borrower self-selects mortgage type that allows him/her to maximize 
their lifetime consumption utility. 
 




( , ,  ) ( , , ,housing consumption preference)g H LTV Mortgage Type f FICO Y W
 
where Y is unobservable real income, and W  is unobservable wealth. Any 
mortgage choice variables can be stated as inverse function form. Therefore, the 
mortgage type choice can be written as 
1 ( , , ( , , ,housing consumption preference))Mortgage Type g H LTV f FICO Y W
 
The above equation could be interpreted that borrowers‟ mortgage choice are 
associated with their preferred observable LTV (verifiable risk factors), house size, 
their heterogeneous unobservable characteristic features like real income, wealth, 
credit worthiness, and housing consumption preference (unverifiable risk factors).  
Those unobservable risk factors in borrowers‟ mortgage choice decision are also 
important factors to borrowers‟ default. This provides the empirical incentives to use 
a two-stage approach(Lee 1978). 
 
The endogenous effect of mortgage choice and borrowers‟ default risk are separated 
in a 2-stage approach (Heckman 1976; Lee 1978). The two types of mortgage in the 
model are differentiated by a binary dummy variable  , which has a value 1, if 
mortgage is an ARM type, and 0 otherwise. The binary mortgage choice decision is 
modeled as a Probit function that depends on the LTV and the credit score of 
borrowers that are observable in the mortgage contracts:  




where p  is a vector coefficient for the regressor vector S , that is 
( , )LTV FICOS , and i is a standard normalized error term. LTV  and FICO  
are defined as categorical variables in the empirical model. 
 
Based on the estimates of the probit model Eq. (4-19), it can predict the probability of 
a borrower choosing an ARM 1  , if the FICO of the borrower and LTV are 
observed:  











              (4-21) 
 
From the probit model, the density function ( )if  , and the cumulative normal 
distribution function ( )iF  , where [ ' ]i p  iS , are used to derive two 
self-selection factors. It can use the self-selection of mortgage type by borrowers as 
useful signals for borrowers‟ unobservable risk to predict the (latent) default risks of 
mortgages. 
 




























, to represent endogenous 
unobservable risk factors captured by mortgage choice of ARM and FRM 
 97 
 
respectively. For denotation simplicity, they are referred to as self-selection factor; 
however, they are different from traditional borrower self-selection in asymmetric 
information framework as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Following other researcher (Lee 
2001), a comparative self-selection factor is also computed: 
( 1) ( 0)
( ) ( )
[ ]










, to measure the relative propensity of choosing 
ARM over FRM by borrowers. For denotation purposes, it use 
( 1)i iSFARM SF    and ( 0)i iSFFRM SF    to represent the self-selection 
of ARM and FRM respectively, and [ ]i i iDSF SFARM SFFRM  as the relative 
self-selection variable, where subscript i denotes a sample mortgage.  
 
A greater absolute value of a negative 
iDSF  means that borrowers have greater 
propensity to choose ARM, as higher negative value of SFARM . On the other hand, 
a greater positive iDSF  represents fewer propensities to choose ARM. This 
interpretation is similar to Fu and Lum (2006)‟s propensity to resale house. 
 
In the second stage analysis, the study extends the competing risk model (Deng 1997; 
Deng, Quigley and Van Order 2000) by incorporating the mortgage self-selection 
factors into the default hazard function:  
' '
0( ) ( , ) ( ) exp( ' )i i i jt t x t X Z SF                (4-22) 
 
where '
iX  is a vector of exogenous variables that include FICO score, income and 
year dummies; 'Z  is the option-based vector that include default and prepayment 
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option premiums; and 
'
jSF  is the self-selection factor estimated from the Probit 
model in Stage one. Partial likelihood method (Cox 1972) is applied to estimate the 
coefficient vectors in the models, that are  ,  , and  . 
4.3.2 Regression Variables  
Table 4.4 provides a concise summary of mortgage level and macro-economic 
variables used in the extended competing risk models. Some key variables and their 
derivations are discussed below: 
 
a) Mortgage Age (AGE) 
 
Mortgage age is measured as the duration between the origination date and the cut-off 
date that is June 2009, if the loans remain active (“alive”). For the foreclosed 
mortgages, the mortgage age is defined as the duration between the mortgage 
origination date and the earliest date in the 24-month payment window, where the 
“foreclosure” of mortgages was first reported. The mortgage age for the “live” 
mortgages is truncated on the right-hand side at the sample cut-off date, whereas age 
of mortgages foreclosed more than 24 months from the cut-off date are truncated on 
the left-tail. The left-truncation is due to unavailability of payment records beyond 24 
months from the sample date. The actual duration of the early foreclosed mortgages 
(left-truncation) is longer than the reported numbers, which bias downward the 
probability of default risks. At same time, the actual duration of the uncensored 
(right-truncation) might bias upward the probability of default. The later on robust 




b) Original Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV)  
 
Borrowers with high leverage position in financing housing consumptions have 
higher probability of default when price shocks occur (Ben-Shahar 2008; Brueckner 
2000; Calhoun and Deng 2002; Harrison, Noordewier and Yavas 2004). Mortgages 
with high origination LTV loans are more likely to hit the negative equity position 
when housing price declines (Calhoun and Deng 2002; Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 
2009; Sherlund 2008). The study also discretely divides original LTV of sample 
mortgages into seven groups, LTV„i‟, where i = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), sorting sample 
LTV in a descending order as follows: [LTV1 > 100%]; [100%  LTV2  90%]; [90% 
 LTV3  80%]; [80%  LTV4  70%]; [70%  LTV5  60%]; [60%  LTV6 > 50%]; 
and the reference group is [LTV7 50%]. 
 
c) FICO Score (FICO) 
 
The credit scoring system, commonly known as FICO score, developed by the Fair 
Isaac Corporation is widely used by lending institutions and banks to assess credit 
risk of mortgagors. Some past studies found significant relationships between the 
FICO scores and the probability of mortgages default (Danis and Pennington-Cross 
2005; Pennington-Cross and Nichols 2000; Pennington-Cross, Yezer and Nichols 
2000; Sherlund 2008; Van Order 2007). Some studies showed that the deterioration of 
credit score of borrowers did not affect default during the period from 2003 to 2007 
(Haughwout, Peach and Tracy 2008; Mayer, Pence and Sherlund 2009).  
Borrowers‟ FICO scores are also sorted into 4 groups, FICO“i”, where [i = (1, 2, 3, 
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4)], such that (FICO1  634); (634 < FICO2  686); (686 < FICO3 736); (FICO4 > 
736). A dummy variable, NOFICO
17
, is used to represent those sample borrowers 
whose FICO scores are not reported in the data. The study tests the empirical 
relationship between mortgage default and the borrowers‟ risk characteristics 
measured by the FICO scores. If the FICO scores reflect the creditworthiness of 
borrowers, a positive relationship between FICO score and default risks is expected.  
 
d) Option variables 
 
Following the competing risk mortgage termination models(Deng, Quigley and Van 
Order 2000), “call option” and “put option” values are included in the default hazard 
models. If the “put option” of a mortgage is in the money, the mortgage has a 
negative equity, and borrowers will ruthlessly default on mortgages. The research 
defines the probability of equity being negative (Calhoun and Deng 2002) PNEQ as 
the function of the current market value CURMKV , the current outstanding 
mortgage balance CURAMT , and the house price volatility
,P t , and it is written 
as: 
,







             
 (4-23) 
 
where [ ]   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The current 
outstanding mortgage balance CURAMT is obtained directly from the mortgage 
                                                             
17  NOFICO is a dummy variable used to indicate mortgage samples that do not have information on 
borrowers‟ FICO scores. It is not referred to no-documentation (No-doc) mortgages, where borrowers 
choose not to use or reveal their FICO scores in the mortgage application processes.  
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data. The current market value CURMKV at time t is not observable. This study 
computes the CURMKV  by setting the drift of the original market value
ORGAMT  to the changes in S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price (Composite 10) 
index 




          (4-24) 
  
where LTV  is the original loan-to-value ratio of mortgages. The house price 
volatility
,P t  is the variance of S&P/Case-Shiller price index using a three-year 
moving window estimation with reference to the mortgage date. 
 
The “call option” reflects the prepayment risk of mortgages, where borrowers 
exercise the options to prepay when the mortgage interest rate
iR  is higher than the 










          (4-25) 
 
where R  is volatility of market interest rate computed from the 6-month LIBOR 
rate. Squared terms of the “put option” (
2PNEQ ) and the “call option” (
2PPAY ) 
are included to test for non-linearity in the option values on default hazards.  
 
e) Household Income and Savings 
 
Low income households facing liquidity constraints are more likely to default on their 
loan service obligations compared to high income households (Haughwout, Peach 
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and Tracy 2008; Vandell 1995). Household income also affects the optimal housing 
consumption (Whiting 2004) and mortgage choice decisions (Follain 1990; Posey and 
Yavas 2001). The effects of household income on mortgage default are conditional on 
mortgage choice and housing consumption decisions. Individual borrower income 
information is not available in the mortgage data sources. This study, therefore, uses 
the monthly income data published by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (source: 
the US Federal Reserve)
18
to index the income of the sample borrowers at the 
origination period ORGINCOME and at the current period CURINCOME  (or at 
the termination for defaulted mortgages). This study uses the monthly personal saving 
CURSAVING given as a percentage of disposal income of US household surveyed 
by the US Bureau of Census (source: the US Federal Reserve), to represent the effects 
of households‟ propensity to consume on housing and non-housing goods on 
mortgage default risk. 
  
                                                             
18
  It is the sum of compensation of employees, supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors' income 
with inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj), rental income 
of persons with CCAdj, personal income receipts on assets, and personal current transfer receipts, less 
contributions for government social insurance. 
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Table 4. 4: Individual Mortgage Data and Variable Description 
 
Variable  Definition and description 
AGE  Month periods between individual mortgage origination and termination or 
the time of left censor of 2009.June. 
FICO  The group variables for FICO credit score. M: No Score; 1: Score<= 634; 
2:686>=Score>634;3:736>=Score>686; 4:Score>736 
CURAMT  The Current Face Value of the Loan 
  1, when borrowers chose ARM, otherwise 0;  
HP  S&P/CASE Shiller Home Price Composite 10 index.     means House 
price index at termination month;     means House price index at 
individual loan origination month. 
ORGINCOME
 
The income index level (US Personal income (Monthly series) (AR) 




The income index level at time of individual loan termination 
(Foreclosure), lag one month (database: DataStream) 
LTV  The group variables for individual loan‟s original Loan To value 
(Org.LTV). 1: LTV>100%; 2: 100%≥LTV 90%; 3：90%≥LTV 80%；4：
80%≥LTV 70%；5：70%≥LTV 60%；6：60%≥LTV 50%；7：
50%≥LTV;  
MKV  Proxy for market value of property under which mortgage is issued. 
ORGAMT  The Original face value of the Individual Loan 
kPNEQ   
PNEQ is Probability of negative equity at termination or censored. 
 
kPPAY  
PPAY is Probability of negative interest rate ratio; generated similarly to 
the PNEQ.  
Rate  The Loan Rate at individual loan origination. 
R  6 month Libor Rate,    means interest rate index at termination. 
CURSAVING
 
The saving percentage at time of individual loan termination (Foreclosure), 
lag one month(database: DataStream) 
SFFRM  & 
SFARM  
Unobserved risk factors‟ effect that is revealed in borrowers‟ mortgage 
choice gained from Probit regression.Referred to as “Self-selection factor” 
for simplicity and clearance. 
DSF  Comparative self-selection factor, gained from probit regression 
Note: Right Censor time is Jun., 2009. For Credit score, it is not isolated based on FICO 
620 according to cautious review category as the data is Non-agency mortgage loans. 
Variables are combined from Bloomberg, Federal Housing Agency and DataStream. 
FICO score is a type of credit measurement based on individual credit history, licensed by 
the Fair Isaac Corporation, and widely used by residential mortgage to access credit 





4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The total 7,297,510 sample mortgages consist of 3,770,640 (51.6%) FRMs and 
3,526,870 (48.33%) ARMs. This study breaks down the composition of the full 
mortgage samples by FICO and LTV. The distributions of mortgage samples are 
tabulated in Table 4.5. The borrowers in FICO4 (>736) constitute the largest 
proportion of the total mortgage samples in both ARM (23.17%) and FRM (25.82%) 
mortgage types. The largest mortgage sub-groups by LTV fall in the range of [80%  
LTV4 > 70%], which stand at 57.48% and 36.51% in ARM and FRM samples 
respectively. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b plot the distributions of mortgage by year (based 
on the origination date) controlling for FICO and LTV. The bulk of the sample 
mortgages were originated in 2006 in all LTV and FICO categories. The LTV4 and 








 (a) Distributions of Sample Mortgages by LTV categories 
Note: These figures show the distribution of mortgage type choice along the different 





 (b) Distributions of Sample Mortgages by FICO 
Note: These figures show the distribution of mortgage type choice along the different 















































































































































































Table 4. 5: Frequency of Mortgage Type in the Whole Sample 
 
a) Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) 
FICO  
category 
Loan-to-Value Category      
LTV1 LTV2 LTV3 LTV4 LTV5 LTV6 LTV7 Sub-total % 
NOFICO 305 24,028 24,745 387,014 89,298 39,823 45,537 610,750 17.32% 
FICO1 460 37,087 43,463 440,314 79,488 26,777 23,603 651,192 18.46% 
FICO2 518 65,098 83,879 430,406 60,742 18,619 14,771 674,033 19.11% 
FICO3 778 104,564 220,086 336,942 68,651 24,187 18,453 773,661 21.94% 
FICO4 759 78,827 185,706 432,439 70,500 24,937 24,066 817,234 23.17% 
Sub-total 2,820 309,604 557,879 2,027,115 368,679 134,343 126,430 3,526,870 48.33% 
% 0.08% 8.78% 15.82% 57.48% 10.45% 3.81% 3.58%     
b) Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM) 
NOFICO 6,981 68,628 43,964 335,002 111,948 66,170 118,645 751,338 19.93% 
FICO1 23,830 104,059 62,035 299,444 87,574 43,827 93,243 714,012 18.94% 
FICO2 24,329 158,360 92,144 253,563 71,430 34,533 81,074 715,433 18.97% 
FICO3 16,109 142,837 123,767 182,687 65,475 31,145 54,182 616,202 16.34% 
FICO4 29,059 136,649 162,866 305,941 106,977 57,806 174,357 973,655 25.82% 
Sub-total 100,308 610,533 484,776 1,376,637 443,404 233,481 521,501 3,770,640 51.67% 
% 2.66% 16.19% 12.86% 36.51% 11.76% 6.19% 13.83%     
Note: This table shows the distribution frequency of mortgage type according to the total 7,297,510 sample mortgages. It breaks the FICO and LTV into different 
catalogs by their distribution percentile of value. The value inside the table is the number of loans, and percentage for each catalog.
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The descriptive statistics of the regression variables are summarized in Table 4.6. The 
sub-sets of statistics sorted by mortgage type (FRM or ARM) are also presented. The 
results show that the average mortgage age of the sample mortgages was 45.90 
months. The FRMs were more seasoned with an average age of 49.64 months 
compared to 41.89 months for ARMs. The average LTV of the sample mortgages 
was 76.06%. The average LTV for ARMs was higher at 78.30% compared to 73.96% 
for FRMs. ARMs had a higher average original loan quantum of $302,474, compared 
to the average $212,362 loan quantum for FRM at the origination date. The 
corresponding average current loan value of ARM of $300,449.90 was also higher 
than the average value of $196,929.20 for FRMs. The average market value of all 
sample mortgages was estimated at $298,433.98 at the sample cut-off date, which 
means that there was a positive equity when measured against the average current 
loan value of $246,960.53. The average market value of equity of $340,083.30 for 
ARMs was higher than the average market value of $259,477.30 for FRMs. 
 
Based on the CURAMT , CURMKT and price volatility, the probability of 
negative equity probability PNEQ  for mortgages was estimated at 0.4992 on 
average. The average PNEQ was higher for ARM at 0.5002 compared to 0.4983 for 
FRMs. The average mortgage rate was 7.27%. The average mortgage rate for ARMs 
was 6.84%, which lower than the average mortgage rate of 7.68% for FRMs. The 
higher interest rate in FRMs implies higher prepayment risk, which was reflected by 
PPAY of 0.9987 for FRMs, which was higher than 0.9923 for ARMs.  
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Table 4. 6: Statistic Table for the Variables 
 
 Whole Sample FRM ARM 
Variable  Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
AGE 45.8969 20.3532 49.6449 23.0011 41.8899 16.1385 
CURAMT 246960.53 234036.84 196929.2 199711.9 300449.9 255251.7 
EQR_T 0.0188 0.3489 0.1016 0.4098 -0.0696 0.2391 
ORGINCOME 10399.92 878.8811 10252.35 974.9307 10557.7 730.6775 
CURINCOME 12237.1 72.5866 12245.91 57.5304 12227.68 84.8038 
LTV 76.0598 19.7545 73.9645 24.6606 78.2999 12.1475 
MKV_T 298433.98 1335136.88 259477.3 510377.1 340083.3 1845683 
ORGAMT 255913.24 240185.73 212362.6 213877.2 302474 257419.7 
PPAY 0.9956 0.0294 0.9987 0.0189 0.9923 0.037346 
PNEQ 0.4992 0.0037 0.4983 0.0043 0.5002 0.00254 
Rate 7.2740 2.0506 7.6756 2.0292 6.8448 1.9852 
CURSAVING 6.4941 1.2490 6.6635 0.9505 6.3130 1.4827 
FICO 681.3289 85.0518 687.32 85.8276 675.1447 83.7955 
SFFRM 0.0553 0.9779 0.9592 0.3676 -0.8916 0.2530 
SFARM 0.0596 1.0251 0.9991 0.4134 -0.9248 0.2808 
Note: This table gives descriptive statistics of the regression variables, and the 
statistics of subsamples of ARM and FRM.  
 
Using the monthly income data by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the average 
income of borrowers was estimated at $10,399.92 at the loan origination date and 
$12,237.10 at the current date. The average income at the origination date was 
computed at $10,557.70 and $10,252.35 for ARM and FRM borrowers respectively. 
The income of the ARM and FRM borrowers grew to $12,227.68 and $12,245.91 
respectively at the cut-off date of the mortgages. In term of saving rate, FRM 
borrowers saved 6.66% of their disposal income, which was higher than the 6.31% 
average saving rate for the ARM borrowers, based on the survey of national 
household savings compiled by the US Bureau of Census. 
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4.4 Analysis of Results 
4.4.1 Conditional Default Rate 
Figure 4.4 cross-plots the conditional default rate, which is defined as the proportion 
of defaulted loan over the total loans in different LTV sub-groups, against the 
mortgage age (duration between origination and cut-off /foreclosure dates). The 
conditional default rate for the first 100 months was relatively low at less than 0.6%. 
The conditional default rates follow a bi-modal distribution, where the first peak was 
observed after two years (24-25 months) in all sub-groups of mortgage loans. The 
default risks declined and stabilized when the mortgages seasoned between 75 and 
150 months. The second peak in the conditional default rates increased was observed 
after 150 months in all sub-LTV groups of loans. The conditional default rates were 
also more volatile at the tailed-end of the mortgage age (duration). The high 
conditional default of older mortgages (between 150 and 200 months) could be 
caused by the residual mortgages held by high risk borrowers who self-select high 
LTV mortgages. The left-truncation based on the most recent 24-month mortgage 
payment history could also cause the high default rates of the seasoned mortgages in 




Figure 4. 4: Conditional Default Hazard Rates by LTV 
 
 
Note: Figure 4.3(a) is the illustration for all the LTV groups. (b) - (h) are the illustration 
for the separate LTV groups for the clearance. Default hazard rate here is based on raw 
data “lifetest procedure” (SAS 9.2 User’s Guide, Chapter 49, Page 3098-3181), which 
computes nonparametric estimates of the survival distribution function. Here it is based 
on 7 LTV strata as group. The “life table” method is chosen in the lifetest procedure, in 
which the “default hazard rate” in the case is the estimates of the probability density 




The conditional default rate patterns were similar in the LTV2 to LTV6 groups of 
mortgages, which reached the peak after 24 months. This study observed high 
conditional default rates in loans with LTV above 100% (LTV1 group) and LTV 
below 50% (LTV7). Deng (1997) showed that conditional default rates of high LTV 
loans (above 95% LTV) were 3 to 4 times higher than loans with LTV between 90% 
and 95%, and 5 times higher than loans with LTV less than 80%. However, the results 
show no clear relationship between conditional default risks and LTV. The LTV4 
mortgage group (with LTV between 70% and 80%) has the highest conditional 
default rate.  
4.4.2 Borrowers’ Self-Selection of Mortgage Type 
This study makes regression for a binary mortgage choice variable, which has a value 
1, if the choice of mortgage type is ARM; and 0 otherwise, as a dependent variable 
using Probit function. The controlled variables include original loan amount
ORGAMT , LTV, FICO and year dummies. For the LTV and FICO, This study uses 
the discrete values rather than continuous values in the estimation. The Probit results 




Table 4. 7: Probit Regression of Self-selection on Mortgage Type Choice 
 





































1991 0.0228 [0.046] 














































Log Likelihood -4367199  
N 7108724  
 
Note: Mortgage Choice between FRM and ARM Probit model, using Dummy_FRM as 1 
dependent variable. The definition of the variables is given in Table 4.4. 𝐿𝑇𝑉7 (lowest 
LTV, lowest loan risk) is reference group for LTV dummies; 𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂4 group (highest credit 
score, lowest credit risk) is reference group for credit score group dummies; 2008 
origination is reference group for origination year dummies. *** indicates 1% 
significant;** 5% significant; *10% significance. ORGAMT coefficients are smaller than 





The regression coefficients for controlled variables (LTV and FICO) are all 
significant at less than 1% level. LTV1 has a positive coefficient, whereas all other 
LTV categorical variables have negative and significant coefficients. The results 
imply that borrowers of high LTV group, LTV1>100%, are more likely to opt for 
ARM compared to borrower in other LTV groups. The coefficient estimates across 
the discrete LTV groups were non-linear. The high coefficient values for LTV3 and 
LTV4 in the two models indicate that borrowers with LTV ranging between 70% and 
90% have the lowest propensity to choose ARM, compared to other borrowers. 
 
The coefficients for various discrete FICO groups and the NOFICO (missing FICO 
data) group were all significant and negative in the two models. The values of the 
estimated (negative) coefficients are larger for borrowers in the low FICO groups 
than the high FICO groups. The results imply that borrowers with FICO below 634 
have lower propensity of choosing ARM than other borrowers in high FICO groups. 
The result also suggest that when mortgage choice is a binary decision on either ARM 
or FRM, borrowers with poor credit history (low FICO score) will prefer FRM, and 
borrowers with good credit history will prefer ARM, ceteris paribus. The results 
show unconstrained borrowers (high FICO) may self-select risky ARM mortgages to 
maximize their personal utility function at the expense of increasing mortgage default 
risks. The same utility maximization objective is not preferred by constrained (low 




The mean values for the comparative factors are computed and plotted on yearly 
basic in Figure 4.5. There was an increasing absolute negative value in the 
comparative selection value from 1991 to 1996, meaning that an increasing 
propensity to ARM mortgage contract. The negative comparative value shows a 
stronger propensity to choose ARM than FRM during the period between 1993 and 
2004. When market is down beginning at 2006, FRM is more preferred than ARM.  
 





Note: This figure is based on the mean of the values DSF. The DSF is comparative self- 
selection value. The positive the value meaning that borrowers have less propensity to 
choose ARM. The higher the absolute value of the negative value meaning that borrowers 
have higher propensity to choose ARM.  
 
4.4.3 Effects of Mortgage Self-Selection on Mortgage Default 
Risks 
The borrowers‟ self-selecting into a particular mortgage contract type is a factor that 














behavior. The self-selection and comparative selection factors are incorporated into 
the mortgage hazard models (Eq. 4-22) in the second-stage analysis. In Model 1, it 
runs the proportional hazard models with full mortgage sample with comparative 
self-selection factor, DSF. Models 2 use ARM sub-samples controlling for borrowers 
self-selection of mortgage types using SFARM (=1) and DSF, whereas Models 3 use 
FRM sub-sample with SFFRM (=0) and DSF as self-selection factor. The interactive 
effects of self-selection factors with the nominal values of LTV and FICO are also 
included in the models. The results are presented in Table 4.8. 
 
The exogenous variables are grouped into mortgage characteristics, borrower 
characteristics, option-based factors and self-selection factors. Most of the estimated 
regression coefficients are significant. It is found that the original loan amount 
ORGAMT has positive effects on mortgage default risks for full sample and ARM 
subsample. The negative estimates for the AGE variables indicate that default risks 






Table 4. 8: Proportional Hazard Risk Model with Self-Selection Factors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Mortgage sample FULL ARM  FRM 
A) Mortgage characteristics: 
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
ORGAMT 3.67E-07*** [0.0000] 5.190E-08 [0.0000] -3.03E-06**
* 
[0] 
AGE -0.266***    [0.0005] -0.358***  [0.0005] -0.213 *** [0.0009] 
LTV1>100% -3.090***  [0.0366] -0.560 *** [0.0628] 2.581 *** [0.1352] 
100%LTV2>90% -1.525
***  [0.0177] -0.161 *** [0.0329] -2.787***  [0.0656] 
90%LTV3>80% -1.175 
*** [0.0163] 0.094 *** [0.0486] -3.815***  [0.0943] 
80%LTV4>70% -0.749 
*** [0.0155] 0.277  [0.053] -3.980***  [0.1033] 
70%LTV5>60% -0.658
***    [0.0142] 0.267  [0.0328] -2.448***  [0.0673] 
60%LTV6>50% -0.651
***  [0.0150] 0.165***  [0.026] -1.738***  [0.048] 
B) Borrower characteristics: 
NOFICO 1.197***  [0.0066] 0.875***  [0.0181] 0.731***  [0.0273] 
FICO1634 1.277
***  [0.0053] 1.024 *** [0.03] -0.551***  [0.0479] 
634<FICO2686 1.165
***  [0.0058] 0.884 *** [0.0144] 0.338***  [0.0238] 
686<FICO3736 0.778
***  [0.0054] 0.575 *** [0.0092] 0.348***  [0.0154] 
CURINCOME -0.007***  [0.0000] -0.008***  [0.0000] -0.008***  [0] 
CURSAVING -1.037***  [0.0009] -1.201 *** [0.0012] -0.909 *** [0.002] 
C) Option variable: 
PNEQ 5185***  [72.1967] -1577 *** [20.817] 2099***  [102.9682] 
PPAY -6.188***  [0.10110] -1.872 *** [0.1023] -35.155 *** [0.4156] 
PNEQ2 -4804***  [71.2977] 1693 *** [22.231] -1792*** [100.7018] 
PPAY2 4.985***  [0.07430] 2.156 *** [0.0725] 30.827 *** [0.3464] 
D) Self-selection variable: 
SFFRM          -4.227***  [0.1704 ] 
SFARM     2.608***  [0.0932]      
DSF -1.266***  [0.1649] -0.534  [0.274] -8.665***  [0.3433 ] 
E) Interactive variable:  
SFFRM*LTV           -0.010***  [0.0007]  
SFARM*LTV      -0.005***  [0.0005]    
SFFRM*FICO         -0.001***  [0.0001]  
SFARM*FICO      -0.003 *** [0.0000]   
DSF*LTV -0.040***  [0.0010] -0.030 *** [0.0019] -0.054***  [0.0014]  







Table 4.8: Proportional Hazard Risk Model with Self-Selection Factors (Continue) 
 
F)Year Dummies  
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
1991 5.817***  [0.6629] 0.115  [3.541] 1.022 *** [0.4606] 
1992 5.292***  [0.4522] 2.230***  [0.8101] -0.044  [0.3676] 
1993 5.874***  [0.3683] 2.032***  [0.5376] -0.286  [0.3297] 
1994 4.795 *** [0.3273] 1.385***  [0.398] -0.070  [0.3423] 
1995 6.038***  [0.2219] 1.411***  [0.3845] -0.400  [0.2908] 
1996 6.115***  [0.1796] 1.181***  [0.3239] -0.420  [0.2747] 
1997 5.680***  [0.1408] 1.176***  [0.2228] 0.226  [0.245] 
1998 5.664***  [0.127] 1.243***  [0.1824] 0.240  [0.246] 
1999 5.451***  [0.1165] 1.538 *** [0.1531] 0.807 *** [0.2364] 
2000 4.729***  [0.1061] 1.828 *** [0.1326] 1.324 *** [0.2209] 
2001 4.333***  [0.101] 2.216 *** [0.123] 1.457 *** [0.2196] 
2002 3.655 *** [0.0972] 2.353 *** [0.1157] 1.215***  [0.219] 
2003 3.502***  [0.096] 2.714 *** [0.1122] 1.315 *** [0.2214] 
2004 2.298***  [0.0861] 3.025 *** [0.0958] 1.903 *** [0.2014] 
2005 1.883 *** [0.0852] 3.420 *** [0.095] 2.090 *** [0.2005] 
2006 2.145 *** [0.0851] 3.957 *** [0.0955] 2.606 *** [0.2007] 
2007 2.374 *** [0.0843] 3.548 *** [0.0938] 2.204 *** [0.2003] 
       
-2 LOG L 15934620 11519531 3445585.2 
AIC 15934696 11519613 3445667.2 
SBC 15935130 11520070 3446076.3 
Likelihood Ratio 4624386.14 3397069.8 1193867.9 
Score 10139264.9 5513703.61 3698283.3 
Wald 3793722.92 2523384.96 1071641.4 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, * denotes 10% significance 
Note：Observation is based on full sample of 7297510. In Hazard regression, the three 
criteria -2logL (2 times log partial likelihood), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), SBC 
(Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion) is used to represent model fit statistics. 
Normally, lower the value fit statistics indicates a better desirable model. Likelihood 
Ratio, Score, and Wald are used to test the null hypothesis of zero parameter. 
 
 
Calhoun and Deng‟s (2002) results show positive effects of LTV on default risks, 
except the 75% to 80% LTV category. In the results, the discrete LTV variables are all 
significant and the signs are negative in all categories mostly, except LTV1 (>100%) 
in FRM Model 3 and LTV (90% to 50%) in ARM model. This result could be 
probably due to the potential multi-collinearity between LTV and the original loan 
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amount for each observation. If the LTV is positively correlated with housing 
consumption and wealth, and if LTV risks are priced in the mortgage rates, borrowers 
of high LTV mortgages are likely to be more resilience to price and income shocks 
compared to borrowers of low LTV mortgages. Therefore, it could not read the LTV 
indicators based on the face values to determine mortgage default risks as suggested 
in some earlier studies, when the self-selection of ARM or FRM by borrowers is 
controlled in the models. 
 
On borrowers‟ credit risk, NOFICO signals high default risk of mortgages. It is 
observed of positive coefficients in other FICO categories, which indicate that 
borrowers with low FICO scores have higher default probabilities relative to the 
controlled group of borrowers with FICO score above 736. Lower FICO score 
borrowers show higher probability to default in this case. The current income 
(CURINCOME) and the current saving (CURSAVING) of the borrowers are 
significantly and negatively correlated with mortgage default risks. They can be used 
as good indicators in assessing borrowers‟ credit risks in mortgage underwriting. 
 
Deng (1997), Deng, Quigley and Van-Order (2000), and Calhoun and Deng (2002) 
found that negative equity probability (put options) could increase mortgage default 
hazards. It is found positive relationships between default option premium (PNEQ) 
and default hazard only in the full mortgage sample and the FRM sub-samples. The 
coefficient for the PNEQ was negative in ARM sub-sample results. The negative sign 
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for the ARM's PNEQ actually tells the story that ARM mortgagors' default incentives 
are less explained by their default option position. 
 
Significant negative “call option” effects are found on default hazards. The signs are 
reversed in the squared terms of the respective option-based variables, which suggest 
non-linear option effects on mortgage default hazard. The results may suggest 
possible “non-ruthless” behavior in exercising default and prepayment options by 
borrowers. 
 
In Brueckner‟s models (1992, 1993, 2000), borrowers‟ choice of ARM over FRM is 
depending on exogenous mobility decisions. Borrowers choosing FRM are those who 
are assumed to have lower exogenous propensity to move before borrowers making 
decision on mortgage type, and thus the exogenous probability of default is lower for 
FRM than ARM. This study instead focuses on the effect of unobservable information 
revealed in borrowers‟ mortgage choice (referred to as self-selection factors for 
simplicity) on borrowers‟ ex-post default risk. In the models, the self-selection factors 
in full mortgage sample in Model 1 (DSF) and FRM sample in Model 3 (SFFRM and 
DSF) are significant, but negative in signs. Interestingly, it is also found the 
self-selection (SFARM) is significantly positive in ARM sub-sample, although 
comparative selection (DSF) factor is negative, however insignificant in ARM 
subsample. The results reject Brueckner‟s indifference of mortgage type hypothesis. 
Instead, the results show that the self-selection of ARM type signals unobservable 
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risk factors, which will cause higher (latent) default risks in borrowers.  
 
The interaction of self-selection of ARM and FRM with FICO and LTV are also 
significant and negative in all the models. The interaction of the comparative 
self-selection (DSF) was negative with LTV, but was positive with FICO. The results 
imply that the self-selection of ARM type by borrowers could increase mortgage 
default risks. Borrowers‟ self-selection into ARM contract increases the sensitivity of 
mortgage hazard. High FICO (low risk) borrowers, who indicate self-selection 
preference of ARM over FRM (as indicated by the positive coefficient of the 
DSF*FICO variable), carry higher default risks than borrowers, who do not choose 
ARM over FRM. The results affirm the importance of borrowers‟ choice of mortgage 
type in influencing default probabilities. 
4.4.4 Robustness Tests of Borrowers’ Self-selection Mortgage 
Type  
A) Controlled for LTV  
Harrison, Noordewier et al. (2004) found that a separating equilibrium exists in 
borrowers‟ choice of mortgages, if the default costs are high. Borrowers with high 
default risk will self-select into low LTV loans to avoid facing the probability of 
costly default. The low risk borrowers, on the other hands, according to the model 
will signal their creditworthiness by taking high LTV loans. In the robustness tests, 
this part controls for high default costs by using only mortgage samples with LTV 
above 95%. The results as shown in Table 4.9 show that the self-selection variables 
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(DSF, SFARM and SFFRM) are all significant, and interestingly, they are positive in 
coefficients in the respective models. The interactive self-selection variables are 
consistent with the earlier results.  
 
Based on the results, it is argued here that self-selection factor of mortgage type has 
more significant impact on the default costs (hazards) of high LTV mortgages. The 
positive DSF*FICO coefficients also suggest that high FICO (low risk) borrowers, 
who self-select ARM over FRM with a high LTV, are likely to carry more risk than 
other borrowers, who do not self-select the mortgage type. In the interaction with 
LTV of mortgages, the self-selecting of specific mortgage types in this sub-sample of 
high LTV mortgages may fit into Harrison, Noordewier et al. (2004) story of 
borrowers attempting to lower default costs. 
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Table 4. 9: Proportional Hazard Risk Model Using Mortgage Sample that have above 95% 
LTV 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Mortgage Type Full ARM FRM 















































































































































































D) Self-selection variable: 



















































































1991 11.536  [25.571] 60.203  [453164] 8.329  [63.495] 
1992 10.652  [25.560] 62.599  [453164] 8.128  [63.492] 
1993 9.147  [25.554] 60.650  [453164] 6.734  [63.493] 
1994 9.375  [25.555] 57.559  [453164] 7.691  [63.495] 
1995 9.827  [25.550] 59.530  [453164] 7.285  [63.498] 
1996 9.350  [25.548] 57.353  [453164] 6.517  [63.500] 
1997 9.853  [25.547] 56.507  [453164] 11.066  [63.503] 
1998 9.410  [25.546] 57.354  [453164] 10.529  [63.506] 
1999 9.288  [25.546] 56.876  [453164] 11.099  [63.505] 
2000 9.272  [25.545] 57.372  [453164] 12.549  [63.503] 
2001 8.922  [25.545] 57.953  [453164] 12.532  [63.504] 
2002 8.063  [25.545] 57.926  [453164] 11.937  [63.504] 
2003 8.149  [25.544] 58.191  [453164] 12.066  [63.505] 
2004 8.996  [25.544] 57.829  [453164] 15.020  [63.501] 
2005 9.358  [25.544] 57.845  [453164] 15.713  [63.500] 
2006 10.065  [25.544] 58.237  [453164] 16.538  [63.500] 
2007 9.739  [25.544] 58.444  [453164] 15.506  [63.501] 
       
-2 LOG L 550528.38 367632.14 132282.57 
AIC 550594.38 367704.14 132354.57 
SBC 550870.17 367993.54 132608.69 
Likelihood Ratio 256478.218 151814.008 77949.9279 
Score 834009.481 221492.752 378721.685 
Wald 181224.436 83505.0959 65877.4249 
 N=618686 N=140548 N=478138 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, * denotes 10% significance 
Note：Observation is based on full sample of 7297510. In Hazard regression, the three 
criteria -2logL (2 times log partial likelihood), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), SBC 
(Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion) is used to represent model fit statistics. 
Normally, lower the value fit statistics indicates a better desirable model. Likelihood 
Ratio, Score, and Wald are used to test the null hypothesis of zero parameter.  
 
B) Controlled for truncated data effects 
As shown in Figure 4.4, the high conditional default rate of older mortgages of 
between 150 months to 200 months may be caused by the left-truncation effects of 
the limited mortgage payment records. Here it controls for the possible sample bias 
effects by eliminating mortgages that are more than 10 years old by mortgage 
origination date. Here it repeats the mortgage default hazard estimations based on this 
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controlled mortgage samples, and the results were summarized in Table 4.10. 
 
The regression coefficients share the same signs, and significance level as in the 
earlier full-sample estimation as in Table 4.8. It is observed that the coefficients of 
self-selection factors for the FRM sample in the controlled sample were smaller than 
those found in the full sample estimation. The full sample may over-estimate the 
negative effects self-selection effects on mortgage default hazards. The results in 




Table 4. 10: Proportional Hazard Risk Models using Mortgage Sub-sample that are less 
than 10-year in Age 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Mortgage Type Full ARM FRM 
A) Mortgage characteristics: 














































































































































































C) Option variable: 
PNEQ 7379.000
***






















































D) Self-selection variable: 




















  [0.356] 
 
E) Interactive variable: 
SFFRM*LTV           -0.021
***
  [0.001] 
 












SFARM*FICO      -0.003
***

















































































































































    
 
  
-2 LOG L 15888537 11512698 3412380.6 
AIC 15888597 11512764 3412446.6 
SBC 15888939 11513132 3412775.4 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
4569290.95 3376770.34 1165881.76 
Score 10030032.9 5493054.85 3653197.24 
Wald 3733677.27 2517002.3 1042863.46 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance,* denotes 10% significance 
Note：Observation is based on the subsample less than 10 years from full sample of 
7297510. In Hazard regression, the three criteria -2logL (2 times log partial likelihood), 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), SBC (Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion) is 
used to represent model fit statistics. Normally, lower the value fit statistics indicates a 
better desirable model. Likelihood Ratio, Score, and Wald are used to test the null 
hypothesis of zero parameter.  
 
C) Controlled for Term Structure of ARM pegged interest index 
ARM mortgages are pegged into different market interest rate, either short-term 
maturity market interest rate, or long-term maturity market interest rate with different 
yield curve. 
 
According the well-known market expectation theory based on perfect substitution 
assumption of term structure, the expected long-term interest rate is the geometric 
mean of the yield on a series of short-term interest rates, which indicating short-term 
interest rates are more volatile. In the borrowers‟ consumption view, mortgage pegged 
to short-term interest rates (more volatile) might be riskier than that pegged to 
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long-term interest rates. 
 
At the same time, liquidity preference theory of market interest asserts that long-term 
interest rates should be higher by a term premium than short-term interests, based on 
non-perfect substitution as liquidity risk caused by the uncertainty. In contrary to 
market expectation theory, liquidity preference could indicate uncertain risk for 
mortgage pegged to long-term index, as higher interests could means lower expected 
house consumption given same condition. This prediction also is consistent with the 
consumption utility model. Whether long term pegged index mortgage could be 
higher riskier or lower under liquidity preference theory, it depends on borrowers‟ 
preference on house and non-house consumption, which is a complex question. 
 
The robust test on ARM mortgage pegged index‟s term structure choice is done. The 
pegged index of the ARM mortgage subsample is listed in Table 4.11. Here it defines 
the pegged interest rate with less than 1 year‟s maturity
19
 to be short-term rate 
pegged, and that larger or equal to 1 year to be long-term rate pegged. Similarly, its 
Probit model is regressed on the ARM subsample studying the borrowers‟ choice on 
short-term and long-term pegged (by Dummy_ShortTerm=1). The Probit result is 
shown in Table 4.12. Then, the proportional hazard rate with self-selection of term 
structure pegged ARM is tested, results are found in Table 4.13. 
  
                                                             
19 Notice that here the maturity is the pegged interest rate „s maturity, it is not the mortgage maturity. 
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Table 4. 11: Description Table on ARM Pegged Index 




Bloomberg CD 1 Month Bloomberg Indices 15 Short 
Bloomberg CD 6 Month Bloomberg Indices 28 Short 
Bloomberg CD 1 Month Bloomberg Indices 19 Short 
Fannie Mae Commitment Rates 30 Year 
Fixed Rate 30 Day 
Fannie Mae 5 Short 
US Treasury H15 Treasure Bill 6 Month 
Auction High Discount Rate 
US Treasury 4 Short 
Federal Reserve US H.15 T Note Treasury 
Constant Maturity 6Month 
Federal Reserve 1 Short 
Fannie Mae US 12 Month Avg of 1 Month 
Libor ARM 
Fannie Mae 1535 Short 
Fannie Mae US 1Year Libor ARM Fannie Mae 539953 Long 
Fannie Mae US 1 Month Libor ARM Fannie Mae 44025 Short 
Fannie Mae US 3 MONTH LIBOR ARM Fannie Mae 253 Short 
Fannie Mae US 6 MONTH LIBOR ARM Fannie Mae 2156277 Short 
Federal Reserve US 12 Month Cumulative 
Avg.1 Year CMT 
Federal Reserve 491299 Long 






Federal Reserve US h.15 T Note Treasury 
Constant Maturity 10 Year 
Federal Reserve 6 Long 
Federal Reserve US h.15 T Note Treasury 
Constant Maturity 1 Year 
Federal Reserve 222364 Long 
Federal Reserve US h.15 T Note Treasury 
Constant Maturity 2 Year 
Federal Reserve 16 Long 
Federal Reserve US h.15 T Note Treasury 
Constant Maturity 3 Year 
Federal Reserve 275 Long 
Federal Reserve US h.15 T Note Treasury 
Constant Maturity 4 Year 
Federal Reserve 84 Long 
Three-Month US Treasury Bill   1 Short 
Six-Month US Treasury Bill   92 Short 
Note: The ARM index pegged to “Cost of Fund National Median”, “Cost of Fund Golden 
West Financial Cost of Savings”, “Cost of Funds for 11th District of San Francisco”, 
“Prime rate by country United States”, ”Mystery” and “Previous” are deleted for this 
robust test. The reason is the unavailability of trustable the term structure information. 
The total ARM loans that are deleted are with number of 14760. It leaves 1,253,997 as 




Table 4. 12: Probit Regression of Self-Selection on Term Structure Choice for ARM 
mortgage 






















































































Log Likelihood -1552485.37  
N 3456268  
Note: Mortgage Choice between Short term interest index and Long term interest index 
based on ARM subsample, deleting the missing variables and loans without index 
information, which left 3,456,268ARM loans. Probit model, uses Dummy_ShortTerm as 1 
dependent variable, when ARM pegged index is a short term structure interest rate. The 
definition of the variables is given in Table 4.4. 𝐿𝑇𝑉7 (lowest LTV, lowest loan risk) is 
reference group for LTV dummies; 𝐹𝐼𝐶𝑂4 group (highest credit score, lowest credit risk) 
is reference group for credit score group dummies; 2008 origination is reference group 
for origination year dummies. *** indicates 1% significant;** 5% significant; *10% 
significance. ORGAMT coefficients are smaller than 0.0001, automatically shown to be 0 




Table 4. 13: Proportional Hazard Risk Models using Mortgage ARM Subsample of Term 
Structure Choice 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Mortgage Type ARM sample ARM pegged to Short 
Term 
ARM pegged to Long 
Term 
A) Mortgage characteristics: 




























































































































































































































D) Self-selection variable: 




  [0.156] 
 


















Table 4. 13: Proportional Hazard Risk Models using Mortgage ARM Subsample of Term Structure Choice 
(Continue) 
E) Interactive variable: 
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
SFShortTerm 
*LTV 
    
  


















    
  









































1991 0.000  [3.572] -2.860  [49.838]
 































































































































































































-2 LOG L 11511089 8319460.8 2551716.4 
AIC 11511165 8319542.8 2551798.4 
SBC 11511588 8319987.9 2552198 
Likelihood Ratio 3405199.85 2497983.06 888928.13 
Score 5511296.74 3560319.55 1907125.99 
Wald 2515427.69 1851760.28 498463.942 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance,* denotes 10% significance 
Note：Observation is based on the subsample less than 10 years from full sample of 
7297510. In Hazard regression, the three criteria -2logL (2 times log partial likelihood), 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), SBC (Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion) is 
used to represent model fit statistics. Normally, lower the value fit statistics indicates a 
better desirable model. Likelihood Ratio, Score, and Wald are used to test the null 
hypothesis of zero parameter.   
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The results support the significance of self-selection factor of ARM with different 
term structure pegged. The SFLongterm, SFShortterm, and DSF are all significant, 
except the DSF for the full ARM sample. The results indicate that borrowers' 
self-selection of mortgages into long-term interest rate structure pegged generally 
includes unobservable information, which increase ex-post mortgage risk, as the 
positive sign for both SFLongterm and DSF in the long term pegged mortgage 
subsamples. This result actually supports the liquidity expectation. 
D) Private Label Jumbo limited credit accessibility 
Borrowers with different credit ability might be provided by different mortgage menu, 
especially when lenders might differentiate their originating strategy to different 
borrowers. This is called “limited credit accessibility” for mortgage choice. In the 
theoretical model, this “limited credit accessibility” has not yet been considered, 
however, it could be beneficial to do the empirical robust test on borrowers with 
relatively unlimited credit amount accessibility. 
 
For GSEs loans, there are conforming loan limits, which give loans flexibility in 
terms of “certain mortgage amount” to be securitized by GSEs. For borrowers 
applying loans with amount lower than the limit, originators are supposed to have 
lower capital costs and more flexibility for such loans. In other words, borrowers, 
even in non-conforming loan pools,  applying for loans lower than the conforming 
loan limit are facing with flexible mortgage menu choice. Borrowers, in 
non-conforming loan pools, with loans higher than conforming loan limits, are 
probably faced with more limited menu to choose. In order to reduce the potential 
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“limited credit accessibility” bias in the borrowers‟ mortgage choice, the private label 
jumbo limited credit accessibility robust test based on non-jumbo subsample is done. 
 
The conforming loan limit after Jan., 2008 has a wide diversification through 
different geographic areas and changed through years. For simplicity and also 
reducing the left-censorship, the individual origination time span between 2005, July, 
and 2007, July is chosen for the study in the whole U.S. The reason for July 2007 are 
1) it happened to be the time with permanent limits of GSEs, which “apply to the 
Enterprises' acquisitions of certain mortgages originated prior to July 1, 2007, are 
set under the terms of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008” 
20
; The 
permanent limits are also quite the same through the whole U.S. market, without 
much geographic difference. 2) For the right time point July 2005, is the 2 years‟ time 
window from July 2007, which is the start of the observation period between July 
2007 to July 2009 (24 months observation). A four year window, compared to a two 
year performance window is relative neutral time window to control the potential 
left-censorship problem.  
 
Therefore, robust test is done based on individual loans subsample originated 2005 
July to 2007 July, with loans smaller than 359,650$ in 2005, and 417,000$ in 2006 
and 2007. Actually, based on Freddie Mac website
21
, there is different conforming 
loan limit for 1-unit, 2-unit, 3-unit, 4-unit family loans through years, however, due to 
                                                             
20
 Source: http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=185;  
21
 Source: http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/860/loanlimitshistory07.pdf 
134 
 
the lack of information on the family unit in the collected Bloomberg data, the most 
conservative way to use the “loan limit” level based on 1-unit to do the robust test to 
the subsample. 
   
Table 4. 14: Proportional Hazard Risk Models for non-Jumbo mortgages in Non-agency 
Loans 
 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Mortgage Type Full Non-Jumbo ARM FRM 
A) Mortgage characteristics: 




















 [0.081] -0.242 [0.126] -3.667
***
 [0.172] 
100%LTV2>90% -4.443*** [0.106] -1.284*** [0.199] 6.091*** [0.299] 
90%LTV3>80% -5.413*** [0.171] -1.734*** [0.322] 10.861*** [0.479] 
80%LTV4>70% -5.240*** [0.189] -1.790*** [0.355] 12.504*** [0.528] 
70%LTV5>60% -3.474*** [0.128] -1.158*** [0.237] 8.386*** [0.352] 
60%LTV6>50% -2.282*** [0.086] -0.793*** [0.158] 5.521*** [0.234] 
B) Borrower characteristics: 
NOFICO -0.893
***
 [0.092] 0.104 [0.175] 7.523
***
 [0.259] 
FICO1634 -0.903*** [0.093] 0.278 [0.177] 7.462*** [0.262] 
634<FICO2686 0.288*** [0.027] 0.602*** [0.051] 2.690*** [0.076] 
















































D) Self-selection variable: 





SFARM   4.870
***
 [0.142] 











Table 4. 14: Proportional Hazard Risk Models for non-Jumbo mortgages in Non-agency Loans (Continue) 
E) Interactive variable: 
 Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
SFFRM *LTV     
  










SFFRM *FICO     
  


















































-2 LOG L 10247674 7516647 2119344 
AIC 10247720 7516699 2119396 
SBC 10247973 7516978 2119643 
Likelihood Ratio 2568208 1946239 636357.3 
Score 6101435 3303958 2530039 
Wald 2299186 1600416 599885.9 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance,* denotes 10% significance 
Note：Observation is based on the subsample individual loans originated 2005 July to 
2007 July, with loans smaller than 359,650$ in 2005, and 417,000$ in 2006, and 2007. 
For such subsample, the total loan number is 3,643,056, where ARM is at the percentage 
51.70%, while FRM is 48.30%.  In hazard regression, the three criteria -2logL (2 times 
log partial likelihood), AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), SBC (Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criterion) is used to represent model fit statistics. Normally, lower the value 
fit statistics indicates a better desirable model. Likelihood Ratio, Score, and Wald are 
used to test the null hypothesis of zero parameter. 
 
The robust test of selection between ARM and FRM based on the non-jumbo 
subsample is done following the same two-step Heckman regressions as the main 
regressions, and its hazard results are shown in Table 4.14. The main result of 
selection factor for the non-jumbo loans is consistent with the full sample, where the 
borrowers who select into ARM loans are contributing to higher default probability, 
and borrowers who select into FRM loans are reflecting unobservable risk factors, 
which will result in lower default probability negative coefficient(-0.482). However 
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the absolute value is smaller than the full sample regressions, this shows that the 
relative limited credit accessibility of the jumbo loans could be important factor, 
which also reflects some unobservable risk factors.  This is strengthened by the little 
difference on the coefficients of interaction terms between the comparative selection 
factor and FICO score, compared to the full-sample regression. Only for ARM 
sample, those borrowers, with relative free credit accessibility when they are with 
high FICO score, are more likely to default, and the reason for this result is the choice 
of low mortgage amount lower the inconsistence of high FICO and ARM. In other 
words, borrowers with high FICO scores are less credit constrained, if they are ending 
up to choose ARM, it could reflect potential unobservable risk factor, which will 
contribute to higher ex-post default risk, which is observable in the main result in the 
full sample regression as in Table 4.8. However, if such borrowers will also choose 
smaller loan amount, it actually reduce such choice inconsistence, which reduce such 
reflection on the unobservable risk factors to contribute higher default risk.  This 
result actually strengthen the simulation results on mortgage choice basket, when 
choosing mortgage contract type, the mortgage size and borrowers‟ observable risk 
factors should be considered interactively to gain useful unobservable information of 






This part hypothesizes that borrowers make their decisions into two steps: mortgage 
choice with ex-post non-default as observed and then mortgage ex-post default after 
mortgage choice. In their mortgage choice process, they choose optimal mortgage 
contracts to maximize their life time consumption utility, based on both verifiable and 
unverifiable information to lenders (e.g., FICO, real income, and housing 
consumption preference). In the proposed theoretically stylized model of maximizing 
utility of consuming housing and non-housing goods, it is found that interaction of 
borrower characteristics and mortgage choice decisions reveals useful information of 
risk characteristics of borrowers, which is consistent with self-selection under 
asymmetric information framework(Ben-Shahar 2008; Brueckner 1992; Brueckner 
1993; Brueckner 1994; Follain 1990; Harrison, Noordewier and Yavas 2004).  
 
Simulation result also shows that borrowers with high FICO score are more likely to 
choose a higher risk ARMs, with potential unobservable risk attributes (e.g., lower 
real income). This finding could indicate that lenders could underestimate default risk 
premiums of low risk (high FICO) borrowers, who choose a higher risk ARMs, 
therefore, borrowers‟ mortgage choices reveal significant unobservable risk factors, 
which could be related to borrowers‟ ex-post default risk, which is consistent with 
other studies stressing the importance of unobservable risk factors (Deng, Quigley 
and Van Order 2000). The observable borrower characteristics alone do not reveal 
sufficient information to segregate pooling risks in mortgages. This study empirically 
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tests the effects of self-selection jointly with other controlled variables on the 
proportional hazard rate or mortgages using the Heckman‟s two-step methodology.  
 
Results show that unobservable risk attributed revealed by mortgage choice (referred 
as self-selection factors for denotation simplicity, however, different from traditional 
self-selection in information asymmetric framework) on of ARM (SFARM) and FRM 
(SFFRM) and the comparative selection (DSF) factors are significant in explaining 
the mortgage ex-post default hazards. Borrowers‟ comparative self-selection of 
mortgages in general, and self-selection into FRM samples reduce mortgage default 
probabilities. The self-selection factor, however, will have positive effects on default 
hazard in ARM mortgages, which is consistent with general view on higher risk for 
ARM mortgages(Dhillon, Shilling and Sirmans 1987; Follain 1990; Posey and Yavas 
2001). The interaction of the comparative selection and FICO score of borrowers will 
increase the default risks in mortgages, which is consistent with “average hybrid 
borrowers with lower credit score” (Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010).  
 
The coefficients of the self-selection factors become significantly positive when high 
(95%) LTV mortgage samples are used in the robustness tests. The mortgage default 
hazard is estimated by removing mortgages that are more than 10-year old. The 
results show no sample biases in the findings that are caused by the truncation of the 




The positive effects of the self-selection factors in the ARM and also the interactive 
comparative mortgage choice and FICO score signify the importance of mortgage 
choice information in determining proportional default hazards of borrowers.  
 
In other words, high credit score borrowers choosing FRMs gives no incremental 
information on default probability, however, when prime (high credit score) 
borrowers chooses high risk mortgage contracts (ARM with high LTV), the signals 
are more credible in predicting ex-post default risks of the borrowers. Lenders should 
pay attention to the signal given by the self-selection to reflect unobservable risk 






Chapter 5 Non-Strategic Default 
5.1 Introduction 
In the financial option theory, default behavior is linked to borrowers‟ financial 
condition. Empirical tests based on the option theory, however, assume that the 
“probability of default” is statistically inversely related to the expected 
“time-to-default”. In other words, mortgage that has a high “probability of default” 
also imply that mortgage is expected to default within a shorter times. Both 
theoretical and empirical option models make an implicit assumption that all 
mortgagors are likely to default in a future time if equity position asks for default 
decision financially, and they ignore “non-defaulters”, who will never default within 
mortgage maturity even their financial situation suggests default position. 
 
The limitations in the standard option theories make them hard to explain 
non-strategic default behavior, where heterogeneous mortgagor chooses to “walk 
away” from the mortgage obligation for non-financial reasons systematically. 
Compared to the “strategic default” (also known as ruthless default) in the traditional 
option models, borrowers who behave either “non-ruthlessly” (as non-defaulters or 
default later), or “sub-optimally” violates the underlying assumption of the theoretical 
option models. 
 
In non-strategic behavior, three considerations are to be examined: First, 
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non-financial incentives to borrowers‟ default; Second, separation of “probability of 
default” from “time-to-default”; Third, the split population of “ever defaulters” and 
“non-defaulters” . 
 
To address the three issues in non-strategic default, a rational default model is 
proposed based on extended negative equity condition of mortgages. Numerical 
analyses on situations, where default is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition to 
borrowers‟ default decision, are simulated. On the empirical tests, the split population 
model is used to test the borrowers‟ incentives to default. 
 
The remaining chapter is organized into 6 sections. Section 5.2 discusses the 
traditional mortgage default option models and their limitations; Section 5.3 proposes 
a rational default model, based on mortgagors‟ maximization utility objective; Section 
5.4 presents the simulation result for the rationale default model. Section 5.5 and 5.6 
cover the empirical tests on the relationships of borrowers‟ characteristics and default 
option using a split population model; the last section summaries the findings and 
suggests future studies to borrowers‟ non-strategic default behavior. 
5.2 Financial Option on Mortgage Default 
The theoretical option models have been widely applied to model mortgagors' default 
behavior. In a two-factor option pricing model (OPM)(Kau and Keenan 1995), 
housing price tP  
follows the stochastic Brownian motion, 
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                             (5-1) 
  is the long term return, and   is the constant house service at every period. 
( )   is the expected house price appreciation. P  is the variance of the house 
price; Pdz  is a standard Wiener Process. 
 
The risk-adjusted interest rate 
tr follows a mean-reverting process (Cox, Ingersoll Jr 
and Ross 1985) 
( )t t t t rdr r dt r dz                            (5-2) 
  is the interest rate revert rate;   is the interest trend rate; r  is the variance of 
the interest rate and rdz is also standard Wiener Process. The correlation between 
rdz and Pdz  are defined by a coefficient ,r P . 
 
The mortgage option value M(r, P, t) satisfies the stochastic partial differential 




1 1 ( )
( ) 0
2 2
r r P r P P
M M M r M M M
r r P P rM
r r P P r P t
 
      
      
       
      
                                                           (5-3) 
 
The value of holding the amortizing mortgage or the equivalent underlying property 
value is defined ( ) ( , )t tV B f M P r   , where tB  is the outstanding loan balance; 
f is a fixed exogenous transaction cost22; Borrowers‟ strategy is to maximize the 
property value tV , if ( )tB f that is not endogenous determined and not affected 
                                                             
22 It is called “default cost” in paper of Brueckner (2000). 
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by borrowers default decision. "Strategic behavior" predicts that borrowers default, 
when the condition satisfies * *( ) ( , ) 0t tV P B f M P r P      ,
23 where 
*P  is 
the triggering critical house price in the option model. 
 
The financial mortgage option models have some limitations. Economically, the 
models fail to incorporate endogenous transaction costs, heterogeneous borrowers‟ 
characteristics (e.g., borrowers‟ income, and credit score), and borrowers‟ liquidity 
constraints (Vandell 1995). Theoretically, the models are based solely on financial 
criteria (e.g., nonnegative equity), which ignore economic rational of heterogeneous 
borrowers and their affordability in the aspects of payment ability and willingness, 
when they trade-off their housing and non-housing consumption. 
 
Technically, the remaining loan balance tB  is assumed to be exogenous, making the 
partial differentiation equation feasible either in fixed rate mortgage (FRM) or 
adjustable rate mortgage structure. However, tB  is endogenous in more practical 
concern, when credit repairing or credit spoiling exists. 
 
Moreover, the stochastic partial differentiation equations (SPDE) are based on two 
stochastic process ( , )P r , four boundary conditions connecting the two stochastic 
processes are required to be analyzed. The “curse of dimension” for the partial 
differential equations limits the analyses of SPDE in both the close-form and 
simulation model. When stochastic income is included to reflect liquidity constraints 
of borrowers, the numerical analyses of the SPDE are more complex.  
                                                             
23 If considering down payment, Loan-to-value (LTV) can treated as costs 𝑉𝑡 − 𝑃
∗ = (𝐵𝑡 + 𝑓) − 𝑃0 ⋅




The option model lacks a unified framework to deal with the issues of the 
co-existence of “sub-optimal” and “non-ruthless” default decisions. In some models, 
exogenous transaction costs are considered to change the boundary condition of the 
SPDE as a partial solution to "non-ruthless" default problem. Exogenous hazard rate 
that is used to represent non-financial trigger event is an alternative way to explain 
the "sub-optimal". Transaction costs defer borrowers‟ decision to default, whereas the 
trigger events modeled in an unexpected Poisson process affect the “probability of 
default”. The “trigger event” is associated with “sub-optimal” defaults, and the 
transaction cost is related to the “non-ruthless” default. This study proposes a rational 
mortgage default model that allow for both no-ruthless and sub-optimal options to be 
jointly modeled. 
5.3 Rational Mortgage Default model 
5.3.1 Mortgagor’s Utility 
Borrowers gain utility from housing and non-housing consumption, no matter they 
have made moving residence decision or not at each time period t .  This study 
modifies the utility model of Steins (1995)
24
, by generalizing the utility of a typical 




                                                             
24
 The proposed model can extend to include different specific form of utility, which capture households' 
satisfaction from house, non-house, and mobility choice. The form of utility is not a key to the 
philosophy of the mortgage default rationale. 
25 The model assumes borrowers have no price bargaining power as price-takers, and they can choose 




When a borrower lives in a mortgaged house at the beginning of the time period, he 
gains a prospective utility




, 0(1 ) ln( ) (1 ) lno t t tu D P C                      (5-4)  
             
The equation (5-4) could be written as 
, 0 0ln( ) (1 ) ln ln( );where , ,o t t tu P C D P o k d p                    (5-5) 
   
where o  represents option region; k  is potential keeping payment region; d  is 
potential default region; p  is potential prepayment decision. 0P  is initial housing 
price;   is housing service parameter commonly defined in option models (e.g., 
Kau and Keenan (1995));   is a fraction of the housing to the total borrower utility 
level; t t tC Y MP   is excess consumption value; tY  is disposable income; tMP  
is mortgage payment. 
 
In first part of Eq. (5-5),  0ln( )P    represents the utility of consuming housing 
services. The second part of Eq. (5-5) (1 ) ln tC   represents the utility of 
non-housing consumption. The third part 0ln( )tD P     is the utility of 
                                                                                                                                                               
following individual decision-making rule without interaction among heterogeneous individuals, and 
with lender/mortgage originator is here assumed. Therefore herding effect in behavioral finance is not 
taken into account up until now, but further models interested in extending the default rationale model 
could consider different behavior habits factors. 
26 Utility formation is similar to Stein (1995) with different economic understanding, however, Stein‟s 
paper only considers the financial ability for a person to choose to move or not, and the relationship 
between the price and trading volume. The focus is on the borrowers‟ default behaviors given the 
exogenous house price. 
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mortgagors‟ moving ability and willingness to exercise a default option, if housing 
value falls within the default option region. The model extends the specification of 
Stein‟s utility model where a dummy is used to model a family‟s decision to either 
move or stay. 
 
tD is mortgage option trigger that determine the potential default option exercising. If 
default option (or prepayment option) is in the money as measured by
*( ) ( , )tB f M P r P
P
  
  , where the housing price falls within the default (or 
prepayment) trigger boundary.  If borrower is still able to choose a new mortgage 
contract for a house with the same quality at lower price, the borrower will gain 
satisfaction resulting from such mortgage contract default. This value reflects the loss 
aversion of borrowers (e.g., Ong, Sing and Teo (2007)). When the housing value falls 
outside of the prepayment or default region, tD is defined to be 0. 
 
In the option default model with transaction costs, borrowers‟ option trigger region is 
determined by the relationship between house equity tE  and exogenous transaction 
cost cf . Home equity value t t tE P B  ; tB  
27is remaining mortgage payment of 
the mortgage contract; cf  is transaction costs that include sale commissions, legal 
fees, and sheriff‟s cost. This transaction costs cf , however, do not include costs 
induced by credit loss and reputation loss
28
. 
                                                             
27 The remaining payment balance is adjusted from time to time through different mortgage rate in case 
of adjustable rate mortgage. 
28 Credit loss is captured explicitly in the process of credit score adjustment, resulting in different credit 




Borrowers‟ option trigger region is then defined as, 
When 0t cE f  , 1 1p  , otherwise it is 0; 
When 









 , 1 1k  , otherwise it is 0; 
When 0t cE f  , 1 1d  , otherwise it is 0; 
 
If borrowers choose to put their mortgages‟ back to lender by exercising the default 
option, they obtain the reference utility 
,e tu of the mortgage upon termination 
, 0ln( (1 )) (1 ) ln( )e t tu P Y            where 
*t t .       (5-6) 
    
Where   is the price premium of heterogeneous house service or referred to as 
“Reservation Rent factor”, where 0 1  , that represent the house service utility, 
normalized to 1 for full service. Homeownership gives households reservation utility 
at each period, and   is inversely related to the reference utility. 
*t is the mortgage 
termination time for exiting mortgage market, which might be different from default 
for one mortgage contract. Mortgage termination time is taken as the earliest time of 
two dates. Eq. (5-6) indicates that when borrowers exit mortgage market, they would 
have lower house service, which could come in forms of government sponsored 
shelters, or in the worst case staying in homeless condition. They will use their 





When the borrower‟s utility 
,o tu at the strategic option triggering point is larger than 
                                                             
29 One could also consider the rental housing by include a discount premium to the proportion of income 
to house rent price. It is believed that it could not change the philosophy of the mortgagor‟s rationale 
model, and gain interesting results under reasonable parameter setting. 
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the reserve utility (or reference utility) 
,e tu , the borrower will keep his potential 
decision either potential default, prepayment or keeping payments if no other 
liquidity constraints. Otherwise, the borrower will default on the mortgage contract 
through exiting mortgage market.  
 
From Eq. (5-5) and Eq. (5-6), the borrowers‟ utility at the time t  can be defined as:  
, , ,( , ) max{1 max{ , }, }t t o t o t k e tu C u u u     where , ,o k d p       (5-7) 
 
The rationale for mortgage borrowers‟ default is summarized. When
* *
,( , )t t e tu C u  , 
borrower defaults decision is determined by liquidity and financial considerations. 
The liquidity constraints depend on mortgage payments structure, and borrowers‟ 
income profile, which will be discussed in Section 5.3.2. Financial options are built 
into borrowers‟ utility as 𝐸𝑡 + 𝑓𝑐 <   in Brueckner (2000) model. In this case, 
*( , )t t tu u C   and when 
* *
,( , )t t e tu C u  , the borrower will exit mortgage market, 
such as
*
,t e tu u , for it   where i is borrower‟s default time, and 
*
,e tu  is the 
reference utility at the default time. i  and 
*
,e tu  are dynamically determined based 
on the life time utility function of the borrowers. 
 











                        (5-8) 
                         
If borrowers are rational, they will maximize the life time utility taking into 
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                 (5-9) 
     
As borrowers are assumed to be price takers, borrowers have the option to either 
default the current mortgage at any time by shopping the future payment to the 
originator, or make the consumption strategy the level of { }tC . Hence, the 
maximization of borrowers‟ life time utility by making the optimal default on the 
reservation utility can be determined as 
, , , ,
0
max max ( , )









                  (5-10) 
 
 
The problem can be solved dynamically as a Bellman equation 
, ,




Vi t ut e EV    
 
where 
,i tV  is the maximum implicit value function. A typical borrower would 
consume housing services and non-housing goods dynamically by trading-off 




In the theoretical setting, the optimal default time is endogenously determined 
                                                             
30 As no interaction with lender/mortgage originator is here assumed and borrowers are completely price 
taker, the only choice for borrowers is to default the mortgage at hand or not at each time to affect their 
future payment requirement set by originator. Hence, maximization is with respect to factors on 
reservation utility. When considering interaction with originators in further work, borrowers can have the 
strategy on the level of 
,i t
C . 
31  When considering the inter-temporal default decision, the model is different with classic 
inter-temporal CCAPM model (e.g., Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007)), which concerns the 
uncertain consumption related risk such as composition risk between housing and other consumption to 
understand stock price. 
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through the life-time utility maximization objective, while the “probability of default” 
at each time point is affected by the reservation utility and the default if triggered will 
endogenously determine the “time-to-default”. There are two joint and not fully 
dependent events, going through the process: the “probability of default” and 
“time-to-default”. While the “probability of default” that is a function of reservation 
utilities, determining whether borrower will become potential defaulters.  
“time-to-default” is conditional on potential defaulters, and determined by stopping 
time model related to stochastic house prices.  
 
In other words, traditional option model assumes that “probability of default” is the 
direct reverse function of “time-to-default”. The “probability of default” in the 
proposed model has included two risks: the risk of potential defaulters, and the risk of 
default relating to “time-to-default”, which is conditional on being potential defaulters. 
The risks of potential defaulters are correlated with borrowers‟ reservation utility. 
5.3.2 Liquidity Constraint 
Borrowers‟ financial ability is bounded by the liquidity constraint, which will affect 
the risk-based pricing of mortgages
32
. Payment in the current period will affect the 
next period payments like a sequential option; Borrowers‟ default decisions are 
constrained by the future credit accessibility, future payment ability, and 
payment-to-income constraint. 
                                                             
32 It is assumed that non-house consumption good can be purchased without friction, however the ability 





tCS  denote the credit spread, which also can be viewed as the default or credit 
repairing costs, when default occurs 
'
t t dS S    
' '( )t tCS f S                             (5-11) 
                         
where '
tS  is potential credit score resulting from option trigger region; d  measures 
the deterioration of the credit score. It is positive when option trigger region indicates 
keeping payments and negative value when option trigger region hints potential 
termination of the loans. f is a decreasing function that map the credit score to and 
credit spread
33
, which may vary with different underwriting strictness. Further 
potential mortgage payments are determined by the remaining loan balance and the 
mortgage payment structure, which are subject to the following conditions 
' ( )t t t cMP Y E f    
'
t d tM Y  
where d is the payment-to-income ratio; 
'
tMP  is potential mortgage monthly 
payment, which is a function of the mortgage balance and potential adjustable 
mortgage interest rates 
' '
tM t t
r CS r  determined by option default trigger region. 
 
Based on the exogenous information set { , , }t t tP r Y  and the endogenously 
                                                             
33 The rationality of the setting is based on risk-based pricing of lenders. Chomsisengphet and 
Pennington-Cross (2006) show that interest rates are higher for the low credit score borrowers based on 
the data for the subprime loans in LoanPerformance, but similar value for different LTV, even though the 
interest rate is much higher when LTV is higher than 1. It is pointed out that “The evidence also shows 
that the subprime market has provided a substantial amount of risk-based pricing in the mortgage market 
by varying the interest rate of a loan based on the borrower‟s credit history and down payment.” 
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information set { , }t tB S , the borrowers making upon their  decision to default 
under the rational mortgage default model will simultaneously renew their 
information set on the credit score and remaining balance at time ( 1)t   
,( 1) ,( 1){ , }i t i tB S  . Their final decision to default is endogenously determined through 
maximizing their total life time utilities. They will have to take into consideration not 
just financial costs of default, but also the potential damage to the credit scores in the 
future that may reduce the consumption utility. This is another drives that affect the 
“the probability of default”, as probability of borrower to be potential defaulters 
instead of non-defaulters and the risk of “time-to-default” conditioning on being a 
potential defaulter. 
 
The “probability of default” at time t can then be written as a function given that i  
is the default time of borrower i, as. 
, , ,( ) ( , , , , , )i i t i t t t i tp t p CS LTV P r Y    
 
where 
,i tLTV  are exogenously decided by mortgage design and mortgagor‟s choice  
as in Chapter 4, ,t tP r  is dependent on the macro economy condition, and , ,i tY   
represents the borrowers‟ characteristics. The “probability of default” and the 
“time-to-default” are simultaneously determined in the model, but two different 
concerned risks are probably affected differently by the observed variables. 
5.3.3 Relationship with the Classic Option Model 
The standard option model, where the default is triggered by the mortgage to housing 
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value ratio, can be treated mathematically as a special case of the proposed rational 
mortgage default model when 1  . When the reservation utility 
, ,i e tu is small, some 
borrowers will never default, until the end of mortgage maturity.  There are potential 
“non-defaulters” in the model, no matter what the financial option value will be. 
 
The proposed rational default model is more general than the classic financial option 
model. The mortgagors‟ default criteria in the rational default model are not based on 
minimizing the financial value of mortgage; rather default decision is driven by 
maximizing their utility on housing and non-housing consumption. Quan and Lebret 
(2006) also employ the utility of borrowers in their analysis using dynamic 
programming approach, their default criteria are based on the cost minimizing 
assumption in a one-period decision making model. 
 
In the financial option model, the “probability of default” and “time-to-default” are 
not explicitly separated in the default event. Therefore the co-existence of suboptimal 
default and non-ruthless behaviors cannot be distinguished. In rational mortgage 
default model, the “probability of default” and the “time-to-default” are also 
endogenously and simultaneously determined, but the “probability of default” is a 
broader concept than “time-to-default”, as “probability of default” includes the 
probability of becoming potential defaulters as determined mainly by the existence of 
reservation utility and also the default trigger option region. “time-to-default” is 
conditioning on the risk of potential defaulters, and then driven by stochastic housing 
price and interest rates. A bad financial shock can also increase both the “probability 
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of default”, and the timing to default. Economic factors such as consumption 
preference, which affect their time-varying utilities and reservation utilities, could 
also cause non-strategic default by borrowers. The unified structure of the 
utility-based model thus allows more financially “irrational” behaviors, which 
include nonstrategic defaults and non-ruthless decisions. The proposed rational 
default model could explain the co-existence of “strategic”, “non-ruthless”, and 
“sub-optimal”. 
 
The way to build a unified utility as criteria to default decisions is different from 
using jump process of trigger event to explain non-optimal default, as in Riddiough 
(1991). Riddiough changed the borrowers‟ decision from “pricing an American put 
option subject to a free boundary condition” to “one of pricing a European put option 
with a stochastic exercise date” under the framework of financially wealth 
maximization with a default trigger probability either constant or variant on housing 
prices. The proposed rational default model in my thesis extends the maximization 
from financial into economic utility sense, without considering whether it is 
American option or European options. Hence, either trigger events as job loss, or 
out-of-money housing equity position, are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions 
for borrowers‟ to choose to terminate their obligations to housing mortgages. Some 
difference and similarity in model assumptions are listed in Table 5.1.  
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(e.g.,Kau et al., (1990)) 









mortgage cost; or 
maximize joint value of 
default and prepayment 










Determined by free 
boundary condition 
Determined by 
occurrence of a jump 
trigger events and/or 
housing price 
stochastic process 
Determined by both 
stochastic property and 
borrowers‟ reservation 
utility. The concept of 
“probability of default” 





1. Instantaneous default 
2. No arbitrary condition 




1. Limited Liability 
2. Discrete Cash Flow 
3. Be able to treat heterogeneous borrowers 
 
1. Conditional Optimal borrower Behaviors 
2. Stochastic house price setting 
3. Risk Neutral Investors 
Note: some definitions for the assumption: 
Conditional Optimal Borrower Behaviors: borrowers can always evaluate their 
mortgages, property value, and potential costs from termination decision caused by a 
trigger. 
Instantaneous default: Borrowers terminate their mortgage regardless of the next 
payment date, relating to trigger event time. 
 
For reader to further understand the logic of the proposed rational default model, I use 
a simplified illustration to demonstrate the default criteria under different models. 
 
Traditional option model with/without trigger event defaults happen when stochastic 
house price triggered critical house price, which makes borrowers‟ option position 
in-of-money or which determined by exogenous trigger probability, as shown in 




However, the proposed rational default model is to maximize the total life-time utility, 
the illustrated shadowed area (see Figure 5.1 (b)-(f)), in different cases relating to the 
heterogeneous characteristics of borrowers. There are diverse cases under different 
stochastic expectation, housing consumption preference, and other coefficients in 
borrowers‟ utilities, and I here only give some cases. For instance, Figure 5.1 (b), if 
borrowers have relatively low reservation utility, the borrower„s strategy is to be 
“non-defaulter”, and gets the shadowed area of life-time utility 
,0iV . In Figure 5.1 (c), 
if borrower choose to have a relative higher reservation utility, at time *
1t , 
instantaneous utility might be lower than reservation utility, and borrower become a 
potential “defaulter”, with perspective default time of *
1t , at the same time, gained 
the shadowed area of life-time utility 
,1iV . After the perspective termination, the 
borrower could expect potential changes in his consumption bundles (e.g., utilities 
changing caused by credit damaging, higher mortgage rates, moving house or living 
in shelters).  
 
Borrowers have the choice to choose their risky type by altering their reservation 
utility, and to gain optimal “time-to-default” * *
1 2{ , , ,...}T t t   to maximize their 
life-time utility 
,0 ,1 ,2max{ , , ,...}i i iV V V V . It illustrates the simplified geometric 





























Note: The figures here are for illustration purpose. (a) represents the criteria for option 
models with/without trigger probability; (b)-(f) are some of the cases in the proposed 
rational default model. The horizontal axis is the time.  The vertical axis for (a) is the 
house price. The vertical axis for (b)-(f) is instantaneous utility each time after discounted 
back to time zero of 
( , )t t te u C
 
 .  The curve could represent
te  ,o tu .  The 
horizontal line i
u
 represents the discounted back 
te  ,e tu  reservation utility, and the 
real value is not constant. Here it just illustrates as constant to compare with 
instantaneous utility, and demonstrating the logic of proposed maximization. The 














5.4 Simulation Analysis 
5.4.1 Borrowers and Mortgage Specification 
The theoretical setting of the rational default model is not constrained by the specific 
forms for house price 
tP , market interest rate tr , and income tY . For convenience, 
the same stochastic processes for 
tP   and tr  as in Eq. (5-1) and (5-2) are applied in 
the simulation study. 
 







                            (5-12)  
  
where 
y  is the drift of the borrowers‟ disposable income; y is the variance of the 
income; 
ydz  is standard Wiener Process. For simplicity, dzp, dzr , and  dzy  are 
assumed to be not correlated in the simulation. 
 
Mortgagors are assumed to take a 30 years mortgage (either fixed rate mortgage or 
adjustable rate mortgage). The prepayment or default events will shorten the maturity 
of new loan in the simulation process. Basic mortgage rate is the same as the Chapter 
4, but the credit spread '
tCS  is determined based on the credit score repairing and 
credit damage if borrower default the mortgage. Mortgage payment, credit adjustment 
period, and interest rate are compound all on a monthly base
34
. 
                                                             





To estimate credit spread and credit score as in Eq. (5-11), FICO score in myFICO 
website on March 15, 2008 is used, and its reported annual percentage rates (APR)
35
, 
credit spread sheet, and market interest rate on the same day as the reference. The 
second-order polynomial function is used to fit the credit spread function at the 
present threshold credit score 640. The fitting function is as below
36
 
When 640tS               
2
1 2 3t t tCS a a S a S      
When 640tS               
2
1 2 3t t tCS b b S b S      
 
The payment-to-income ratio (PTI) 
d , is set at a reasonable value of 0.6. In practice, 
a range from 0.2 to 0.6 is normally used by lenders to qualify a new mortgage loan. 
However, the PTI ratio for borrowers defines the maximum payment limit of the 
borrowers. The disposable income limit may be larger than 0.6, if no savings are 
considered in the model. In other words, the borrower may use the residual of income 
for non-housing consumption to increase the LTV of housing loan. In the past 
decades, non-agency lenders relax their underwriting standard lending to subprime 
mortgage(Mian and Sufi 2009). 
5.4.2 Simulation Procedure and Results 
The Monte Carlo method is applied to simulate default decisions of individual 
                                                             
35 For scores above 620, these Annual Percentage Rates (APRs) assume a mortgage with 1.0 points and 
80% Loan-to-Value Ratio. For scores below 620, these APRs assume a mortgage with 0 points and 60 to 
80% Loan-to-Value Ratio. Assumes mortgage is for a single family, owner-occupied property. Based on 
source: myFICO 
36 At this stage, FICO credit adjustment criteria are exogenous without consideration of interaction with 
lenders, the credit repairing adjustment parameters are based on the FICO score discussion forum. 
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borrower i . If total the number of simulation trial is MN , and each run is mn , the 
















                        (5-13) 
 
The first step of the Monte Carlo simulation ( MN =100 in the case) is run to obtain 
the mortgage default option value for one specific borrower at each time, given 
mortgage type (FRM or ARM). The realization of stochastic process (e.g., income), 
option values, and other parameters (e.g., initial credit score) are jointly solved to 
determine the borrowers‟ total life utilities and the corresponding default decisions 
(e.g.,
,i mn ) following Eq. (5-9) and Eq. (5-10) of the rational default model. 
Mortgagors‟ optimal default decision is determined by changing the interval of 
optimal preference through 0.01 to 0.99 in each Monte Carlo run so as to maximize 
the life time utility. In this way, the default probability and default time could be 
jointly determined in the simulation process using Eq. (5-13). 
 
Table 5.2 shows a list of input parameters. The simulated number of negative equity 
cases is more than 6 times than that of positive equity cases
37
. Based on the 
assumption, the simulated market reflects more closely a recession scenario. 
                                                             
37 Series of simulations are performed to test the sensitive to parameters (e.g., borrowers‟ initial income, 
initial credit score and income volatility) keeping others constant (e.g. lenders‟ risk-based pricing rules). 
It is found that borrowers‟ default patterns are highly affected by their initial income, income volatility, 
and original credit score, while probability of negative house equity could partially explain the borrowers‟ 
default decision. After considering these heterogeneous characteristics and their interaction with default 
options, borrowers‟ default probability is non-linear to their characteristics. 
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Table 5. 2: Parameters for Recession Economy Scenario 
Description Parameter Depression Market 
House Price 
Long Term Return   0.0103 
House Service   0.0175 
House Price Volatility 
P  
0.01 
Market Interest rate (Annual) 
Revert Rate   0.0035 
Trend Rate   0.0401 
Interest Rate volatility 
r  0.0047 
Borrower‟s Characteristic 






fraction of house service in the total utility   0.7 
Reservation Rent factor   0.1 
Lender‟s Underwriting criteria 
Credit score adjustment on prepayment 
1  
0.4 




Credit score adjustment on default 
3  
-40 















Fixed explicit transaction cost 
cf  
0.002 
Payment-to-income ratio on new mortgage 
d  
0.6 
Initial interest rate (Annual) 
0r  
0.057 






Note: Interest rate parameters are based on one-month LIBOR rate from 1998 Jan. to 
2008 Jan. Maximum likelihood of Nelder-Mead Method for Cox, Ingersoll and Ross 
Model (1985) is used to estimate interest parameters. House price parameters are 
estimated through S&P/Case-Shiller® Home Price Indices from 1998 to 2008, and then 
reversed to match a depressed downward market. Parameters credit spread function are 
estimated by FICO score and corresponding mortgage rate charged, based on myFICO 
(with fitness R=0.90297). Initial house size, initial credit score, and initial optimal LTV 
are used based on Chapter 4 
 
The “sub-optimal” and “non-ruthless” behaviors are represented by the simulated 
default percentage at the end of mortgage maturity. The results are categorized in to 
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groups based on LTV and FICO. In Figure 5.2 and Figure5.3, the size of the circle 
represents the simulated default probability, measured by the proportion of default 
loan in each subgroup. The larger the circles, the higher probability of the mortgagors 
default at the end of time. The default probability in Figure 5.3 are larger than that in 
Figure 5.2
38
, which indicates that default percentage for positive equity mortgages is 
larger than the defaults in negative equity mortgages. In the model simulation, the 
majority of mortgagors are suboptimal defaulters, instead of strategic defaulters. 
 
The size of two circles in Figure 5.2 has only marginal difference, although the upper 
left circle is slightly larger. Borrowers in the LTV 4 group (between 70% and 80%) 
and FICO1 subgroup (below 634) are more likely to execute their in-the-money 
default option as ruthlessly default in the simulation. In comparison, the difference 
between the two circles in Figure 5.3 is more significant. It means that borrowers in 
the LTV3 (between 80% and 90%) and FICO2 (above 634) subgroup are more likely 
to default suboptimally even though they have positive equity in the mortgages.  
 
The simulation results support the importance of borrowers‟ characteristics to 
determine the “probability of default”, relating to reservation utility and borrowers‟ 
utility form in the theoretical rational default model. 
  
                                                             
38 Figure 5.3 has a smaller scale when mapping to have clear demonstration. 
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Figure 5. 2: Simulated Mortgagor‟s Default Percentage for Specific Borrowers for 
Negative EQRMSA Subsample 
 
 
Note: The simulation is based on parameters in Table 5.2. Borrowers’ FICO score and 
LTV are based on Chapter 4 for six types of borrowers. Size of the circle in the picture 
denotes the percentage of defaults at the end of second year from origination, compared 
to total number of the negative EQRMSA, after 24 months to 36 months from origination 
time. The value is scaled by 360*100*24 for clear demonstration, compared to the size of 
the axle.  
 
Figure 5. 3: Simulated Mortgagor‟s Default Percentage for Specific Borrowers for 
Positive EQRMSA Subsample 
 
 
Note: The interpretation is similar to Figure 5.2 at the end of second year from 
origination, except it is under positive EQRMSA, and it is scaled by 360*100*0.2 for the 
clear demonstration, compared to the size of the axle. 
 
It seems that the high initial income borrowers are more likely to be “non-ruthless” 
defaulters, and low income borrowers are more likely to be “sub-optimal” defaulters. 
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The high credit score borrowers are more likely to default “sub-optimally” and less 
likely to behave “non-ruthlessly”. Borrowers with low credit scores default less 
“sub-optimally” and more likely to default “non-ruthless”. The predictions by the 
proposed rational default model imply that the financial option value is not a 
sufficient condition for mortgage default decision. 
5.5 Empirical Methodology 
5.5.1 Variables 
The data, used in the empirical tests come from the same data sources as thus used in 
previous chapter. Detailed data description is in Section 3.2.1, part 1), 2), 3), and 4). 
 
Household mobility is related to mortgagor‟s prepayment and/or defaulting Rossi 
(1955). In the theoretical study, the macro-economy factors, that affect market 
expectations and individual heterogeneous characteristics, determine the financial 
constraints and utilities, which will in turn predict the “probability of default” and 
“time-to-default”.  
 
This study uses house size, contract type, original loan to value (LTV), borrowers‟ 
individual characteristic such as credit score and income index in the empirical tests. 
The definitions of these variables are the same as those shown in Chapter 4 (refer to 
Table 4.4). The house size (Hz), individual characteristics ( CURINCOME and 
CURSAVING ), Option values ( PNEQ and PPAY ) are included in this part of the 
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study. Group dummies are defined for the option variables, to capture potential 
non-linear relationship and their cut-off values.  
 
The house equity ratio (EQRMSA) reflect the positions of in-the-money or 








where CURMKVMSA  is the current market value and CURAMT  is the current 




Based on the housing equity ratio, four categories of borrowers are defined: 
“sub-optimal”, “non-ruthless” and two groups of “financially rational” borrowers40. 
 
When 0EQRMSA  and the borrower default at time  , a “sub-optimal” 
borrower is identified; 
 
When 0EQRMSA  and borrower does not default at time  , the borrower is a 
“financially rational” type; 
 
When 0EQRMSA  and borrower does not default at time , then borrower is a 
                                                             
39 In European option sense, EQR would always be bigger than 0 theoretically if no transaction cost is 
considered at the time of censorship of no default. The numerator is actually the intrinsic value in option. 
40 It is worth to notice that when the default conditions are considered as in the model, the so-called 
“sub-optimal” and “non-ruthless” could also be rational. Therefore the default decision based on 





When 0EQRMSA  and borrower default at time  , borrower is also a 
“financially rational” type, who is known as “strategic defaulter”. 
 
Based on the cut-off sample date of June 2009, 9.22% are observed as defaulters, of 
which the majority is “sub-optimal” defaulter. In fact, 7.13% of borrowers are the 
“sub-optimal” defaulters. 9.87% of borrowers are observed to be “woodheads” types 
and 83% of borrowers are “strategic defaulters”. The composition of borrower type 
for the year from 1991 to June 2009 is plotted in Figure 5.4. There were a large 
proportion of suboptimal defaulters and strategic defaulters in the two-year period of 
2006 and 2007, coincidental with the house price decreases. The proportion of 
“woodheads” increases from 2004, despite the dramatic house price falling in 2007, 
which imply that many borrowers with negative housing equity postpone their default 
option, such that “probability of default” reduces, although the financial 
“time-to-default” is shortened for wood-head borrowers after house price deceasing. 
 
Why do some borrowers choose to default strategically, while others choose to hold 
on to the mortgage with negative value, such as “woodheads”? These questions 
require further empirical verification in the study. 
                                                             
41 The woodheads defined here are different with Deng and Quigley (2003), where a borrower passes up 
the opportunities to prepay the mortgage is treated to have higher likelihood to be “woodheads”. They 
count the total missed prepayment opportunities for the period of mortgages. It only focuses on the 
default decision side at the termination time or truncation time, and woodheads are defined in the sense 




Figure 5. 4: Proportion of Borrowers‟ Type in Each Year 
 
Note: This figure shows the percent of borrowers’ type in each year. It is based on all the 
available individual mortgage performance data of 7,108,723 loans. The unmatched 
value on MSA is estimated by national level to keep the full picture of borrowers’ type. 
Hazard regressions later on are based on matched subsample to keep the accurate default 
put option value. Borrowers’ type is defined into four groups. RationalNDefault is 
rational non-defaulter; StrategicDefaulter is the strategic defaulter; Suboptimal means 
suboptimal defaulter; and woodheads are the fourth kind of borrowers. Specific definition 
refers to the description to EQRMSA part. 
 
5.5.2 Empirical Model 




is utilized to analyze the default behavior. The reasons 
for utilizing the split population (Schmidt and Witte 1989) are: 1) the empirical 
                                                             
42 Split population model is widely used in clinic test and in criminology (see Schmidt and Witte (1989)). 
It is suitable for testing the probability of eventual failure and the timing of failure, depending on 
individual characteristics simultaneously estimated while separately interpreted. 
43 The reason of not using the competing model: 1) when prepayment and defaults are of equal interest, 
it could use competing risk analysis. However, mortgage defaults are more concerned. 2) Competing risk 
analysis is more suitable to the case that the hazard of prepayment and default is independent. However, 
as the prepayment option and default option are all related to market interest as mortgage balance in 
default option calculation is related to market interest rate when it is ARM, even though the house price 
is assumed to be independent with market interest rate. Therefore when considering the potential 
dependence on prepayment option and default option, it is not proper to use competing model. 
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method is suitable for mortgage samples with rapidly decreasing hazard rate, which 
are observed in  pattern of the mortgage samples. 2) Split population regression is 
able to separate the effects of independent variables on the “probability of default” 
and its “time-to-default” for borrowers who eventually default, which is consistent 
with the theoretically rational default model. For instance, credit score explains the 
“probability of default” more, but should be less related to the “time-to-default”. The 
differences between “the probability to default” and the “time-to-default” are 
discussed in Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994). 3) The split population model allow for 
the group of borrowers as “non-defaulters”, who would never default under financial 
condition. The traditional hazard model implicitly assumes that every individual will 
eventually default if their equity position asks for default financially, which is not 
consistent with real observations. A fraction of the total sample would never default 
to the end of maturities (as “non-defaulters”). 
 
For each individual i , the default time is observed i rct t , where rct  is the right 
censored time (June, 2009 as in the sample). The observed default, if it occurs within 
the sample time is represented by Censor=1
44
 , which indicate the observed default 
time period, it  “time-to-default” measured from the mortgage origination to the 
observed default or truncation time. Its probability density is written as 
(Censor 1, ) ( ) ( ', 1)i i i i iP t t X f t X A                (5-22) 
For non-censored samples, 
                                                             
44 Note that, if studying the effects on the survival rate, instead of hazard rate, the censor sign is 1 for 
censorship of continuing as survival. The explanatory variables‟ effect on hazard rate is directly 
concerned, the censorship is 0 signed. 
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(Censor 0) 1 ( ) ( ) [1 ( ', 1)]
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i
i i rc
P X X F t X A
X X S t
 
 
      
   
     
 (5-23) 
 
where “probability of default”
 
( )iX  is estimated using different distribution such 
as Probit and Logit models depending on its matching to performance data. 
iX  is a 
vector of explanatory variables such as borrowers‟ characteristics, which is used to 
test the “probability of default”. 'iX  is also a vector of explanatory variable in 
predicting “time-to-default” as hazard, which could be either the same with or 
different from the vector of iX . ( )f  and ( )F   are probability and cumulative 
distribution functions for the “time-to-default”, conditioning on individuals who will 
eventually default. iA  is endogenous indicator, denoting mortgagor who will be an 
ever defaulters, after the right-hand sample censoring time. Based on the spirit of the 
“split population model”, “many individuals would in fact never default”. ( )rcS t  is 
the survival function condition on/after the censor time. Eq. (5-23) means that the 
probability of observing censorship is composed of the “probability of non-defaulter” 
and the “probability of defaulter that still survival”45. 
 
The log-likelihood function could be expressed as a function of iX  
and 'iX  as 
1
{ ln[ ( ) ( , 1)] (1 ) ln[1 ( ) ( ) ( )]}
N
i i i i i i i i rc
i
LL Censor X f t X A Censor X X S t  

     
 where N  is number of borrowers. 
 
                                                             
45 In the regression implementation, it is to use Newton-Raphson method similarly in SAS PROC 




Notably, the assumption of “non-defaulter” in the split population model means that 
there are borrowers that never default with estimated probability. Others will default 
with a certain probability. The observed defaults are a subset of all “defaulters”, on 
which there are still unobserved future defaulters. Borrowers, who have not defaulted 
as the censorship, are comprised by “future defaulters” and “non-defaulters”. 
 
According to the definition of “non-ruthless” and “suboptimal”, the full sample is 
separated into two subsamples based on the 
it
EQRMSA  at the measure time 
(default time if uncensored, right censor time if censored). 
 
For the subsample 0
it
EQRMSA  , borrowers are comprised by “suboptimal 
defaulters”, “non-defaulters” and potential “future defaulters” endogenously in the 
split population. Therefore, the split population hazard regression explains “what 
drives borrowers to default sub-optimally”, based on the subsample of 
0
it
EQRMSA  . 
 
For the subsample 0
it
EQRMSA  , borrowers are comprised by “ruthless defaulters”, 
“non-defaulters”, and potential “future defaulters” in the split population model. Split 
population hazard regression explains “what drives borrowers to default ruthlessly” 
based on the subsample of 0
it
EQRMSA  . Its opposite signs of the regressors‟ 
coefficient will explain the non-strategically non-ruthless behaviors, as “survival 
probability” reflects the non-ruthless behaviors, which is the opposite of the “hazard 
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probability” in hazard regression. 
5.6 Result Analysis 
5.6.1 Statistics 
The quarterly house prices in different MSA increased from 1991Q1 to 2006 and 
2007, followed by dramatic decreases, especially in Los Angeles (see Figure 5.5). In a 
boom market, the likelihood of borrowers having negative equity in their put option 
value is small. 
 
House price volatility (see Figure 5.6) creates uncertainty to individual borrowers‟ 
default put option value. The high volatility of 2007 increases the value of holding the 
put option in the mortgage as “time-to-default”, which explains a large proportion of 
“woodhead” during the period, given a high probability of negative equity during 
house price recession. 
 
The descriptive statistics of key variables in different sub-samples are shown in Table 











Note: The house price index is from Federal Housing Finance Agency. For clear 
demonstration, only 14 major MSA house price trends are shown (14 major MSA is 
defined according to the largest by population, referring to Wikipedia). They are Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Philadelphia, Houston, Miami, Washington, 




Figure 5. 6: House Price Index Volatility 
 
 
Note: The house price volatility at state level based on cross-sectional Federal Housing 
Finance Agency house price index. Only the states in the western area of U.S. (Federal 
Reserve Districts 12) are shown for clear demonstration, including Arizona, California, 
Indiana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. The jump at 2000 Q2 is because of 
missing observation. 
 
Comparing the “observed default” and the censored “un-defaulter” (see Table 5.3), 
“observed default” borrowers have higher averaged LTV (80.7%) than that of 
“un-defaulter” (75.409%), but “observed default” borrowers have lower variance of 
LTV. It indicates that defaulters have more homogeneous LTV. 
 
The “observed default” borrowers have smaller averaged house size than that of 
“un-defaulter”. Families, having more people, are more likely to buy a large house. 
Large families are more prone to meet with social affiliation to refrain from moving 
and defaulting freely, which could be referred to as large family constraints to reduce 
default risk. Large families are also more likely to have high wealth, and total 
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monthly income, which reduce their liquidity risk under the budget constraints. At the 
same time, families with a lot of family members tend to meet with high uncertainty 
trigger events (e.g., unemployment, marriage status changing, larger monthly 
installments), which will increase default risk. It could be referred to as large family 
risk. The statistics match better to the large family constraints. 
 
Observed defaulters in aggregate have larger ARM percentage and lower average 
current income. This is consistent with high default risk for ARM contracts than 
FRMs and for borrowers with lower income. However, the “observed default” and 
“un-defaulter” borrowers have similar average FICO score. “Observed default” 
borrowers generally have averaged FICO score of 653.71, while “un-defaulter” have 
average FICO of 676.353 with larger variance, indicating higher level of 
heterogeneity for “un-defaulter”. 
 
CURSAVING index for “observed default” sample is 3.31, and it is 6.834 for 
“un-defaulter” sample. It shows that there is distinctive difference in saving 
preference to mortgagors‟ total income between the observed defaulters and the 
censored un-defaulters. Borrowers, who save more, might be less risky in the aspect 
of default. The “Observed default” sample has a higher value of PNEQ (0.3385), 
while the censored “un-defaulter” sample has smaller mean value of 0.2121. This 
observation is consistent with previous empirical studies, which suggest that the 
PNEQ is correlated with the default risk. 
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Table 5. 3: Descriptive Statistics-Comparison of Defaulter and Un-Defaulters 
 Observed Default Un-default (Censored) 
Num. of Obser. 670479 6438245 
Variables Mean Std. Mean Std. 
House size (Hz) 1696.690  4382.820  1986.880  8692.960  
Dummy_ARM 0.763  0.425  0.460  0.498  
LTV 80.700  9.774  75.409  20.450  
FICO 653.710  65.417  676.353  76.140  
CURINCOME 12067.360  109.931  12255.200  33.974  
CURSAVING 3.311  1.763  6.834  0.448  
PNEQ 0.3385 0.2195 0.2121 0.2037 
PPAY 0.9873 0.0595 0.9965 0.0235 
 





 Rational Suboptimal Ruthless Non-ruthless 
N 3283901 286651 383828 3154344 
Variables Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
House size 1655.24  8684.8  1456.43  5005.31  1876.120  3843.09  2332.14  8688.02  
Dummy_ARM 0.432  0.495  0.722  0.448  0.793  0.405  0.488  0.500  
LTV 75.288  19.096  79.971  9.890  81.244  9.650  75.534  21.770  
FICO 672.213  77.138  648.896  72.422  657.306  59.397  680.663  74.843  
CURINCOME 12256.03  31.282  12060.72  106.576  12072.32  112.116  12254.33  36.547  
CURSAVING 6.844  0.407  3.506  1.719  3.165  1.781  6.822  0.486  
PNEQ 0.1608 0.1444 0.2443 0.137 0.661 0.122 0.6357 0.105 
PPAY 0.9970 0.0219 0.9905 0.053 0.985 0.064 0.996 0.025 
Note: The number of observation is based on the total sample. 
 
Table 5.4 gives the statistics for different type of borrowers. Non-ruthless mortgagors 
have the largest house size (2332.14), while suboptimal defaulters have the smallest 
house size (1456.43). The phenomenon supports the argument of large family 
constraint, in which borrowers in larger house are more reluctant to default. 
 
Suboptimal defaulters have extremely large percentage of ARM (72.2%), and also 
most of ruthless defaulters take ARM contracts (79.3%). It indicates that borrowers 
with ARMs default more both suboptimally and ruthlessly, than borrowers with 
FRMs. This again supports that borrowers with ARMs are higher risk than those with 
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FRMs. Ruthless borrowers have the largest average LTV (81.244), while sub-optimal 
borrowers have the lowest average FICO (648.896).  
 
Consistent with definition of the option measurement, put option value is in average 
larger than 0.5, when house equity is negative. Ruthless borrower and non-ruthless 
borrowers have similar put option value when house equity is at negative positive. 
Rational un-defaulters have smallest put option value of 0.1608. 
 
The proportion of defaulters under positive and negative equity categories is mapped 
in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8. Borrowers with LTV between 70% and 90% (LTV3 and 
LTV4) have a high default risk for both negative equity ratio and positive equity ratio. 
Borrowers with negative equity ratio (Figure 5.7)  and low FICO score have high 
default risk; while borrowers with positive equity ratio (Figure 5.8) and high FICO 
scores (FICO3 and FICO4, larger than 686)  also have high default risk. It is 
interesting to find that borrowers with high FICO are more likely to exercise 
suboptimal default. The default pattern for borrowers with high FICO score is less 
predictable by default option, and the incentive for them to defaults is probably due to 
other non-financial and non-housing equity considerations. The statistic observations 
are consistent with the simulation result of the proposed rational default model shown 
in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5. 7: Mortgagor‟s Default Percentage for Specific Borrowers‟ Characteristics 
Group for Negative EQRMSA Subsample 
  
Note: This is based on 0EQRMSA  subsample, originated in 2006. They have 2 to 3 
years with high default probability, since origination in the time of censorship of June, 
2009. . The size of the circle represents the default rate level. The default rate is 
calculated by the number of default loan/the number of loans for the specific groups. The 
largest circle is 0.226006, and the smallest is 0.001855. 
 
Figure 5. 8: Mortgagor‟s Default Percentage for Specific Borrowers‟ Characteristics 
Group for Positive EQRMSA Subsample 
 
Note: This is based on 0EQRMSA subsample, originated in 2006. The largest circle 
is 0.280803, and the smallest is 0.003107.  
 
The average mortgage age, relating to “time-to-default”, for different cohorts of FICO 
and LTV are tabulated (see Table 5.5). Borrowers with LTV4 (between 70% and 80%) 
are the riskiest in most FICO levels. The highest LTV group borrowers do not 
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necessarily have the shortest “time-to-default”, although their default risk is high 
shown in the previous table. 
 
Table 5. 5: Distribution Pattern of Averaged Age as “Time-to-Default” for Defaulters 




















NOFICO 101.93  58.69  57.44  53.50  58.98  61.24  56.31  
FICO1 
634 
82.47  44.66  45.32  43.65  44.56  45.27  45.17  
634<FICO
2 686 
62.60  42.43  44.12  41.34  43.64  44.87  40.88  
686<FICO
3 736 
59.56  44.01  45.85  42.96  44.94  46.93  42.06  
736<FICO
4 
60.34  44.61  47.38  44.01  46.81  48.88  46.10  
Negative House Equity Position 
NOFICO 97.26  50.79  53.03  50.26  58.83  61.14  58.12  
FICO1 
634 
68.42  38.83  40.40  41.19  43.23  43.78  44.87  
634<FICO
2 686 
44.45  36.55  38.07  38.07  42.92  45.06  42.66  
686<FICO
3 736 
43.15  37.01  39.24  39.59  44.98  48.03  45.44  
736<FICO
4 
44.80  38.16  41.14  41.60  47.46  50.19  49.59  
Note: This is statistical mean of the mortgage age, which is defined as “Month periods 
between individual mortgage origination and termination or the time of left censor of 
2009.June. 
5.6.2 Split Population Regression of Mortgage Default 
The Probit-Hazard split population model is used to study the default risk. In the 
“probability of default” part, event is treated as 1, while in the “time-to-default” part, 
censorship is treated as 1. This treatment leads to consistent coefficients in both parts, 




                                                             
46 Different studies use different treatment during the treatment for “censorship” and “event”. Some 
studies use “event” in both part, which will result in opposite sign in the two parts of “probability” and 
“time-to-sth” for direct explaining variables. This is convenient when looking into conditional time as 
keeping survival. In the regression of this study, the treatment could provide convenient way to compare 




Therefore, positive sign for “probability of default” indicates the effect of increasing 
default risk, while positive sign for “time-to-default” means the effect of increasing 
the conditional hazard risk and reducing “time-to-default”, compared to its reference 
group. 
 
If the sign for “probability of default” and “time-to-default” is exactly the same as 
positive (negative), the independent variable contributes to strongly increase 
(decrease) default risk. Otherwise, if the sign for “probability of default” and 
“time-to-default” is different, the independent variable has trade-off of mortgagors‟ 
default behaviors. 
 
Table 5.6 shows that Probit-Cox split population model has better fitting than normal 
hazard model by the -2LOGL criteria. Most signs for the coefficients of the hazard 
part in Probit-Cox split population model and the traditional proportional hazard 
model are the same, except that the sign for house size in normal hazard model has  





Table 5. 6: Comparison between Probit –Cox Split Population Model and Normal Hazard 
 Probit-Cox Split population Model Normal Hazard 
 Probability of default Hazard risk of 
“time-to-default” 
Hazard risk of 
“time-to-default” 
Variables Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Intercept 93.984
***
 0.265     























































































































































































-2Log-Likelihood 17042823.8 17588406 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance,* denotes 10% significance 
Note: LTV7 50%,FICO4>736 , 5%Percentile≥PNEQ6, and 25%Percentile≥PPAY5 is 
the reference group. In Hazard regression, the criteria -2logL (2 times log partial 




After considering the existence of “non-defaulters”, house size becomes negatively 
correlated with the borrowers‟ hazard, as indicated by the coefficient for 
“time-to-default”. The result of the split population model matches to the basic 
statistic result better than normal hazard model, which supports large family 
constraints to reduce default risk. 
 
The absolute value of the coefficients in the hazard part of the Probit-Cox split 
population model is smaller than traditional proportional hazard model. It indicates 
that most of characteristics are less important to borrowers‟ default hazard after 
considering the existence of “never-defaulter”. Some characteristics contribute to the 
“probability of defaulter”, instead of when to default. 
 
The split population model is better fitted than normal hazard model in the goodness 
of fitting. At the same time, it decomposes the sensitiveness of variables on default 
risk into two parts: “probability of default” and “time-to-default”. 
 
Further looking into the “probability of default” and the “time-to-default” in the 
Probit-cox split population model, most of the coefficients on mortgage characteristic 
variables are larger for the “probability of default” than the coefficients for the 
“time-to-default”. It indicates that borrowers‟ characteristics play more important 
roles on becoming potential defaulters than deciding when to default. This result is 
highly consistent with the proposed rational default model (e.g., unobservable 
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preference to consumption, reservation utility). 
 
Dummy_ARM is positive in both parts, which is consistent with previous results. 
LTV is all positive in the first part, which indicates that debt burden increases the risk 
to become defaulters, but it does not necessarily increase the risk of hazard in terms 
of timing. The “time-to-default” is the most sensitive to the LTV6 (50% to 60%), 
indicating that borrowers, who put in more equity on their residential mortgages 
concern more seriously on their financial status such as LTV. Current income index 
(CURINCOME) and saving percentage index (CURSAVING) as control variables are 
all negative in both sides. 
 
The coefficients of PNEQ groups in the two parts of split population model have 
given at least three interesting points. 1) Most of them have the same sign for the 
coefficients, which suggests the importance of option value on default risk, and 
effects on “probability of default” and “time-to-default” are consistent. 2) The 
coefficients on PNEQ1 (>95%Percentile) and PNEQ2 (between 75% and 50% 
percentile) in “time-to-default” part is larger than those in “probability of default” part. 
However, PNEQ3 (between 50% and 25%) and PNEQ4 (between 25% and 5%) have 
larger coefficient in the “probability of default”. This again supports the proposed 
rational default model, suggesting that option value is either sufficient or necessary 
condition on default risk. When put option value is relatively high (e.g., PNEQ1), it is 
a significant factor to the risk of default, as it highly affect the borrowers‟ 
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instantaneous utility, and total maximized life-time utility, which determine more the 
probability of default. While even a small PNEQ could be able to trigger the option 
indicator D  in the theoretical model, which determine more the time-to-default. 
 
In short, high default put option value determines more on the “time-to-default”, 
compared to “probability of default”; while small default put option value determines 
more on “probability of default” instead. It also shows that all the prepayment option 
control variables have higher coefficients in the part of “probability of default”. 
 
Previous suboptimal default studies concentrate on the exogenous “trigger event” in a 
Poisson process, which is more related to borrowers‟ characteristics. The 
“non-ruthless” behaviors used to be explained by transaction cost. The total 
observations are separated into subsamples with positive and negative EQRMSA to 
study the non-strategic behaviors. Some characteristics variables of borrowers are 
suspected to perform differently on “probability of default” and “time-to-default” in 
the positive and negative EQRMSA subsamples. In the following sections, the split 
population regression in positive house equity subsample is used to discuss the 
incentive of suboptimal default; while split population regression in negative house 
equity subsample helps to explain the ruthless defaulters. 
5.6.3 Ruthless Default  
In Table 5.7, most of coefficients have consistent signs in the part of “probability of 
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default” and “time-to-default”. Except for the largest LTV borrowers (LTV1>100%), 
the time-to-default risk is negative with their LTV for those potential defaulters. No 
FICO and lowest FICO borrowers (FICO1634) have a high probability to become a 
potential defaulters, but their risk of “time-to-default” is low. 
 
Those borrowers with extremely high LTV, No FICO, and Low FICO borrowers are 
widely-known high default risk individuals. It is supported by the high coefficient in 
the Probit part of the split population model, considering the existence of 
“non-defaulters”. However, the negative coefficient in the risk of “time-to-default” 
shows their reluctance to make default decision. This could be due to the limited 
future credit accessibility, which refrains from default. In other words, they are highly 




Table 5. 7: Probit –Cox Split Population Model Estimation Results (EQRMSA<0) 
 Probit-Cox Split population Model Normal Hazard 
 Probability of default Hazard risk of 
“time-to-default” 
Hazard risk of 
“time-to-default” 
Variables Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Intercept 84.348
***
 0.351     




























































































































.  . 0.000 . 0.000 . 
50%Percentile≥PNEQ4>
25%Percentile;  
. . 0.000 . 0.000 . 
25%Percentile≥PNEQ5>
5%Percentile; 



































-2Log-Likelihood 9397550 9648493 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, * denotes 10% significance 
Note: Interpretation refers to Table 5.6. Except that this table is for negative house equity. 
It is to study the ruthless default incentives, and its reverse signs are the explanation to 
“non-ruthless” behaviors. For EQRMSA< 0 (N=3538171, with 383828 observed 
defaulters), it is also endogenously separated as defaulters and non-defaulters. The 0 in 
PNEQ 3, 4, 5 is because this is based on EQRMSA<0, which will result in very few 
observations within these joint option groups which is with large option value. 
 
The LTV4 (between 70% and 80%) has the largest coefficient (1.286) in the first part 





Compared to Table 5.5, most coefficients of the FICO group variables in Table 5.6 are 
positively smaller, or negatively in absolute value larger than those in Table 5.5 in the 
part of risk of “time-to-default”. This indicates that borrowers with lower FICO score 
are relatively more likely to choose non-ruthless strategic, when they hold negative 
equity. This again is probably due to the future credit accessibility, which let 
borrowers with low FICO scores refrain from making default decision. In other words, 
borrowers with low FICO scores are instead less risky in ruthless default, than 
borrowers with high FICO scores, who are more freely to choose future credit 
contracts if default. 
 
Borrowers with PNEQMSA1>95%Percentile (PNEQMSA>0.639067598) have the 
largest coefficient (0.368) in the part of “probability of default” as the ruthless 
behaviors. It shows that borrows with high put option value (PNEQ) plays an 
important role of the “probability of default”, even more than “time-to-default” when 
the borrowers hold negative house equity. This result is a little different from full 
sample regression, although higher put option still contributes higher default risk 
totally in both regressions. 
5.6.4 Suboptimal Default 
In Table 5.8, the results are for suboptimal default. First of all, there are different 
signs in the part of “probability of default” and the risk of “time-to-default” for the 
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observable mortgage characteristics. It shows that observable mortgage 
characteristics do not have a consistently determinant role on borrowers‟ suboptimal 
default. Instead, the sign for observable characteristics are opposite in the two parts of 
split population model. It actually indicates that “suboptimal” default is less 
predictable by observable risk factors, and its causality might be due to unobservable 
characteristics and potential soft information of borrowers (e.g., housing consumption 
preference, income volatility). These results actually are consistent with previous 
studies with exogenous trigger events, which in my view might result in changes in 
soft information. That is why soft information might be more important on explaining 
borrowers‟ suboptimal defaults. For instance, borrowers‟ job losing might result in 
high income volatility and less preference to non-housing consumption than holding a 
stable job. These factors will contribute to borrowers‟ suboptimal default than the 
observable characteristics (e.g., LTV, and FICO).  
 
Similar to the ruthless default regression, borrowers with NO FICO and FICO1 are 
more likely to become potential defaulters, but their default decisions are delayed. 
The results show that the future credit constraints of those borrowers with no FICO 
and low FICO outperform their creditworthiness of payment history, resulting in 
reluctance to default in the risk of “time-to-default”. Especially, the coefficient on NO 
FICO has a large value of 1.339 in the part of “probability of default”, which means 
that borrowers without credit score reporting are highly likely to step into 
unforeseeable suboptimal defaults as potential defaulters, although they hesitate on 
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the timing of default with coefficient of -0.410. 
 
Consistent with the option theory and the proposed rational default option, borrowers 
with positive housing equity could evaluate their default option value calmly. The 
coefficients of PNEQ in the part of “time-to-default” are high. In other words, 
although put option is neither sufficient nor necessary condition to default; it is still 
important factors that are considered in the borrowers‟ utilities, and also the time to 
trigger perspective default time. This also explains the large coefficients of 
prepayment option value in the part of “probability of default” for the suboptimal 





Table 5. 8: Probit-Cox Split Population Model Estimation Results (EQRMSA≥0) 
 
 Probit-Cox Split population Model Normal Hazard 
 Probability of default Hazard risk in the 
aspect of 
“time-to-default” 
Hazard risk in the 
aspect of 
“time-to-default” 
Variables Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. Coeff. Std. 
Intercept 106.922
***
 0.411     
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 0.016 -0.090 0.009 0.501
***
 0.009 
-2Log-Likelihood 6907411 6939549 
*** denotes 1% significance, ** denotes 5% significance, * denotes 10% significance 
Note: Interpretation refers to Table 5.6. For EQRMSA≥0 (N=3570552, with 286651 
observed default), it is the regression to study the suboptimal defaulters Split population 
is endogenously determined as non-defaulter and defaulters Suboptimal defaulter is a 






Extending from the classic option model, a rational default model based on borrowers‟ 
life-time utility maximization is proposed. Simulation is done to study the borrowers‟ 
default incentives.  
 
Empirically, split population model are used separately in the positive and negative 
equity subsamples, which all assume the existence of “non-defaulters” endogenously. 
For negative house equity subsample, the empirical test is used to discuss the ruthless 
default incentives. For positive housing equity subsample, it explains the suboptimal 
default incentives.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that borrowers with no FICO, low income will have 
high “probability of default” , which is consistent with (Pennington-Cross and Ho 
2010; Pennington-Cross, Yezer and Nichols 2000), however, they delay the 
“time-to-default”, for both ruthless and suboptimal default, probably due to future 
credit accessibility constraints. This is consistent with the theoretically proposed 
rational default model, which predicts that borrowers with extremely low credit score 
are intent to both “ruthless” and also “sub-optimal” default, but with reluctance when 
making decision. 
 
Borrowers‟ observable characteristic are less predictable on borrowers‟ suboptimal 
default with contracting coefficient in two parts of the split population model. This 
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suggests potential importance on unobservable soft information, relating to the 
unexpected trigger events to borrowers‟ suboptimal default, as suggested by (Vandell 
1995). 
 
Relatively high option values are more important on both ruthless default and 
suboptimal default. Intermediate level of put option value is not sufficient to push 
borrowers to make default decision, both in the case of ruthless and suboptimal 
studies. Some variables have double side effect on the “probability to default‟ and 





Chapter 6 Contestability of Residential 
Mortgage Market 
6.1 Introduction 
Introduction of securitization, risk-based pricing, and government supported 
enterprises (GSEs) has dramatically remolded the mortgage market. Banking and 
non-banking institutions are both complementary and substitution suppliers in 
non-agency mortgage market.  
 
This part asks the question “How does market concentration and contestability in the 
supply-side of banking market affect total individual residential mortgage supply and 
its performance for non-agency loans? Why do some lenders lower their underwriting 
standard, loosen credit constraints and increase their market share for specific 
mortgage risk types? ”. The market conditions of concentration and contestability 
(Baumol 1982; Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1983) affect the supply of risky assets. 
The aggregate supply effects on individual mortgagors‟ default decision are 
examined. 
 
In the remaining of the Chapter, theoretical intuition and hypothesis on mortgage 
structure, credit supply, and mortgage default are given Section 6.2. Variables are 
discussed in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4, empirical methodologies, results and robust 
tests are analyzed to study the concentration and contestability effects of banking 
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market effects on credit supply and default rates. Section 6.5 summaries this part. 
6.2 Theoretical Intuition and Hypotheses 
6.2.1 Four-Quadrant Model for the Credit Market 
In this study, the credit expansion is not an exogenous event. The 4-quadrant model 
for real estate asset and space markets by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) is adapted 
as the theoretical framework to illustrate the interconnectedness of the securitization 
(investors), origination (lenders) and mortgage financing (borrowers) markets (Figure 
6.1). The first quadrant (north-east quadrant) is the borrower (mortgage user) market, 
connecting mortgage interest rate with mortgage demand & stock. In the second 
quadrant (north-west quadrant), it is the capital market (e.g., securitization market), 
connecting capital cost with mortgage interest rate. In the third quadrant (south-west 
quadrant), it is mortgage origination market, connecting mortgage origination amount 
and capital costs. In the fourth quadrant (south-east quadrant), it is the endogenous 
credit supply market, which matches credit demand in an equilibrium. Mian and 
Sufi‟s (2009) finds a rightward shift in supply curve, but fails to explain its reason. 
 
Economic activities in three distinct but inter-connected markets could influence the 
endogenous credit supply (aggregate stock and flow of mortgages) in the market. 
Specific focus is placed in this study on the market structure of the originators (banks) 
and how it will influence the costs of capital (price) and the credit origination (supply) 
activities to the whole mortgage market (both originated by banks and non-banks). 
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Figure 6. 1: A 4-Quadrant Model for Credit Market 
 
Note: This figure show a 4-quadrant model illustration for the mortgage credit market.  
In the first quadrant (north-east quadrant), it is the borrower (mortgage user) market, 
connecting mortgage interest rate with mortgage demand and stock.  In the second 
quadrant (north-west quadrant), it is the capital market (e.g., securitization market), 
connecting capital cost with mortgage interest rate. In the third quadrant (south-west 
quadrant), it is mortgage origination market, connecting mortgage origination amount 
and capital costs. In the fourth quadrant (south-east quadrant), it is the endogenous 
credit supply market, which matches credit demand in an equilibrium. 
 
 
The first quadrant (north-east quadrant) is the borrower (user) market, where the 
demand and supply of new mortgages is regulated by mortgage interest rates i . For 
borrowers, mortgage interest rate is like a “price” of the mortgage product, their 
demand for mortgage product is highly related to the mortgage interest rate. The 
reverse demand function is 
1( )i D S  , where   denotes price elasticity, and S
denotes the aggregate mortgage stocks. If there were no income shocks, the supply 
growth is induced through lower interest rates (shift along the demand curve) 










Lender’s market Credit supply / stocks
i =  D-1(S)r = i/P
F = C(P)
S = F -S
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Moving in the counter-clockwise direction to the second quadrant (north-west 
quadrant), it is the capital market (e.g., securitization market), which consists of 
investors and issuers of mortgage backed securities. The pricing elasticity of 
mortgage cash flows, which is represented by the weighted average coupon (WAC), 
reflects the risk premiums r . It is placed on mortgage backed securities by the 
securitized markets /r i P , where P  denotes the security price. The third 
quadrant (south-west quadrant) represents the loan origination markets, where the 
supply of new loans F  is a function of the capital costs of lenders P , which equals 
the price of capital set in the securitization market. By keeping the risk premiums in 
securitization markets constant, the competition and contestability of the banking 
markets could affect the capital costs of lenders and underwriting standard, which in 
turn influence the credit supply in the market, which is a function ( )F C P . The 
fourth quadrant (south-east quadrant) is the endogenous quadrant for credit supply, 
after matching to the demand in the first quadrant. 
 
In equilibrium, the supply in the origination market and the demand in the user 
market matches, such that the aggregate stocks of mortgages in the south-east 
quadrant of Figure 6.1 can be determined. The change of mortgage stocks are 
dependent on new loan originated (inflow) F , and loan foreclosure or default S , 
which is S F S   . The change of supply is endogenously determined, by the 
situation of other three quadrants. If the equilibrium outstanding mortgages shrink, 
the supply elasticity will be negative 0S  , which implies that default rate might 
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be even higher than the new loan origination growth rate, and vice-versa. 
 
Contestability and competitiveness of the banking market and the clustering of the 
same characteristics in a neighborhood affect residential mortgage default probability. 
Mortgage originators have different market power (e.g., through non-price war 
strategy as loosing underwriting strictness, reducing price to reduce profit margin
47
) 
to adjust their market strategies on the supply side. The market power is a 
double-edged sword that influences the risk-taking strategies in monopolized 
mortgage origination market. On one hand, in a highly monopolized market, 
originators have limited incentive to access to innovation and risk minimizing 
instrument offered by third party providers. On the other hand, the lack of 
competition reduces originators‟ incentives to take risk control resulting in weak 
screening and loose underwriting process. The lax underwriting strategy will increase 
possibility of mortgage mismatches and poor risk management reporting.  
 
One simple example is illustrated in Figure 6.2 on how changes the supply curves 
between credit supply and capital costs of originators among others. Firstly assuming 
that the total supply elasticity in the lender‟s market is dependent on the 
competitiveness and concentration in the banking market for simplicity and constant 
                                                             
47
 Some mortgage origination institutions introduce hybrid ARM contracts to start a price war (lower 
interest rate in firstly fixed period, and higher interest rate after the period), as mortgage originators 
assume that they can fulfill their market domination after the fixed period. However, price-war is likely 
to end up with unexpected result. For the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM), borrowers can choose to 
default or refinance to other mortgage institution‟s loan when interest rate goes up if no mortgage market 
incumbent dominant after the fixed period. Hence it will turn out to be risky contract. In U.S., residential 
mortgage related commercial bankers in contestable markets apply such strategies when trying to 
penetrating mortgage market covered by GSE (government sponsored enterprise). 
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status on other quadrant, it is expected that credit market to expand if market 
contestability increases originators‟ cost efficiency from ( )F T to '( )F T  (Figure 
6.2). In contrary, if banks in a highly concentrated market choose limiting pricing 
strategy to preempt new entry (Gan and Riddiough 2008), the credit supply is shrink 
from '( )F T  to ( )F T as a results if others being constant. 
 
The total credit supply could further decompose into supply of low risky loan and 
supply of high risky loan (in Figure 6.2). During mortgage securitization process and 
encouragement of homeownership for low income borrowers, the capital cost 
reduction level is different for high and low risky mortgages. For instance, there 
might be a higher elasticity for low risky loans '( )F L in the third quadrant 
(south-west quadrant) than that for high risky loans '( )F H . Therefore, the total 
supply change S is decomposed into two parts: high risky loan credit supply 
change ( )S H and low risky loan supply change ( )S L . In such case, the 
proportional of high risky loan to total loan ( ) /S H S increases, which resulting 
higher default risk of mortgage. 
 
Different dynamics could also arise as a result of interactions of activities in different 
markets. In the four-quadrants, equilibrium results are affected by the changing of 






Figure 6. 2: Changing and Decomposition of 4-Quadrant Model for Credit Market 
 
Note: These figures illustrate one simple case of changing the supply curve in third 
quadrant (From F(T) to F’(T)) and decomposition of the supply curve into high risky loan 
supply(F’(H)) and low risk y loan supply curve (F’(L)).  
 
6.2.2 Hypotheses 
To answer “How does banking market structure affect total individual residential 
mortgage supply and performance?”, it is to look at changes of supply curve on third 
quadrants caused by market structure forces (e.g., competition among bank and 
existent of substitution suppliers as non-banks), which would result in different 
equilibrium credit supply and its correspondingly defaults, under different scenarios 
for the first and second quadrants. The market structure forces include competition 




Firstly, the basic economic theory tells that the aggregate supply in perfect 
competition market is higher than natural monopoly market. These arguments always 
suggest that supply-side policies in product markets with free trades are able to 
increase competition, which further induces efficiency, and aggregate productivity of 
an industry for the product. The basic economic argument assumes implicitly that 1) 
stable technology (stable underwriting criteria)  and one single product market 2) no 
substitution supplier markets 3) sufficient demand, in other words, aggregate 
demands are always high enough to meet with supply capacity. Under normal 
assumptions, Bailey and Baumol (1983) defines contestable market as “if no price in 
that market can be in equilibrium when its magnitude is such as to enable an entrant 
to undercut it and nevertheless earn a profit”, which suggests even smaller number of 
firms are able to achieve efficiency, no excess profit, no cross-subsidy, and marginal 
cost pricing as in a competitive market. In other words, aggregate supply in perfect 
contestable market is large. Therefore, series of Hypothesis 1 are given following 
classic economic theory: Hypothesis 1a, and 1b. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Under the assumption of stable technology, one single product market, 
no substitution supplier markets, and sufficient demand, contestability in banking 
supply market increase aggregate supply, which is similar to perfect competition.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Under the same assumption above, market concentration (as in 
monopoly market) will decrease aggregate supply, as market power and ability to 
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operate at the minimum point of U-shaped average cost curve. 
 
The Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b actually represents the basic intuitions for 
perfect contestability and natural monopoly inefficiency market. This is consistent 
with the finding that more financing obstacles and less credit with high bank 
concentration(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2004). However, these 
assumptions might be violated under some scenarios. Assumption of stable 
technology and flexible demand are all violated during the period 1990s, 2000s to 
2010s. mortgage demand has been reduced as decreasing income (Mian and Sufi 
2009) although higher housing price could drive up demand for arbitrary. The 
contestability, the driven to maintain zero profit, will lead suppliers to reduce supply 
through increasing price margin to maintain at least zero profit to face with 
decreasing demand. The decreasing demand in 4-Quadrant model is to shift the first 
quadrant (north-east quadrant) demand curve leftwards to the middle point. The more 
contestable the banking suppliers, they have more reducing supply efficiency, in other 
words, they will be able to reduce the supply faster or more. In this case, the ideal 
case of Hypothesis 1a is violated; instead, it has negative relationship as the 
bellowing Hypothesis 1c. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Facing decreasing demand, aggregate supply is negatively related to 




Similarly, the Hypothesis 1b for concentration is not realistic in the U.S. mortgage 
market. For instance, there might be substitution suppliers to the market. In U.S., not 
only banks are operating and issuing residential mortgage, there are also some 
non-banks, who are already existent in the market or becoming potential entrants to 
the mortgage markets. The market structure situations could not be measured by the 
concentration level of banking only. A high concentration of banking market could 
limit the supply from banks (
bankS ), but it could also leave a surplus demand space 
for non-banks to supply (
non bankS  ), therefore the total supply for mortgage in strong 
concentrated banking market could be increased instead. It is the Hypothesis H1d. 
 
Hypothesis 1d: Facing potential substitution suppliers of non-banks, aggregate supply 
could be positively correlated to market concentration in banking submarkets. 
 
Interestingly, under the market situation in U.S. during 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, the 
Hypothesis 1c and Hypothesis 1d are exactly opposite to perfect market arguments of 
Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b. 
 
Meanwhile, Hypothesis 1c tells us the decreasing supply under market contestability 
facing decreasing demand (e.g., maintain acceptable price to keep zero-profit). Such 
ability to price should be more powerful, when banking market is simultaneously 
with high concentration, if no substation suppliers, that is the interaction case of 
Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 1c. Even there are substitution suppliers as non-banks, 
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total supply could be reduced because of the decreasing demand, as non-banks are 
facing with the same decreasing demand, which is the interaction of Hypothesis 1c 
and Hypothesis 1d. 
 
Hypothesis 1e: When demand is not sufficient and even there are non-bank 
institutions as substitution suppliers, the total supply could decrease in banking 
submarket with both strong contestability and strong concentration. 
 
The Hypothesis 1c and Hypothesis 1d will give us different combinations of the 
banking market structures effect on total mortgage supply, and testable market 
structures are listed in Appendix 1. 
  
In terms of mortgage default, basic economy theory always believes that market 
contestability and competition are actually encouraging unobservable risky taking in 
uncertainty as lax underwriting standard. The Hypothesis 1c scenario under 
decreasing demand, it is intuitiveness that risk taking are even more serious in 
short-run profit maximizing.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Under decreasing demand, high contestability of banking market is 
positively correlated with the mortgage ex-post default risks. 
 
Meanwhile in Hypothesis 1d scenario, non-banks as substitution suppliers force 
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actually are not able to initiate price-war to compete with large banks as price-war 
will squeeze their margin profit as the lack of economic scale compared to large 
banks. Most likely, originators could initiate non-price war through loosing 
underwriting criteria in short-run. Such strategies could possibly result in higher 
default in long run. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Under the existent of non-banks substitution suppliers, the level of 
concentration of banking market is positively correlated with the mortgage ex-post 
default risks. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: In general, when banking market is both contestable and concentrated, 
it is more likely to have lower default risk, as the case of contestability efficiency in 
controlling risk. 
 
Through the reasoning of economy theory, it is intuitive to get Hypothesis 2c, 
however, under different scenario of demand market, and substitution suppliers 
threaten, the effect on default risk is uncertain, which is more an empirical question. 
 
In this study, these hypotheses are tested under the measurement of market 
concentration and market contestability in the Appendix 1. 
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6.3 Empirical Methodology 
6.3.1 Regression Variable 
This chapter uses the loan performance data sample from 1999 to 2000, with total 
observation of 4,004,380 individual loan observations from non-agency securitized 
deals, and detailed data description should see Section 3.2.1, part 1), 3), and 4). The 
measurements based on Bankscope database from Wharton, University of 
Pennsylvania are able to capture the concentration of banking market, and but the 
contestability of banks in the whole market. Non-banks concentrations are not able to 
be tested directly in this study, instead, they are indirectly discussed as the 
substitution suppliers, which affects total supply in the hypothesis. 
 
A) Heterogeneous variables: 
  
To control for the borrowers‟ characteristics, house size, contract type, and original 
loan to value (LTV), and credit score FICO are included. Original mortgage LTV is 
an indicator of the original equity level, and credit score (FICO) of borrowers are 
used as the proxy for borrowers‟ creditworthiness, which are the same as Chapter 4.  
 
To reduce potential linearity of original amount and LTV, borrower‟s house size (or 






                    (6-1)  
where ORGAMT  is the original mortgage amount and LTV  is original LTV of 
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borrowers‟ mortgage contract; ORGHP  is house price index at time of origination 
for the property located MSA (from Federal Housing Finance Agency). The house 
size measurement could also be interpreted as cross-market variations in housing 
prices if considering housing heterogeneity. 
 
B) Macro-economy variables 
 
PNEQMSA  is used to measure option as the difference between the current market 
value CURMKT  and the current outstanding mortgage balance CURAMT ,  
which is written as: 
    ,







        (6-2) 
 
where   is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, and p,t is 
volatility of house price index for each MSA reported by the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency. Monthly ORGHP  is estimated based on time series in past three years. 
While the current outstanding mortgage balance is directly obtained from the sample 
mortgage data, the current market value at time t or at termination time CURMKV
is measured by adjusting the original market value ORGAMT , using the changes in 
tP  from the Federal Housing Finance Agency house price index at MSA level 
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             (6-4) 
 
C) Market structure variables 
In the empirical study of market structure, Gini coefficient of banking market is used 
to measure the concentration level on banking market, and H-statistic is used to 
measure the contestability and efficiency level in banking market. The number of 
banks is used to facilitate discussions. See detailed descriptions on the measurements 
in Appendix 1. 
 
D) Zip-code level concentration of characteristics 
The spatial distributions of properties are dependent on many factors such as 
employment, neighborhood characteristics, amenities, public service, and borrowers‟ 
mobility. In this study, the location of the property is not caused by the “adjacency 
effect” of some physical characteristics, neither by “situation effect”48 (Can 1998), 
that is related to social and demographic characteristics, nor public-service provision. 
The geographic effects of adjacency, situation, and demographic and the borrowers‟ 
heterogeneous characteristics of mortgage features are to some extent correlated. The 
concentration of banks is not independent from geographic effects of properties and 
borrowers.  
 
Concentration of minority and low-income households(Calem, Gillen and Wachter 
2004) in neighborhood could be influenced by the mortgage originators. Borrowers‟ 
                                                             
48 “Adjacency effect” is the spatial spillover externalities, compared to its neighboring structure like 
height; “Situation effect” is the accessibility to other activities (e.g., post office, bus station).  
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default behavior have been affected by the concentration of borrowers‟ characteristics 
in neighborhood effects (Agarwal et al. 2009; Deng, Pavlov and Yang 2005). This 
study also controls such zip-code characteristics proportions. Different loan 
characteristics proportions & concentrations at Zip-code levels such as mortgage rate, 
ARM types, loan amount, FICO of borrowers, LTV, capture effect of loan and 
neighborhood clustering. 
 
Loan concentration at zip code level (CL), which captures the residential mortgage 







                                     (6-5) 
 
where 
zipLAMT  is total loan origination amount in the zip code; cityLAMT  is the 
total loan origination amount in its corresponding city.  
 







                                        (6-6)
 
where 
zipR  is the mean of the mortgage rate originated in the zip code neighborhood; 
cityR  is mean of that in the corresponding city.  
 







                             (6-7)
 
where 




The zip-code proportion of low FICO scores (CLFICO), where NOFICO and FICO 
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where 
zipNLFICO  is the total number of low FICO score borrowers in the zip code 
neighborhood; 
zipN  is total number of borrowers in the zip code.  
 
The zip-code concentration of high LTV (CHLTV), where LTV group 1 and 2 are 







                                  (6-9)
 
where 
zipNHLTV  is total number of high LTV borrowers in the zip code 
neighborhood. The definitions of the variables
49
 are summarized in Table 6.1. 
  
                                                             
49
 Mortgage originators are also criticized with “adverse selection” concern. Researches argue that 
mortgage originators might keep better quality loan in their balance while selling bad quality ones in 
securitization market. Reasons for not considering the “adverse selection” are 1)SPVs are believed to use 
randomized selection rule (mentioned by Keys, etc. (2010)). 2) The data are all that already securitized, 
hence if there is adverse selection, it would be systematically relatively “bad” assets, and it does not 
affect comparison results within “bad” assets. It tries to include Gini‟s mill into regression to avoid such 
endogenous relationship, based on Dummy of Gini>50% percentile=f(CR, CARMzip, CHLTVzip, 




Table 6. 1: Variables in Market Structure Studies 
Symbol Definition 
Hz Individual borrowers‟ house size (Cross-market variations in housing 
price) 
Dummy_ARM Individual mortgage choice of ARM or FRM. Dummy_ARM=1, when 
individual borrower is under adjustable rate mortgage; otherwise, 0. 
LTV Borrowers‟ original Loan-to-value (LTV). Its group variables are 
defined. 1: LTV>100%; 2: 100%≥LTV 90%; 3：90%≥LTV 80%；4：
80%≥LTV 70%；5：70%≥LTV 60%；6：60%≥LTV 50%；7：
50%≥LTV 
FICO  Borrowers‟ credit score FICO. Its group variables are defined. NOFICO: 
No Score; 1: Score<= 634; 2:686>=Score>634; 3:736>=Score>686; 
4:Score>736 
PNEQMSA  Probability of negative equity on cross-sectional MSA volatility at time 
of termination when 2009, June is selected as truncated time point. 
PPAY  Prepayment Option measurement at time of termination when 2009, 
June is selected as truncated time point. 
H-statistic State-level competitiveness 
NBzip Number of commercial banks issuing mortgage at zip level 
Gini Coefficient Concentrations of bank service in U.S. market for each year from 1999 
to 2008 in each state, using real estate loan amount of individual banks 
to gain its inequality level (GiniLoan).. 
CL Loan concentration at zip code level 
CR Concentration of mortgage rates as pricing at Zip code level 
CARM Zip-code concentration of ARM loan amount 
CLFICO Zip-code concentration of low FICO scores 
CHLTV Zip-code concentration of high LTV 
Note: LTV， FICO, PPAY are the same as definition in Chapter 4, Table 4.4. 
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
A) Full Sample 
Table 6.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the key empirical variables defined 
in the early sections. The non-agency pooled of mortgages consists of 48.84% of 
ARM, and the remainders of 51.16% were made up of FRM. The average origination 
LTV for the full sample is 75.91%. The FICO score averages at 682 and the variance 
is 82.63, which imply that the credit quality of average pooled mortgage is higher 
than subprime mortgages, which is usually cut-off at 660 or 620 (Keys et al. 2010). 
For the two option variables, the probability of negative equity is estimated at 0.2236 




By loan amount at origination, the average per zip code loan origination relative to 
the city-level aggregate is about 1.69%. The average relative loan rate of 1.00 
indicates no significant difference between zip-code and city-level average loan rates. 
The average CARM of 53.94%, which is the proportion of ARM originated in the 
non-agency mortgage loan data at the zip-code level, shows that the numbers of local 
(zip-code level) banks that originate more ARM than FRM are above the city-average. 
In terms of credit quality, the CLFICO of 42.74% and CHLTV of 13.50% indicate 
that the proportions of loans originating high FICO and low LTV loans are below the 
city-averages. The zip-code statistics imply significant neighborhood variations at the 
local zip-code level relative to the city average. 
B) Sub-market Analysis 
For sub-market analyses of the relations between market structure and credit supply 
and mortgage characteristics, sample markets are sorted into two distinct submarkets 
based on the medium concentration (Gini coefficient) and the medium contestability 
(PR H-statistics) measures at the state-level. A weak market includes sample states 
ranked in the lower 50% percentile of the distributions; whereas a strong market 
includes the top 50% percentile states by the concentration and contestability 
statistics. The descriptive statistics are summarized alongside the full-sample statistics 
in Table 6.2. 
 
The results show significant variations in terms of credit quality of the loans 
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originated (e.g., ARM percentage, LTV, FICO). By LTV and FICO criteria, loans are 
risky for observable risk factors in markets where banks are weakly contestable and 
concentrated. The loan LTV increases from 75.21% to 77.04% and from 74.81% to 
77.27% when bank market structures change from strong to weak in terms of 
contestability and concentration. Difference-in-difference comparisons between 
strong and weak sub-markets are done, and the significant t-test results suggest that 
the characteristics and also aggregate characteristics in the weak and strong 
submarkets based on the two segregations (concentration and contestability) are 
significantly different. 
C) Zip-Code/ State Level Analysis 
In the panel (b) of Table 6.2, banks in strong concentrationmay possess market power, 
but they have the lowest contestability statistic of 0.9791, compared to 0.9841 for 
sample banks in weakly concentrated markets. The concentration statistics for the 
strongly and weakly contestable sub-markets are estimated at 0.8747 and 0.8742. 
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Table 6. 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 a) Full 
Sample 
b) Market sorted by level of concentration: c) Markets sorted by level of contestability  
   Strong Weak  Strong Weak   
A) Mortgage-level Variables: 
Variable Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance T-Test Stat. Mean Variance Mean Variance T-Test Stat. 
φ 0.4884 0.4999 0.4996 0.5000 0.4700 0.4991 -54.77*** 0.5075 0.4999 0.4645 0.4987 -94.87*** 
LTV 75.91 19.75 75.2107 20.1032 77.0412 19.1149 118.89*** 74.8117 19.3550 77.2733 20.1540 164.64*** 
FICO 682.12 82.63 684.7598 77.0632 677.7934 90.8495 -84.13*** 687.3331 85.2936 675.9429 78.9103 -152.84*** 
PNEQ 0.2236 0.2084 0.2448 0.2236 0.1904 0.1769 -228.88*** 0.2335 0.2264 0.2118 0.1837 -78.32*** 
PPAY 0.9957 0.0290 0.9955 0.0287 0.9959 0.0295 14.98*** 0.9946 0.0322 0.9969 0.0244 104.74*** 
π 1474.23 6277.35 1529.55 4408.27 1387.33 8412.36 -34.13*** 1585.71 4746.28 1339.71 7729.15 -58.05*** 
B) Zip-Code / State- Levels Variables: 
H-STAT 0.9810 0.0402 0.9791 0.0366 0.9841 0.0453 157.27*** 1.0022 0.0376 0.9539 0.0237 -1967.3*** 
GINI 0.8745 0.0595 0.9104 0.0273 0.8144 0.0497 -3299.7*** 0.8747 0.0569 0.8742 0.0627 -11.08*** 
CL 0.0169 0.0831 0.0123 0.0661 0.0244 0.1046 91.04*** 0.0150 0.0762 0.0193 0.0910 -31.85*** 
CR 1.0000 0.0610 0.9997 0.0580 1.0005 0.0654 17.20*** 0.9974 0.0610 1.0033 0.0607 131.40*** 
CARM 0.5394 0.1923 0.5512 0.1947 0.5202 0.1868 -147.94*** 0.5540 0.2039 0.5211 0.1751 -174.51*** 
CLFICO 0.4273 0.2086 0.4148 0.2102 0.4477 0.2043 134.44*** 0.4183 0.2051 0.4386 0.2124 65.22*** 
CHLTV 0.1350 0.1128 0.1265 0.1086 0.1487 0.1180 241.27*** 0.1125 0.1032 0.1629 0.1179 611.68*** 
Number of 
Obs. 
4,051,555 2,075,645 1,975,910  2,215,585 1,835,970  
Note: The full sample is 7,108,724 individual loans. After match the geographic area, the total sample used in the statistics becomes smaller to 4,051,555 observations. H-STAT is the measurement of Market contestability. 
Gini coefficient measures the market concentration in the supply side.CL measures the relative loan number originated. CR measures relative mortgage rate. CARM measures the share of ARM. CLFICO measures share 
of low FICO mortgages. CHLTV measures share of high LTV mortgages. Sample states in different concentration sub-markets: 
Strong market concentration is that market with Gini coefficient larger than/equal 50% percentile of the whole distribution. Weak market concentration is that submarket with Gini coefficient smaller than 50% percentile 
of the whole distribution. Strong market contestability is that larger than/equal 50% by H-statistics. Weak market contestability is that submarket with H-statistics smaller than 50% percentile of its whole distribution. 
The t-value is the t test for mean comparison to test whether values in weak is equal to that in strong market. *** indicate significantly different at level of 1%.. 
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Zip-code level loan characteristics vary in the concentration and contestability 
sub-markets. The loan origination amount (CL) by banks in strongly concentrated 
markets expressed as a ratio of city-level loans origination averages at 1.23%, which 
is half of the sample averages of the 2.44% of the loan amount originated by banks in 
weakly concentrated market. In the contestability sub-market the difference in loan 
amount between strong (1.50%) and weak (1.93%) submarket is relatively smaller. 
The zip-code average mortgage rates for loans originated by banks in the strong 
concentration and contestability submarkets are lower at 0.9997 and 0.9974 compare 
to the rates of 1.0005 and 1.0033 in the weakly concentration and contestability 
submarkets. It corresponds to the pattern on observable risky factors of LTV and 
FICO. 
 
The compositions of ARM mortgages originated by banks in the strong sub-markets 
are relatively higher with the estimated CARM at 55.12% (concentration) and 55.40% 
(contestability). The highest proportion of high risk loans is in in weakly concentrated 
and contestable banking markets, which include 44.77% and 43.86% (CLFICO 
values) of loans with FICO below 686; and of 14.87% and 16.29% (CHLTV values) 
of loans with LTV above 90%. In comparison, the lowest CHLTV values of 12.65% 
and 11.25% in strong concentration and strong contestability counties imply that large 
and highly efficient banks are more conservative in originating high LTV loans as 
observable risk attributes. 
D) Time-series Analysis of Credit Supply and Risks  
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Did loan characteristics at the zip-code level change drastically during the periods? 
Four zip-code level loan variables are plotted on a yearly basic across the sample 
periods from 1999 to 2008. The characteristics at the concentration and contestability 
submarket are shown in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3 shows that the mortgage interest rates decline across time from 
1999 to 2003 in both two contestable markets. The interest rates for the 
periods from 2003 to 2006 increase, but interest rates in the submarkets show 
more divergence during the periods. The FICO scores of borrowers in the 
three submarkets generally trend upward over the periods 1999-2008. The 
zip-code LTV trends mirror the interest rate trends, which saw LTV declines 
from 1999 and hits the lowest in 2003. The LTV then increases again in 2004 
and the submarket variations widen during the periods 2003-2006. On the 
share of ARM loans, increasing number of ARM loans were originated 
especially in the periods after 2003. The deviations of CARM across the three 
submarkets increase during 2004-2006 periods. 
 
There is much difference for these characteristics under different market 
structure (either by market concentration or by market contestability), for 




Figure 6. 3: Zip-Code Level Mortgage and Borrower Characteristics 
 
(a) Mortgage Rate             (b) Weighted FICO 
 
(c) Weighted LTV             (d) ARM percentage 
 
(e)Mortgage Rate             (f) Weighted FICO 
 
(g) Weighted LTV                (h) ARM percentage 
Note: (a)-(d) is the comparison between strong concentrated market and weak 
concentrated market. (e)-(h) is the comparison between strong contestable market and 
weak contestable market. (a) and (e) are mean of original mortgage rate for individual 
loans in each submarket. (b) and (f) WFICO are weighted average FICO score by 
original mortgage amount for individual loans in each submarket. (c) and (g) WLTV are 
weighted average LTV by original mortgage amount for individual loans in each 
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submarket through year. (d) and (h) are ARM type percentage. The submarket is defined 
according to the 50% percentiles of the measurement Gini coefficient and H-statistics. 
6.4 Empirical Methodology and Testing  
As shown by the statistics in the earlier section, significant variations are 
found in loan characteristics across states/zip-code counties with different 
banking market structure. The market power (concentration) and efficiency in 
banking industry (contestability) have different impact on mortgage 
origination activities in lenders‟ markets. In the following sections, Empirical 
methodologies are designed to test the two series of hypotheses relating to the 
market structure. 
6.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Banking Market Structure and Mortgage 
Supply  
The series of first hypothesis is related to the causal-relations between zip-code level 
mortgage supply and local market structure factors. The local total mortgage supply is 
defined as aggregate activities based on the amount of new loan origination each year 
in each zip-code. A total of 234,079 zip-code-year observations is generated for the 
zip-code level mortgage supply computed in logarithm term and is used to represent 
the dependent mortgage supply variable, Fit, in the pooled regression below: 
 
ittititit YZCF   3210         (6-10) 
 
where the zip-code-year observations are indexed by the subscript zip-code i and year 
t in the pooled regression. The regression model includes two vectors of regressors, 
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itC  and itZ , and a year vector, tY , itC  represents the state-year level market 
structure through a vector of variables, which include the PR H-Statistics and Gini 
Coefficient, their respective square terms and also an interactive term 
HSTAT Gini . Discrete measures of contestability and concentration are also 
utilized, where strong and weak indicators are represented by dummy variables 
indicating the top 10% deciles and the lowest 10% deciles of the respective indicators. 
The interactive terms are included to capture the joint effects of contestability and 
concentration of markets. 
itZ is a vector of zip-code level variables, which include 
two zip-code to city-level ratio variables that are the concentration of loans itCL t, 
relative weighted mortgage interest 
itCR  and three zip-code level share variables in 
terms of compositions of ARM 




Both full sample mortgages, and submarket samples under different market structure 
are studied (divided by medium samples). Two sets of sub-market analyses are 
included for testing of two supplementary Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The first set of tests 
sorts the sample into strong and weak markets using the state-year level Gini 
coefficients, and the second set of tests sorts them into the same two submarkets but 
based on the PR H-statistics of contestability. The empirical results are summarized in 
Table 6.3. The regression models have strong goodness-of-fit with R
2
 ranging 
between 0.5714 (column 3) and 0.5706 (column 2) for the full-sample models. A 
large majority of the estimated coefficients in the models are significant.  
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Table 6. 3: Relationships between Market Structure and Mortgage Supply 
  Full Sample Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Concentration 
Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Contestability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Strong 




(6) Strong  
(H-STAT>50
%) 


















  (0.4365) (0.0480) (0.0481) (3.9297) (0.1925) (0.2868) (0.3548) 
(A)   Market  Structure Variables:   
H-STAT -0.5683     -11.5824 -1.7797
***
     









     
(0.3264)     (4.1459) (0.1614)    
GINI 18.1160
***





(0.9865)       (0.7146) (0.8801) 
GINI^2 -1.8452
***





(0.3330)         (0.4252) (0.4821) 
H-STAT*GINI -12.0605
***









(0.7845)     (0.2107) (0.0772) (0.1723) (0.3066) 
90%1H STAT   
 0.0661
***
 0.0072        
 (0.0103) (0.0123)       





        






        






        
 (0.0096) (0.0109)       
90% 90%1 1H STAT Gini  
 
   -0.3189
***
        
   (0.0333)       
10% 90%1 1H STAT Gini  
  
   0.1351
***
        
   (0.0358)       
90% 10%1 1H STAT Gini  
  
   0.4241
***
        
   (0.0244)       
10% 10%1 1H STAT Gini        0.3381
***
        
   (0.0482)       
























































































Table 6.3: Relationships between Market Structure and Mortgage Supply (Continue) 
 
 Full Sample Sub-Sample Analyses 
by Market 
Concentration 
Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Contestability 





(6) Strong  
(H-STAT>50
%) 
(7) Weak  
(H-STAT <=50%) 






































































































































(0.0424) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.0802) (0.0498) (0.0462) (0.1020) 
N 233922 233922 233922 91305 142617 115851 118071 
R-square 0.5372 0.5706 0.5714 0.5739 0.5123 0.5664 0.5091 
Note: Dependent variable: log value of aggregate mortgage amount originated each year at 
zip-code country level. The pooled OLS regressions are estimated using maximum likelihood 
method. H-STAT is the measurement of Market contestability. H-STAT^2 captures the 
Non-linear Effects for market contestability. . Gini coefficient measures the market 
concentration in the supply side. Gini^2 measures the non-linear effects for market 
concentration. 
CL measures the relative loan number originated. CR measures relative mortgage rate. CARM 
measures the share of ARM. CLFICO measures share of low FICO mortgages. CHLTV 
measures share of high LTV mortgages.  
For each line of regression variables, standard errors are listed below the estimated 
coefficients for each variable. 





The full-sample results (column 1) in Table 6.3 show significant but opposing effects 
of market power (Gini Coefficients) and efficiency in the markets (PR H-statistics) on 
the mortgage supply at the zip-code level. The coefficient on the contestability 
variable is negative, but weakly significant at a 10% level. The coefficient on the 
non-linear contestability term is positive and significant, which shows a downward 
convex relationship of the market contestability on mortgage supply. The coefficients 
on the concentration variable and the squared term are both significant, but the signs 
are different. There is positive correlation between credit supply and the level of 
concentration in banking market. The mortgage supply is a positive concave function 
of the concentration of banking market, i.e. the credit growth increases at a 
decreasing rate when banking concentration increases. 
 
On the interactive term, the coefficient is significantly negative, which implies that in 
counties with few large banks and entry barrier is high, credit supply is likely to be 
small compared to other less contestable markets with weakly concentrated banks. 
The results support Hypothesis 1c that mortgage supply decreases in local markets 
with highly contestability submarket; and Hypothesis 1d that credit expansion is more 
likely to occur in markets with few large banks, instead of Hypothesis 1a and 
Hypothesis 1b.  
 
The hypotheses are further strengthened using the top and lowest deciles of 
H-Statistics and Gini coefficients to create four different dummies to represent strong 
and weak markets in terms of contestability and concentration. Although the 
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coefficients on the two contestability dummies are positively highly significant, it is 
because extreme cases are less likely to be affected by the demand side, approaching 
to the Hypothesis 1a. At the same time, the credit supply is significant higher in the 
weakly contestable markets ( 10%H STAT  ) (0.3358) than the strongly 
contestable markets ( 90%H STAT  ) (0.0661), which again support the 
Hypothesis 1c, suggesting the negative correlation between credit supply and the 
degree of contestability in the markets. Similar for coefficients on the two 
concentration dummies ( 90%Gini  and 10%Gini  ), both are negative and 
significant, as extreme case approaching to the Hypothesis 1b. Meanwhile, the lower 
value of -0.8210 for the weakly concentrated market relative to the value of -0.2277 
for the strongly concentrated market again implies a positive slope in the credit 
supply curve in relation to the level of market concentration, supporting Hypothesis 
1d, and implying the positive relationship between credit supply and market 
concentration. 
 
In column 3, four interactive terms are added to further separate the market structure 
effects, and each interactive term can actually represent one market structure effect: 
monopolistic contestability ( 90% 90%1 1H STAT Gini   ), monopolistic inefficiency 
( 10% 90%1 1H STAT Gini   ), competitive contestability ( 90% 10%1 1H STAT Gini   ) and 




Table 6. 4: Interactive Terms‟ Representative Market Structure Effects 
  Market Contestability (H-statistic) 
  Strong (top 10% 
deciles) 


















The results show that the interactive term representing monopolistic contestable 
market has a negative but significant coefficient, which is not consistent with classic 
contestability theory as in Hypothesis 1a. This could suggest that the extreme 
concentration effect of Hypothesis 1b over-perform the effect of contestability. All 
other three terms have positive coefficients, and these results are intuitive (e.g., when 
there are many banks that possess limited market power, credit expansion is expected 
in the market through more aggressive loan origination strategies of banks), except 
that one might still expect the negative relationship with supply under monopolistic 
inefficient too. Again the positive effect on monopolistic inefficient could be driven 
by substitution suppliers of non-banks, as in Hypothesis 1d.  
 
In the strong and weak submarket analyses (either by concentration or by 
contestability), the results (columns 4 and 5) show that the coefficients on the Gini 
term and the squared Gini term are consistent with the full-sample estimates. 
However, the contestability measure has stronger impact on banks in highly 
concentrated markets (-11.5824) compared to banks in weakly concentrated markets 
(-1.7797). This strongly supports the Hypothesis 1c, and Hypothesis 1f, which 
suggests that the effect of imperfect contestability with market power of high 
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concentration leads to lower total supply, as the incentives to control price to maintain 
zero-profit. On the contestability sub-markets analyses (columns 6 and 7), it is found 
that market concentration increases credit supply in both strong and weak 
concentration sub-markets, which again supports Hypothesis 1d. However, the 
coefficient on the Gini for the strongly contestable market (6.2630) is smaller than the 
coefficient (8.1936) for the weakly contestable market, as the strong contestability 
(Hypothesis 1c) force buffers the effects of strong concentration effects (Hypothesis 
1d). The results suggest that market power has positive and significant effects on 
credit supply in a market with low entry barriers, which again is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1c and 1d.  
 
The results for the control variables of zip-code and city-level mortgage 
characteristics effects on mortgage supply in the respective zip-code counties are 
consistent and stable in the full-sample and the sub-sample analyses.  
 
In terms of year effects, significant and positive increases are observed in credit 
supply tests during the periods 2002 to 2007, when 2008 is controlled in the models 
as the reference year. The periods 1999-2001 showed slower growth in credit supply 
compared to the reference year 2008. The supply trends were consistent with the 
evidence of credit expansion during the 2002-2007 periods found in Mian and Sufi 
(2009) and other researchers.
50
 
                                                             
50  The mortgage growth on year-on-year changes in the market structure and zip-code / city-level loan 
characteristics is tested. The results show that annual rates of change in the levels of contestability and 
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6.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Banking Market Structure and Mortgage 
Default  
To test Hypothesis 2 on relationship between banking market structure and ex-post 
mortgage default risks, proportional hazard model is again used(Deng 1997; Deng, 
Quigley and Van Order 2000). In additional to the variables such as mortgage 
characteristics, competing option values and housing value, state levels banking 
market structure and zip-code level credit supply variables are also included in the 
mortgage default hazard function. Possible endogeneity in the mortgage supply and 
market structure is eliminated by using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, 
where the predictive values of mortgage supply estimated from the earlier Eq. (6-10) 
are included as the explanatory variable in the second stage default hazard function. 
The 2SLS model is defined as follows:  
tititit YZCF 3210
ˆ            (6-11) 
0 1 4
ˆ( ) ( ; ) ( )exp( )i it t t F       
' ' '
i i i 2 i 3X X β Yβ C β            (6-12) 
 
where 0 ( )t is the baseline hazard that is related with the year of amortization (age) 
of mortgage i ; '
iX  is a vector of exogenous variables that include two categorical 
variables: LTV and FICO score, a dummy on ARM type, , a continuous relative 
housing price variable, , and year dummies from 1999 to 2008; '
iY  include default 
and prepayment option values as in Eq.(6-2) and (6-4) respectively; and 
'
iC are the 
                                                                                                                                                               
concentration in the banking markets and the interactive term have significant positive effects on annual 
growth in credit supply. The marginal change in market contestability has negative impact on the supply 
in the markets when banks moderately concentrated. The results remain consistent, but they are not 
shown in the paper due to space constraints. 
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market concentration and contestability variables (both the continuous and discrete 
measures) including the non-linear and interactive terms; and ˆ
iF  is the predicted 
mortgage supply variable derived from Eq. (6-11).  
 
In Eq. (6-12), the proportional hazard ( )i t is a function of t , which is defined as the 
duration from the date of mortgage origination to the first date of occurrence of 
mortgage foreclosure, or the right-censoring date of the sample data that is June 2009, 
whichever is the earliest. The records of month-by-month payment and foreclosure 
for the sample mortgages are available for a 2-year window before the June 2009 
cut-off date. For sample mortgages have “matured” and/or foreclosed more than 24 
months from the cut-off date, the first date of the 2-year window is used to define the 
foreclosure. The vector coefficients in the proportional hazard model Eq. (6-12) are 
again estimated by the partial likelihood method of Cox (1972). The results are 






Table 6. 5: Relationships of Mortgage Structure and Mortgage Default Risks 
  Full Sample Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Concentration 
Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Contestability 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) Strong  (5) Weak (6) Strong (7) Weak 
(A) Mortgage and Borrower characteristics: 
LTV1 > 100% 
















(0.0457) (0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0718) (0.0593) (0.0561) (0.0791) 















(0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0275) (0.0253) (0.0229) (0.0326) 
90% LTV3 < 80% 
















(0.0180) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0265) (0.0246) (0.0221) (0.0316) 















(0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0255) (0.0239) (0.0213) (0.0305) 
70%  LTV5 < 60% 
















(0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0176) (0.0260) (0.0244) (0.0217) (0.0312) 















(0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0298) (0.0282) (0.0248) (0.0366) 
NOFICO 
















(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0099) (0.0092) (0.0082) (0.0118) 















(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0100) (0.0092) (0.0084) (0.0114) 
634 < FICO2   686 
















(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0081) (0.0114) 















(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0098) (0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0119) 
ARM type,  
















(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0065) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0066) 
(B) Option and housing price variables: 































(0.2189) (0.2187) (0.2187) (0.3903) (0.2653) (0.2444) (0.5161) 
PNEQ
2

































(0.1437) (0.1436） (0.1437) (0.2576) (0.1733) (0.1607) (0.3338) 
Hz 
















(8.24E-07) (9.73E-07) (9.69E-07) (3.29E-07) (3.89E-07) (7.19E-07) (2.01E-07) 
(C) Mortgage Supply and Market Structure Variables: 
   
-0.0895
***









(0.0040)   (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
H-STAT 106.5919
***




     









     
(0.9011)   (2.7488) (0.8368)    
GINI 82.6338
***



















Table 6.5: Relationships of Mortgage Structure and Mortgage Default Risks 
(Continue) 
 Full Sample Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Concentration 
Sub-Sample Analyses by 
Market Contestability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Strong  (5) Weak (6) Strong (7) Weak 
H-STAT*GINI -47.0848
***









(1.1015)   (0.1327) (0.0667) (0.1337) (0.1821) 





         
  (0.0078) (0.0089)         
10%1H STAT   
  -0.0022 -0.0083         






         






     
  (0.0063) (0.0070)     
90% 90%1 1H STAT Gini      -0.0217         
  (0.0398)         
10% 90%1 1H STAT Gini       0.0272         
  (0.0183)         
90% 10%1 1H STAT Gini       -0.0654
***
         
  (0.0185)         
10% 10%1 1H STAT Gini       0.0543
**
     
  (0.0276)         
















(0.1308) (0.2173) (0.2172) (0.5798) (0.1383) (0.1488) (0.2875) 
2000 
































(0.1371) (0.2215) (0.2215) (0.5827) (0.1489) (0.1558) (0.2841) 
2002 


























(0.1399) (0.2225) (0.2224) (0.5845) (0.1543) (0.1585) (0.2972) 
2004 
































































(0.1411) (0.2227) (0.2226) (0.5854) (0.1560) (0.1600) (0.2993) 
-2 LOG L 10216436 10250024 10250004 4134624 5547234 6064877 3647359 
AIC 10216498 10250098 10250086 4134682 5547292 6064935 3647417 
SBC 10216833 10250498 10250529 4134971 5547590 6065236 3647702 
Likelihood Ratio 659587 672810 672830 316092 367909 472183 206547 
Score 629118 638488 638582 296355 386999 457751 202307 
Wald 428576 429828 430046 185977 277331 291830 147935 
N 4004378 4004380 4004380 1945911 2058468 2215585 1788794 
Note: Dependent variable: instantaneous default hazard of individual mortgage k 
(Duration and default censorship as in standard proportional hazard model). Weak and 
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Strong submarkets are defined by lower and upper 50% percentiles by Gini and 
H-statistics separately. PNEQ measures probability of negative equity, PPAY measures 
prepayment option, PNEQ
2
is the square of PNEQ, which measures the non-linearity on 
PNEQ. PPAY
2
 measures the non-linearity of PPAY. . Fˆ  measures the predicted mortgage 
supply,   measures the relative housing value, H-STAT measures market contestability. 
H-STAT
2 
measures non-linear contestability effects, GINI measures market concentration, 
GINI
2
 measures non-linear concentration effects. The Cox’s partial maximum likelihood 
method is used to estimate the vector coefficients, j.  
In Hazard regression, the three criteria -2logL (2 times log partial likelihood), AIC 
(Akaike Information Criterion), SBC (Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion) is used to 
represent model fit statistics. Normally, lower the value fit statistics indicates a better 
desirable model. Likelihood Ratio, Score, and Wald are used to test the null hypothesis of 
zero parameter.  
For each line of regression variables, standard errors are listed below the estimated 
coefficients for each variable. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
In contrary to the supply-based hypothesis of Mian and Sufi (2009), the predicted 
credit expansion supply in this study has negative effects on the mortgage default 
hazard in all markets, except for the weakly concentrated market  
 
All the estimated regression coefficients on predicted mortgage supply and market 
structure variables are significant, most signs of market structure variable are positive, 
as expected (see Table 6.5, Panel (C)), except for some interactive terms. Competition 
as contestability drives risk taking, and concentration in banking drives total markets‟ 
risk taking as the existent of non-banks. The results do not reject the Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b, which suggest that banking market structure has significant positive impact 
on mortgage default risks, after controlling for the credit supply in the model. 
 
The negative interactive term in the full sample supports Hypothesis 2c, as in 
contestability theory. The results may suggest that mortgage default rate is generally 




In columns (2) and (3) of submarket studies, the coefficient on the strong 
contestability market dummy was significant and positive, supporting Hypothesis 2a. . 
The negative of weak contestability is the consistent with Hypothesis 2a again. The 
negative of weak concentration dummy is also supporting Hypothesis 2b. Although 
strong concentration dummy shows negative too, but its absolute value is smaller than 
the coefficient of weak concentration, which again does not deviate from Hypothesis 
2b. The smaller negative value could be caused by unmeasured concentration of 
non-banks. The interactive terms in column (3), of dummies again strengthen the 
interactive terms in full sample, suggesting monopoly contestability is efficiency in 
reducing mortgage risk in general, again supporting Hypothesis 2c.  
 
Interactive term 2 ( 10% 90%1 1H STAT Gini   ) represents strong concentration in banking 
but low contestability (natural monopoly), which decreases inefficiency as to increase 
default risk. The positive sign of the interactive term 2 supports the arguments.  
 
Interactive term 3 ( 90% 10%1 1H STAT Gini   ) represents the effect of perfect competition 
market, which is predicted to be efficient in long run by basic economic theory. In 
term of default risk, it is expected to be negative. The negative coefficient value of 
-0.0654 supports the argument. 
 
Interactive term 4 ( 90% 10%1 1H STAT Gini   ), a cutting-throat competition representative 
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variable, is supposed to have a higher default risk, as inefficiency in long-run is 
expected under such market structure. 
 
The default studies in the concentration (Columns 4 and 5) and contestability 
(Columns 6 and 7) submarkets support the results drawn from interactive terms too. 
In a highly concentrated sub-market ( 50%Gini  ), banking market could be either 
monopoly efficiency or monopoly inefficiency, depending on the contestability level, 
which resulting in either negative or positive sign to default risk. The results of 
-74.0291 and 84.2972 support the idea (in Columns 4 and 5). Similarly, the 
coefficient of Gini variable should be either positive or negative to default risk, 
depending on the contestability submarket (columns 6 and 7). The significant positive 
(103.9148) and negative (-9.9588) coefficient on the Gini variable support the 
hypotheses.  
  
The coefficients for the mortgage and borrower variables in hazard models are stable 
across different sub-samples. Using [LTV7  50%] as the reference group, the 
coefficients on the LTV2 to LTV6, except for the [LTV1>100%], are significantly 
positive, indicating higher risks when LTV increases. Borrowers with no FICO 
records and those with FICO of 736 and below have relatively high mortgage default 
risks, when the [FICO4  736] group is used as the reference group. ARM mortgages 




The coefficients on the two option variables and the squared terms are also significant, 
and the signs are consistent across different sub-market samples. The probability of 
negative equity PNEQMSA , and the prepayment probability PPAY , both increase 
the default risks of the sample mortgages. The effects are, however, non-linear as 
shown by the negative signs of the squared terms that are significant. The year 
dummies show that significant rates of increases of default probabilities over the 
years. Using 2008 as the reference year, the coefficients on year dummies 1999 to 
2003 were negative in most of the models, but the magnitude of coefficient decline 
over the years. The coefficients on the year dummies were positive and significant 
after 2004 culminating to the peak in 2007, which highlighted clearly the rising trends 
in mortgage default risks in the samples. 
 
Model (3), clearly representing different market structure, performs best among the 
all the empirical models, both in terms of R-square in supply regression, and also in 
terms of likelihood ratio in default regression. 
6.4.3 Robust Test: Effects of Legislation Risks 
The judicial foreclosure laws and deficiency judgments are found to influence the 
market shares of the conventional loans and the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insured loans originated by the government sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs)(Ambrose and Pennington-Cross 2000). Similarly, US states are sorted into 
four broad groups with different foreclosure and deficiency judgments, that are Q1 
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includes states with non-judicial foreclosure but allow deficiency judgments; Q2 
includes states with non-judicial foreclosure and no deficiency judgment; Q3 includes 
states with judicial foreclosure and allow for deficiency judgments; and Q4 includes 
states with judicial foreclosure but no deficiency judgments. Two steps regressions 
are repeated for mortgage supply Eq. (6-11) and mortgage default hazard models Eq. 
(6-12) as in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. There are significant variations in how contestability 
and concentration in banking market structure affect the supply (origination) of 
non-FHA in different jurisdictions. In Q1, where it allows deficiency judgment, but 
without judicial foreclosure law protections, the market is supposed to more risky. In 
such legislation background, risk-taking strategies are more freely to be used. In the 
contrary of Q4, where it does not allow deficiency judgment, but with judicial 
foreclosure law, such geographic market is supposed to be less risky and less power 
to freely utilize their pricing and non-pricing strategies. It is expected that the market 
structure variables should performs quite differently in Q1, and Q4. The result shows 
that the contestability coefficient is almost exactly opposite in the Q1 and Q4, which 
strongly support the significant role of such market structure. Although it is relatively 
difficult to explain the extension of the coefficient difference without sufficient 
control variables in different geographic area, the results support the significant role 




Table 6. 6: Robustness Tests – Step 1 Credit Supply Models 
 
 Judicial foreclosure law states
#
 Phases of credit expansion
%
 














 (2.6589) (3.5948) (2.9608) (23.1612) (4.3655) (0.4873) (3.3681) 







 -0.3893 1.0011 




































































(2.3418) (2.3074) (3.7984) (21.5586) (2.4405) (0.9173) (2.8570) 
















































































(0.0207) (0.0249) (0.0232) (0.0521) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0341) 











   











   







    






Table 6.6: Robustness Tests – Step 1 Credit Supply Models 
(Continue) 
 Judicial foreclosure law states
#
 Phases of credit expansion
%
 



















 -0.2876  -1.0366
***
  







 0.1552  -0.8141
***
  







 0.3364  -0.5246
***
  







 0.4445    







 0.1066   1.1814
***
 
(0.0741) (0.0662) (0.0886) (0.3166)   (0.0471) 
N 85183 63587 65205 8231 43166 151491 39112 
R-square 0.5216 0.5506 0.5163 0.4774 0.2811 0.4833 0.4732 
Note: Dependent variable: the log value of aggregate mortgage amount originated each 
year at zip-code country level. Dependent variable: log value of aggregate mortgage 
amount originated each year at zip-code country level. H-STAT is the measurement of 
Market contestability. H-STAT^2 captures the non-linear effects for market contestability. . 
Gini coefficient measures the market concentration in the supply side. Gini^2 measures 
non-linear effects for market concentration. 
CL measures the relative loan number originated. CR measures relative mortgage rate. 
CARM measures the share of ARM. CLFICO measures share of low FICO mortgages. 
CHLTV measures share of high LTV mortgages.  
The pooled OLS regressions are estimated using maximum likelihood method 
For each line of regression variables, standard errors are listed below the estimated 
coefficients for each variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. 
 For year dummies, the reference year is 2008. 
## The definitions of judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgments are based on Ambrose 
and Pennington-Cross (2000):  
  The presence Judicial 
foreclosure law 
  No Yes 
Allow for deficiency 
judgments 
Yes Q1 Q3 
No Q2 Q4 
Q1: AL, AR, DC, GA, HI, MO, IA, MA, MD, MI, MS, RI, NE, NH, NM, NV, NY, TN, UT, 
VA, WV, WY, CO.   
Q2: AK, AZ, CA, ID, OK, ME, MN, MT, NC, OR, SD, TX, WA.   
Q3: CT, DC, FL, IL, IN, KS, KY, NJ, OH, PA, SC, VT.  
Q4: LA, ND, WI.  
% Based on the credit expansion story of Mian and Sufi (2009), the sample periods are 
separated into three phases: the slow growth phase: 1999-2001, the rapid growth phase: 
2002-2006, and the post-crisis phase: 2007-2008.  
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Table 6. 7: Robustness Tests – Step 2 Proportional Hazard Models  
 
  
 Judicial foreclosure law states
#
 Phases of credit expansion
%
 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 1999-2001 2002-2006 2007 -2008 
(A) Mortgage and Borrower characteristics: 















(0.0829) (0.0867) (0.0651) (0.1910) (0.1484) (0.0494) (0.4482) 















(0.0325) (0.0268) (0.0271) (0.1121) (0.0915) (0.0209) (0.0494) 

















(0.0316) (0.0258) （0.0263） (0.1087) (0.0810) (0.0202) (0.0478) 

















(0.0306) (0.0248) (0.0255) (0.1059) (0.0778) (0.0196) (0.0457) 

















(0.0312) (0.0252) (0.0259) (0.1090) (0.0865) (0.0200) (0.0450) 

































(0.0112) (0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0531) (0.1769) (0.0074) (0.0291) 















(0.0111) (0.0092) (0.0096) (0.0525) (0.1772) (0.0076) (0.0149) 

















(0.0109) (0.0087) (0.0096) (0.0544) (0.1860) (0.0075) (0.0143) 

















(0.0114) (0.0089) (0.0100) (0.0586) (0.2050) (0.0077) (0.0147) 















(0.0069) (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0237) (0.0343) (0.0047) (0.0097) 
















































































(5.74E-07) (5.78E-07) (2.51E-06) (7.54E-07) (3.87E-07) (1.63E-06) (3.34E-06) 
(C) Mortgage Supply and Market Structure Variables: 









































(1.0829) (1.5900) (2.4296) (18.3014) (10.6718) (0.9472) (3.6002) 
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Table 6.7: Robustness Tests – Step 2 Proportional Hazard Models (Continue) 
Note: Dependent variable: instantaneous default hazard of individual mortgage k 
(Duration and default censorship as in standard proportional hazard model). PNEQ 
measures probability of negative equity, PPAY measures prepayment option, PNEQ
2
is the 
square of PNEQ, which measures the non-linearity on PNEQ. PPAY
2
 measures the 
non-linearity of PPAY. . Fˆ  measures the predicted mortgage supply,   measures the 
relative housing value, H-STAT measures market contestability. H-STAT
2
 measures 
non-linear contestability effects, GINI measures market concentration, GINI
2 
measures 
non-linear concentration effects. 
The Cox’s partial maximum likelihood method is used to estimate the vector coefficients, 
j. For each line of regression variables, standard errors are listed below the estimated 
coefficients for each variable.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively. The referenced variables for the dummies include LTV750%, 
736<FICO4, and year dummy 2008. 
#,% The definitions of Judicial foreclosure and deficiency judgments and credit expansion 
refer to description in Table 6.6. 
 Judicial foreclosure law states
#
 Phases of credit expansion
%
 


















































(1.4704) (1.6766) (2.3920) (14.8489) (10.6755) (1.2051) (3.4000) 









   









   







 5.9238    







 6.8949  -5.4457
***
  





 7.7651  -4.3694
***
  





 8.8162  -2.9313
***
  







 10.0184  -1.5083
***
  







 11.3061    







 12.1918   -1.0891
***
 
(0.3776) (0.2238) (0.2448) (34.2450)   (0.1301) 
-2 LOG L 3,562,736 4,806,218 4,809,675 222,102 84,781 8,412,715 1,529,629 
AIC 3,562,798 4,806,280 4,809,737 222,164 84,829 8,412,767 1,529,675 
SBC 3,563,102 4,806,593 4,810,051 222,390 84,980 8,413,043 1,529,882 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
225,262 315,602 277,246 17,241 4,039 504,405 30,609 
Score 203,939 291,439 270,218 15,870 3,982 480,757 29,810 
Wald 142,757 195,288 194,654 11,508 3,353 334,574 25,778 
N 1,615,898 1,990,467 1,351,295 112,487 94,120 3,357,381 552,877 
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6.4.4 Robust Test: Credit Expansion Phases 
Mian and Sufi (2009) argue that the sharp increases in credit during the periods 
2002-2006 is largely responsible for the unprecedentedly high mortgage defaults in 
2007. If credit supply and credit expansion are associated with market structure, it is 
expected that changing market structure variables performs differently during credit 
expansion. Three time phases are studied including the slow growth phase from 1999 
to 2001, the exponential growth phase from 2002 to 2006, and the post financial 
phase from 2007 to 2008. 2-step estimation procedures are tested and the results are 
summarized in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Interestingly, large bank with concentration in 
more contestable market caused mortgage supply to decrease in the early slow growth 
phase 1999-2001. Strong concentration in banking cause sharp increases in mortgage 
supply in the high growth phase, by the positive coefficient of the Gini coefficient, 
showing that the credit expansion might be caused by the present of large banks. 
However, the negative interactive term implies that large banks, if operate more 
efficiently, could decrease its credit supply, probably due to matching with decreasing 
demand to maintain zero-profit suggested by contestability theory. It thus cannot rule 
out the hypothesis that the bulk of the credit expansion in the periods 2002-2006 was 
affected by the origination activities of inefficient large banks. 
 
In the mortgage hazard model (Table 6.7), results were not consistent with the supply 
story of Mian and Sufi (2009), which hypothesizes that the large credit supply in the 
periods 2002-2006 was associated the subsequent increases in mortgage default. The 
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coefficients on the predictive mortgage supply was negative in the rapid growth phase, 
but was positive in the post-crisis phase. Results, however, show that the presence of 
either large banks or banks in highly contestable market leads to high default in the 
markets during the two periods 2002-2006 and 2007-2008, which supports the 
situation of Hypothesis 2a and 2b again. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter finds that contestability in banking market reduces total non-agency 
mortgage supply and concentration in banking market increases total non-agency 
mortgage supply, when the market is faced with downturn demanding or substitution 
suppliers as the existent non-banks. This result is line with when GSEs perform as 
substitution through purchasing seasoned loan, more active market activity are 
seen(Ambrose and Thibodeau 2004). The contradicting force between the 
concentration and “industry entry” under the existence of substitution is consistent 
with argument of relationship banking (Cetorelli and Strahan 2006), in which 
vigorous competition could mitigate banks‟ willingness to invest in relationship 
banking as inability to sustain the relationship banking cost, on the other hand, 
banking concentration perform as a financial barrier to entry in product markets. 
 
Market structure factors are also able to explain its ex-post default risk in different 
market situations (monopoly efficiency as contestable market, natural monopoly 




Chapter 7 Contribution and Future 
Work 
7.1 Summary 
7.1.1 Main Findings 
To understand the determinants on mortgagors‟ termination, this thesis first builds up 
borrowers‟ self-selection stylized model that includes unobservable risk factors (e.g., 
real income, housing consumption preference) in a dynamic multi-period utility 
maximization framework. Then, it empirically tests the effects of unobservable risk 
factors and borrowers‟ self-selection on borrowers‟ ex-post risk. 
 
After borrowers‟ self-select into different mortgages, they start to service their 
mortgages through installment payments, and decide to terminate their mortgage 
under the life-time utility maximization motivation given the lenders‟ pricing strategy. 
Simulations are conducted to systematically evaluate heterogeneous default behaviors 
such as non-ruthless decision and sub-optimal default. Empirically, split population 
model is then used to test the effects of risk factors (e.g., income, FICO) on the 
non-strategic mortgage default determination. 
 
Thirdly, pricing and credit expansion strategies of mortgage originators, especially 
banks, are considered as to be endogenously affected by the banking market structure 
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(competition and contestability). Taking into consideration the originators‟ mortgage 
supply effects as an additional risk determinant, borrowers‟ mortgage termination is 
examined empirically. 
 
A) Borrowers’ self-selection 
In a dynamic environment with a two-step decision assumption, borrowers choose 
their optimal mortgage contract from a mortgage menu to maximize their life-time 
utility on housing and non-housing consumption. The theoretical model shows that 
borrowers with unobservable income and FICO characteristic could have different 
observable mortgage selection baskets. The theoretical result suggests that borrowers‟ 
observable mortgage choice (house size, mortgage type, an LTV) reveals useful 
information on borrowers‟ unobservable risk attributes (e.g., real income, and 
housing consumption preference), which are important factors for borrowers‟ ex-post 
default risk. The importance of unobservable risk attributes is supported by other 
empirical findings (Deng, Quigley and Van Order 2000), where direct error term is 
used, instead of the endogenous relationships as measured in this thesis. 
 
Empirical studies find that unobservable risk attributes revealed by borrowers‟ 
comparative mortgage choice (referred to as “self-selection” of mortgage for 
simplicity) in general, and self-selection into FRM in specific reduce mortgage 
default probabilities. However, the self-selection has positive effects on default 




Borrowers with low credit scores do not have alternative mortgage options, other than 
selecting subprime ARMs. High credit-score borrowers, who have other options, but 
choose ARMs over conventional FRMs may signal possible default risks, which is 
consistent with general view on higher risk for ARM mortgages(Dhillon, Shilling and 
Sirmans 1987; Follain 1990; Posey and Yavas 2001).  
 
Prime borrowers (high FICO score) over-consume housing goods by entering into 
high risk mortgage contracts (ARMs with a high LTV), if the marginal risk premium 
of ARMs is small. Potential inconsistent self-selection (with high FICO borrowers‟ 
choice on ARMs) performs better signal in separating the default risks of borrowers. 
For instance, high credit-score borrowers, despite having more mortgage options, 
choose ARMs over FRMs, may convey unobservable information of ex-post default 
risks. 
 
Therefore, sorting borrowers into high and low risk groups based on their 
credit-scores, and charging default risk premiums based on observable risk factors do 
not fully protect lenders against default risks. These results are consistent with the 
importance of soft information as recently discussed in (Agarwal et al. 2011).  
 
B) Non-Strategic Default 
A rational default model based on the utility function of heterogeneous mortgagors‟ 
default decisions improves understanding to ruthless, non-ruthless and suboptimal 
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default behaviors.  
 
The proposed rational model and the corresponding empirical evidence suggest that 
borrowers with no FICO and low income will have high “probability of default”, 
which is consistent with the findings (Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010; 
Pennington-Cross, Yezer and Nichols 2000).  However, they are reluctant to default 
as delaying their “time-to-default” in the case of ruthless and suboptimal default, 
which could be due to future credit accessibility constraints. 
 
The simulation and empirical results suggest that the borrowers‟ suboptimal defaults 
might be determined more by the soft information than by observable characteristics. 
This is consistent with the suggestion by Vandell (1995). Furthermore, relatively 
high option values are more important on both ruthless default and suboptimal 
default. Intermediate level of put option value is not enough to trigger ruthless 
default by borrowers, which is not contradicting the argument by previous 
studies(Deng and Quigley 2005).  
 
The theoretical model and empirical “split population model” can explain the 
co-existence of “sub-optimal” defaulter and “non-ruthless” defaulters. 
 
C) Market Structure and Mortgage Default 
In 2000s, financial liberalization, financial innovations, risk-based pricing techniques, 
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GSE credit facilities to low-income borrowers, and other monetary policy, have 
caused excessive liquidity and credit boom in the U.S. housing market (Ambrose and 
Thibodeau 2004; Gabriel and Rosenthal 2010). The residential mortgage market and 
market contestability have experienced significant changes, especially the risk-based 
technique and governments‟ policies of promoting home ownership for low-middle 
income and minority population. 
 
Through empirical comparison of submarkets under different concentration and 
contestability levels in the banking market, it is found that contestability in the 
banking market reduces credit supply and concentration in the banking market 
increases total credit supply during 2000s, when market faces a downturn in demand 
and the existent of non-bank substitution suppliers. These explain the different 
period‟s crowding-out effect by GSE activity in mortgage purchases in the private 
secondary market as suggested by Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010). 
 
Furthermore, the interactive term of concentration and contestability of banking 
market forms different market structure effect on total mortgage credit supply and 
default risk. 1) “Monopoly efficient” banking market structure factor decreases credit 
supply, and also decrease default risk. 2) “Monopoly inefficient” banking market 
structure factor increases credit supply, at same time increases default risk. 3) 
“Competitive contestability” factor (with many banks performing under efficiency) 
increases total credit supply, at same time, would reduce default risks. 4) “Cut-throat 
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competitive” banking market factor increases total credit supply, and also increase 
potential default risks. We have not discussed the main reasons for the differences, 
and the future studies can be extended to examine strategy incentives under different 
market. These results are different from those in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), where “credit-rationing” of competing lenders with 
asymmetric information impedes the flows of credit to an otherwise qualified 
borrower. The difference comes from the risk tolerance assumptions, where mortgage 
originators are more willing to take risk in the thesis under the background of 
mortgage securitization and the usage of originate-to-distribute model.  
 
These borrowers‟ ex-post default risks are related to unobservable risk factors under 
different contestability and competition conditions in the banking market besides 
observable factors (e.g., LTV, FICO). 
7.1.2 Policy Implication 
A) Importance of borrowers’ choice and information on their characteristics 
The results on borrowers‟ self-selection indicate the importance of borrowers‟ 
selection of mortgage contracts and proper matches between mortgagors and their 
contracts in affecting borrowers‟ default risk especially for ARM. Therefore, it is 
necessary to educate borrowers to make the right choice on the mortgage contracts to 




It also raises the necessity to disclose both soft and hard information on the mortgage 
contracts as much as possible for investors during both primary underwriting and the 
securitization process in the secondary market. Besides mortgage securitization 
process, lenders are encouraged to collect sufficient borrowers‟ heterogeneous 
information. 
 
B) Is FICO score an adequate risk measurement? 
All three parts of the borrowers‟ default studies suggest that FICO score is to some 
extent inadequate as a base for risk pricing to capture residential mortgagors‟ default 
risk. To the question “Did lender use the wrong risk model? or did lenders have 
wrong expectation on the financial environment such as house price, market interest 
rate, and borrowers’ income expectation?”, the thesis inclines to “the wrong risk 
model”, despite expectation to future. 
 
These results argue for stringent regulation and inspection on mortgage origination at 
the micro-level. The openness in the underwriting process, training to financial 
experts, and disclosure necessary information are important to improve risk 
management. Underwriting mortgages using observable information on 
heterogeneous characteristics of borrowers alone is inadequate in segregating high 
risk borrowers from low risk borrowers. Lenders, who ignore unobservable incentive 
to defaults, could underestimate mortgages risk premiums. The mispriced mortgages, 
when sold in the securitization process, may expose investors of the pooled mortgage 
securities to risks that are not commensurate with the investment returns. 
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C) Banking Regulations 
The results suggest that market structure in banking sector performs important roles 
in guiding credit supply and its ex-post default risk for the whole mortgage market, 
especially when market is faced with downturn demand and existence of substitution 
mortgage suppliers to banks. Results of banking market structure seem to encourage 
the “competitive contestability” situation of banking market, which both increases 
total credit supply, at same time, would reduce default risks. It also suggests that “the 
too big to fail” mode creates excessive risk. The results are based on a decreasing 
demand caused by reduced income suggested by other studies, existent of non-banks 
as substitution suppliers, and also the risk-based pricing, which allows for flexible 
underwriting criteria. If regulators do not prefer “competitive contestable” market, 
they have to learn to deal with mortgage demand, alternative market supplier 
regulation, and the rule of “risk-based pricing”.  
 
Bank concentration and competition significantly influence individual mortgage‟s 
performance. It is suggested to better improve banking supervision & oversight, and 
control unhealthy competition among regulators, bankers, and non-banks. This 
argument echoes the emphasis on changing the evolved institutional structures to 
banking system by some policy makers. 
7.2 Contribution 





 1). Economic condition, such as house price trend, interest rate trend, and 
mortgage pricing strictness. House price trends and interest rate trends are 
normally built into financial option values for mortgages. 
 
 2). Contract observable risk, such as mortgage payment structure (e.g., LTV, 
FICO score, loan amount), penalty roles, ceilings, and so on. 
 
 3). Unobservable risk factors, such as real income, and housing consumption 
preference. 
 
 4). Others, such as behavioral herding effects, and distraction mechanism. 
 
In general, this thesis adds ingredients to the mortgage credit risk factors to 
termination determinant, through filling the knowledge gap in the following ways: 
 
1). Provide relatively systematic literature review on recent researches mainly in 
primary mortgage market.  
 
2). The thesis identifies the knowledge gap: unobservable risk factor effect (reflected 
in borrowers‟ mortgage selection) on ex-post default, specific determinants in 
non-strategic mortgage behaviors, and the banking market structure as the drive on 
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credit expansion & its effect on ex-post default. 
 
3). It enriches knowledge and understanding on a type of borrowers‟ decision in a 
dynamic life-time utility maximization incentive: a two-step borrower with choosing 
mortgage first, and deciding mortgage ex-post default along the payment 
installments.  
 
4). It emphasizes the necessity to collect sufficient soft information to determine 
residential mortgage risk. It also gives incentives for investors to implement effort to 
control soft information (e.g., income verification, housing preference and market 
condition that emphasized in three identified gaps.) 
 
5). This study is one of the few studies focusing on individual mortgages issued by 
private originators, normally known as “non-agency” loans. Securitization pools of 
non-agencies loans might reflect the default likelihood differently in the aspect of 
securitization process
51
. Furthermore, the agency as GSEs might have lower 
incentives to screen and adjust their underwriting criteria, as GSEs might have greater 
access to other alternative mortgage instruments and methods to manage their risk. 
GSEs also have more standard underwriting guidelines, which make less flexibility to 
                                                             
51 From Freddie Mac‟s “Cautious Review Category”, FICO score below 620 indicates that borrowers‟ 
reputation is not acceptable. Mentioned on Keys (2010), rating agencies use 620 cut-off to determine 
default probabilities, and after 2000 year, lower credit score loans has been shifting to non-agency 
sectors. In the original mortgage individual data of whole time span, there are 80.79% loans, whose 
FICO score is higher than 620. In the original mortgage individual data after year 1999, there are 81.01% 
loans, whose FICO score is higher than 620. They have found discontinuity in the credit threshold of 620 
with unconditional probability of securitization with larger number of 620+, assuming the same 
prospective number of borrowers. It does not show this trend in the data. 
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adjust underwriting level. Hence, non-agency loans provide a better platform to 
understand the issues among mortgage default, mortgage underwriting, and banking 
market structure. 
 
5). It fills the mortgage literatures on borrowers‟ default specifically through  
A) Self-Selection 
Theoretically, a stylized model utilized in the thesis derives the optimal choice 
between ARMs and FRMs for borrowers in a different income and FICO groups 
under stochastic setting. This extends most of mortgage choice studies of 
two-period models to a multi-period model with housing and non-housing 
consumption allocation to maximize their life-time utility.  
 
The key factor of “self-selection” in explaining ex-post default has not been 
considered in the previous studies to my knowledge, which shed light on potential 
unverifiable information of borrowers in mortgage choice. 
 
B) Non-Strategic Mortgage Default 
It has provided an economic framework with financial option values (a rational 
default model in stochastic setting) to explaining the co-existent of strategic and 
non-strategically default decisions (“sub-optimal” and “non-ruthless”), which is not 




Empirically, it uses the split population model, which is able to explain the 
existence of strategic & non-strategic default, and the existence of “non-defaulters”, 
as in the proposed theoretical rational default model. 
 
C) Banking Market Structure 
It provides the market structure explanation on the incentives for lenders to utilize 
different underwriting standard strategies under different concentrated and 
contestable market structure. It suggests empirically the potential mechanism on 
how lenders‟ strategies to affect ex-post borrower mortgage termination strategies. 
 
7.3 Discussion 
7.3.1 Limitation and Future Work 
A) General Limitation 
Generally, social efficiency and inefficiency in a theoretical equilibrium with both 
borrowers and lenders are worth exploring in the future studies. 
 
Mortgage is a current tool for housing finance. Mortgage default risk is one of 
essential facets in liberalization, stability of financial markets with the urbanization 
process under different stimulation scheme for homeownership. Individual default 
risk is systematically affected by the policies in different stages of urbanization, 




Current studies, based on the existing mortgages, ask few questions on equilibrium 
“optimal” mortgage and/or financing method to borrowers, lenders, or the 
government, especially when the market are flexible and uncertainty in the supply 
and demand.  
 
B) Self-Selection Part 
Extending from the current mortgagor‟s self-selection study, lender‟s choice on 
mortgage under different market structure, instead of exogenously given mortgage 
menu based on current risk-based pricing strategy, can be considered, even under lax 
underwriting standard, and lack of incentives to control risk in the process of 
securitization. If both lenders and borrowers‟ choices of mortgages are modeled in a 
dynamic equilibrium market, asymmetric information, which requires knowledge of 
the dynamic microeconomic equilibrium theories, will need to be resolved. 
 
C) Non-strategic Termination 
Future theoretical works on non-strategic termination can be extended in three 
directions: 
 
1) One is to use more complex decision rules on mortgage defaults under irrational 
assumptions as rule of thumb in behavioral finance with consideration of 
psychological factors (Lettau and Uhlig 1999), borrowers‟ irrational distraction 
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mechanism to the value function in stochastic setting (Agarwal, Driscoll and Laibson 
2004), and herding behaviors in default decision (Seiler, Lane and Harrison 2011).  
 
The thesis is to admit economic incentive (rational or irrational) as additional 
interactive conditions for borrowers to default, which allows financial option to be 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Future works could extend assumptions, 
such as relaxing one single property mortgage in the behavioral mortgage default 
decision model to allow borrows to take more than one mortgage. 
 
2) Another extension involves incorporating borrowers‟ utilities with their stochastic 
income, housing price, mortgage interest rates into the existent financial option 
framework, which involve at least 3-dimensional stochastic partial differentiation 
equation (SPDE) by applying complex mathematic formulas (e.g., Ito-Ventzell‟s 
formula). It can solve the SPDE relating to “multi-asset underlying derivative” 
pricing. However, both the simulated and close-form theoretical solutions for the 
1-dimensional SPDE problems strongly depend on the specific structure of the 
equations (e.g., Theorem 4.2 in Mania and Tevzadze (2008)), this method will lead to 
more complex mathematical solutions. 
 
3)The third possible way is to extend mortgage related options from the financial 
options to the property related “real option” with consideration of house property 
market‟s demand and supply, which is widely used in studies on land development 
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and lease contracts (Capozza and Helsley 1989; Williams 1993). In this way, the 
concept of mortgage option is modified, but not default conditions. 
 
D) Supply-side Market Structure 
From the supply side, there are some limitations to empirically test the market 
structure, which include: 
 
1) Firstly, the significance of borrowers‟ observable characteristics (e.g., low FICO 
score concentration) is found to be similar to the result of Agarwal etc. (2009). 
However, it cannot infer any conclusions on the neighborhood effects on default, as 
the possibility of “explicit manipulation of FICO score” either by mortgage 
originators or by borrowers in geographic neighborhood is not excluded. Furthermore, 
geographical information such as distance to work place and individual income 
information are useful for the empirical models in the future. 
 
2) Secondly, specific contestable causality issues are not covered by the current study 
(e.g., such as activity restriction; Government‟s explicit and implicit protection and 
guarantees; interstate banking prohibitions; branch limitations; barriers to entry; 
anti-trust policies; preexisting regulatory; capital expenditure on financial 





Better data from mortgage originators (including non-banks such as thrifts, credit 
unions) are helpful to improve the causality arguments. Market structure in this study 
is exogenously defined. Theoretical modeling of residential mortgage risk pricing 
under specific market structure regulations for the mortgage origination service 
companies is still a challenging task. . 
 
3) The effect of market concentration on pricing of mortgage rates are not the same in 
different geographical Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) (Aspinwall 1970). The 
impact is higher in small MSAs. This intrigues the future study on issues like “does 
the size of the geographical location affect the estimated result on market structure 
factors?”  
7.3.2 Extensions to Asian Markets 
The secondary mortgage market has not yet been developed in Asian markets (except 
Hong Kong and South Korea), as a channel for risk management for mortgage 
originators.  
 
This research on the securitization of U.S. market can be relevant for the the primary 
markets. Therefore, the theoretical models and intuition can be applied to the Asian 
markets through utilizing different parameters in the theoretical model (e.g., different 
consumption preference of individuals). The empirical results in this research could 
not directly be used to explain the Asia‟s phenomenon as different microeconomic 
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fundamental, although the empirical models could be estimated, if data on Asian 
mortgages were available. Extending this research to understand mortgage defaults in 
Asia countries could be an interesting topic, either for the self-selection, borrowers 
“non-ruthless” and “sub-optimal” behaviors, or banking market structure. 
 
Only a small portion of real estate loans has been securitized in Singapore, and the 
mortgage credit risk of Singapore is relatively low. However, a deeper understanding 
of mortgage default risks can improve pricing of mortgage rates. The importance of 
banking management in the supply market structure is also relevant to the Asian 
markets, as the market structure could affect many risk-taking strategies for lenders, 
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Appendix 1: Contestability and 
Concentration on Banking Markets 
How banking concentration and market contestability are measured? Concentration 
measured by the Gini coefficient indirectly reflects the market power of banks in the 
local markets. The presence of large banks measured by total bank deposit either in 
the top 25 in the US banking or control 10% local market share could increase the 
profitability of other banks (Pilloff 1999). Academics utilize price markups between 
prices and marginal cost, like Lerner index, H-statistics, to link the inputs cost with 
output prices Other researchers, however, argue for the use structural measures of 
competition using the marginal approach (Bresnahan 1982; Lau 1982) and also the 
input factor elasticity approach by Panzar and Rosse (PR, 1982, 1987). 
 
Based on limited data availability
52
, three variables are used to capture market 
structure in different geographic scope: number of banks, Gini coefficient of U. S. 
banks as market concentration measure and PR H-statistics as market contestability 
(industry efficiency) measurement, Wharton‟s banking database of the University of 
Pennsylvania are used as inputs for computing the market structure variables. The 
data on income statement and bank location are available for the sample periods from 
                                                             
52 One significant distinction making banking industry apart from others is the banking regulation, 
mainly by governments representing Federal Reserve and the existence of property law (threat of new 
entrants, possibility of mega bank entering, substitution institutions). It would be better if there are city 
and zip-level banking regulation information, such as fraction of entry denied (the number of entry 
application denied as a fraction of the number of applications received from domestic and foreign 
entities, which can also act as contestability of the market), and activity restrictions (e.g., whether bank 
activities in the securities, insurance, and real estate markets, ownership, subprime mortgages are 
restricted or not). 
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1999 to 2008 on a quarterly basis for a total of more than 9000 banks, which give a 
pooled of 347,356 observations.  
1)  Bank Number 
The deregulation of the banking industry and increasing use of technologies including 
telecommunication, internet banking and automated teller machine (ATM) in the 
1990s have resulted in declines in the number of banks over the periods 1999-2008 
(Figure A1), except for some states such as Arizona, Alaska, California, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, and Louisiana, where the number of bank increases through 
new banks and/or new branches. The numbers of banks and branches at the local 
level represent the market reach in the selected neighborhoods.  
 
Figure A. 1: Mean of Number of Banks in State Level through years 
 
Note: This figure is generated from bank income report of Wharton. The horizontal axis is 
year, and vertical value is the mean of the number of banks with loan in each state of U.S. 
at the specific year. 
 
2) Gini Coefficient Measure of Bank Concentration 
Gini coefficient
53
 measures “inequality of banks”, which is defined as the area 
                                                             
53
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration (HHI) is also used, which at city level is calculated 
using the sum of the squared market shares. The smaller HHI indicates higher concentration level in the 
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between equality line and Lorenz curve divided by total area under the equality line:   
1 1
0
1 [( ) ( )]
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i i i i
i
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    
                (A1) 
 
where 
iY  is the cumulative proportion (discrete density function) of the measured 
variable 
iy  sorted in an ascending sequence; iX  is the cumulative proportion of 
the number counts
ix . G  has its value in a close interval of [0 1], where a value “0” 
means equality, and a value “1” means inequality. As a measure of market 
concentration, a Gini coefficient of 1 indicates a high level of concentration in the 
market. 
 
Gini coefficients are computed based on real estate loan value and total asset (equity 
and debt) from the sample of 72,570 bank-year observations over the 10-year periods. 
Gini Coefficients on bank concentration level for a panel subsamples of state year are 
computed,
54
 which include 541 resulted Gini values from 1999 to 2008 (excluding 
the missing Gini results for the AS (American Samoa) and FM (Federated States of 
Micronesia). By the definition of banking market concentration, New York in 1999 
may have different Gini from the New York market in 2008. The market 
                                                                                                                                                               
city scope. HHIL is firstly used, which is based on loan market share measured by percentage of total 
loans on total loan of banks in city level. Other general HHIA is based on the market share measured by 
percentage of total assets on total banks asset (Equity and debts) in city level, which is assumed to 
measure the bank industry concentration. The regression results of their sign are not changed by using 
proxy of HHIA and HHIL. 
54 One can also use city level Gini. However, in the bank sample, there are totally 4,463 cities, having 
reports, while in this individual mortgage loan data, there are 16,845 cities. Matching through cities will 
create some small cities biases, where no banking reports, and also lose quite quantity number of 
individual mortgage performance data. Cities name is determined based on the post zip code. There are 
totally 18,443 cities (including municipality, town, village,etc.) following definition of U.S. Census 2000 
http://www.census.gov/. Compared with the cities in bank reporting data and individual mortgage data, 
one can see that not all small cities have banks with real estate loan, and a lot of cities have not reported 
their bank account information. 
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concentration of neighbor states measured by Gini values change annually. 
 
Figure A2 shows that by loan values, the Gini coefficients reflect a relative high level 
of concentration, where the values fall within a narrow band of 0.965 to 0.940. In 
comparison, the Gini coefficients by total asset value of between 0.72 and 0.925 
reflect a weaker concentration relative the loan value Gini coefficients. The two Gini 
coefficient series move in an opposite direction during the pre-crisis periods from 
2002 to 2006. By loan size, the market shares of banks were diluted over the periods; 
but more big banks with larger total asset value emerged during the same periods. 
Empirical studies use the Gini coefficient by loan value from bank income statement. 
Figure A. 2: Concentrations of Bank Service in U.S. Market 
 
Note: This figure shows the histogram of Gini coefficient values based on total national 
bank reporting sample from Wharton, measuring the concentrations of bank service in 
U.S. market in general sense for each year from 1999 to 2008. The left histogram is using 
real estate loan amount of individual banks to gain its inequality level (GiniLoan); while 
the right side one is using total asset value (debt + equity) of individual banks to gain the 
inequality level (GiniTotalAsset). The value is quite close to 1 (high inequality), indicating 
high concentration in banks and real estate loan service, even though the trend of general 
bank service concentration is different from that of loan service concentration through 
years. In the later parts, the Gini coefficient based on the loan amount in bank reporting 





3) H-statistics for Bank Competiveness 
The use of H-statistic (Panzar and Rosse 1982; Panzar and Rosse 1987; Rosse and 
Panzar 1977) as a measure of contestability and competitiveness in the banking 
market has been widely adopted in the banking literature (Bikker and Spierdijk 2008; 
Bikker, Spierdijk and Finnie 2007; Claessens and Laeven 2004; Yildirim and 
Mohanty 2010). With the state-level bank data in the US, log-version of the 




0 1 2 3ln ln ln lnF PE PCE                       (A2) 
 
Unlike Bikker, Spierdijk, Finnie (2007) that use the first differences for the 
variables, the absolute (level) values for the total interest income
56
  ; annual 
expense on funds F ; personal expense PE ; and physical capital expense that 
include furniture, fixture, equipment and auto PCE , are used in the models. 
From Eq. (A2), the H-statistics at the state-level can be computed as the sum 




                                                             
55 The small bank sample at zip-code level restricts the estimation of the H-statistics at the zip-code 
level, and the MSA-level H-statistics are also less susceptible to estimation errors. 
56 The total observation number of from year 1999 and 2008 quarterly bank reporting is 347,355 
(excluding 17,259 missing explanatory variables, proportionally 4.97% missing). In average, there are 
about 7000 to 8000 banks reporting every year. Equation (3) is run for 560 times (56 states 10 years) to 
gain one H-statistics for each state in each year. Hence 4 quarter reports are also included in regressions, 
following the time series rules based on Finnie, Spierdijk et al. (2007). The resulted competiveness 
parameters “H-statistics” for each state are extremely stably around the value “1”, which shows highly 
competiveness by traditional interpretation. However as other control variables are not included for quite 
a mount of missing data, they are interpreted for comparing the relative competiveness. H-statistic is 
biased for territory such as AS (American Samoa), FM (Federated States of Micronesia), GU (Guam), 
and VI (Virgin Islands), as number of bank in these states is smaller than 30. 
57 The reasons to not follow the interpretation of Hstatistics of Bikker, Spierdijk, Finnie (2007), where 
they define monopoly and perfect cartel for  ≤   , monopolistic competition or oligopoly for 
 < 𝐻 < 1, perfect competition for  = 1, are 1) the definition of H=1 criteria to market structure are 
based on cross-elasticity, instead of cost-return elasticity. 2) it is found that H-statistic value is affected 
by including different control variables. 
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1 2 3H                                      (A3) 
 
Higher   parameters will result in higher H-statistic value. High H-statistic 
indicates that the banks are more likely to produce their total services at marginal 
costs. Hence, H-statistic increases with the bank‟s efficiency in its service operation 
in contestable sense. H-statistic could be interpreted as the state-year level efficiency, 
which is a proxy of contestability of the banking industry. 
 
This measurement follows the definition of contestability “if no price in that market 
can be in equilibrium when its magnitude is such as to enable an entrant to undercut 
it and nevertheless earn a profit”(Bailey and Baumol 1983), which actually stress the 
contestability is to ensuring “the lowest prices consistent with the financial viability 
of the firm”. 
 
Eq. (A2) are run using yearly data for a sample of 50 US states and 6 other territories 
/ islands (that are American Samoa (AS), Federated States of Micronesia (FM), Guam 
(GU), Puerto Rico (PR), Rhode Island (RI) and Virgin Islands (VI)), and repeat the 
estimates on yearly basis for the periods 1999-2009. The results as in Figure A3 show 
that the state-level bank efficiency decreases for the pre-subprime crisis periods from 
2001 to 2006 admit increases in the number of loans originated. After 2006, it shows 





Figure A. 3: Mean of State-level H-statistic and the Number of Loans through year 
 
Note: The figure shows the State-level H-statistic through year. Higher H-statistic means 
high bank’s efficiency in its service operation in a contestable state level submarket. The 
right side vertical line is the total number of loans that originated at the specific years. 
